Politics of Belonging: Identity, Integration, and Spatial Practices of Algerian Immigrants and Their Descendants in Paris, France by Nelson, Elizabeth
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Theses and Dissertations 
Spring 2021 
Politics of Belonging: Identity, Integration, and Spatial Practices of 
Algerian Immigrants and Their Descendants in Paris, France 
Elizabeth Nelson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd 
 Part of the Geography Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nelson, E.(2021). Politics of Belonging: Identity, Integration, and Spatial Practices of Algerian Immigrants 
and Their Descendants in Paris, France. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from 
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/6316 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
POLITICS OF BELONGING: IDENTITY, INTEGRATION, AND SPATIAL PRACTICES OF 






Bachelor of Arts 
University of Nebraska, 2002 
 
Master of Arts 




Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 




College of Arts and Sciences 
 






Caroline Nagel, Major Professor 
 
David Kneas, Committee Member 
 
Meredith DeBoom, Committee Member 
 
Michael Samers, Committee Member 
 
Tracey L. Weldon, Interim Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
ii 








 As with any work of this nature, life is bound to present a few distractions and 
obstacles along the way—the hurdles to graduate school and this research were 
significant and constant. So much so, that there were multiple occasions when it seemed 
as if everything conspired to prevent completion. Nevertheless, as evidenced by what you 
now read, I have succeeded. I certainly did not accomplish this alone. There were many 
who encouraged me to persevere and to continue. To those people, I owe much.  
 I would like to thank my dissertation committee members for their support and 
assistance, and the thoughtful and insightful feedback they provided—intellectually and 
practically—along the way. Their helpful comments and criticisms, as well as their 
encouragements to take my mind one step further, fundamentally contributed to the 
quality of this work. I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Caroline Nagel, who has 
demonstrated over and over her compassion, insight, and support; both her gentle and 
strong nudges, staunch encouragement, and judicious direction as well as her confidence 
in my work and my humanity have confirmed my belief that I came to the right advisor 
and the right program. David Kneas has shared with me the enjoyments of critical theory, 
shown me the warmth and kindness of a truly engaged human being, and provided both 
intellectual and moral support that helped me through graduate school. Michael Samers 
has worked with me to sharpen my mind and challenge me to think better; his intellectual 
rigor inspires me, and his diligence and acceptance require that I return his gifts to future 
students. Finally, Meredith DeBoom has provided the much-needed boost to morale as 
v 
the years of graduate school seemed to grind on; she showed deep, genuine, and generous 
engagement with my work by sharing her incisive mind, thoughtful advice, and generous 
friendship. I am grateful to each of my committee members for being so invested in my 
work, in me. I am also grateful to my former professors who fostered a strong academic 
and intellectual foundation, Dr. Martin Pasqualetti, Prof. Bob Lind, and Prof. Stan Dart.  
 I would like to extend a very special note of thank you to all the Algerians in Paris 
who opened up their hearts and lives to me, who agreed to spend their time with me by 
providing interviews and information for this project. None of this would have been 
possible without their trust and cooperation. I thank my host family in France, who 
welcomed me into their home during my fieldwork visits to France in 2016 and 2017 and 
on a trip to visit their family in Algeria in 2017. My host-mother spent hours passionately 
discussing the intricacies of life as an Algerian in France with me. I thank the family 
from the café in Paris, the original gatekeepers who sought only to assist me in this 
project. I am indebted to my hosts in Algeria, who opened their homes and themselves to 
me; they patiently met my many questions with generous and thoughtful discussion and 
supported my work on every level. I owe all of these people a profound debt that only a 
lifelong friendship can repay, I am deeply grateful.  
 For the everyday angels that carried me through difficult times and seemingly 
impossible barriers to success, I am eternally grateful. To my H.P. and the people and 
serenity that he brought into my life. I send gratitude to my parents, Pat and Mary Louise, 
for their steadfast encouragement and love, to my sister Michelle, who offered 
encouragement and editorial guidance at all hours, to Connie for giving me straight talk, 
to Amanda for believing in me, to April for getting me to write, to AVB for never closing 
vi 
the door, to Dr. P and his endless wisdom and support, to Jeff for teaching me to never 
give up, to Case and Kaelin for walking the sometimes thorny path of graduate school 
with me, to Chris for helping me with the ‘impossible’ map of Paris, to Annie for being 
the best substitute classmate I could ask for—to all of you, the best of friends in this 
adventure through academia and everything else, I thank you! 
Financial support for travel and research was key to making the project feasible. 
For that, I thank the Walker Institute and the Islamic World Studies program at the 
University of South Carolina for multiple grants. I am grateful to the Department of 
Geography for support through research and teaching assistantships.  
vii 
ABSTRACT
 Using a geographic framework, this dissertation explores how Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants perform identity and negotiate belonging in French 
society. Bringing together critical theorizations of race, identity, space, and place, this 
work investigates what it means to be a racialized minority in a postcolonial context and 
to learn and experience the boundaries of ‘Frenchness.’ It is based on the narratives of 
Algerian immigrants who have migrated to Paris, France, and their French-born children. 
The empirical evidence of the case studies highlights the myriad ways in which Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants encounter and structure their interactions with French 
society, and the many geographic contexts that influence where these interactions unfold.  
By highlighting the postcolonial influence, this dissertation situates integration in a 
broader historical and geographical context, examining how ‘belonging’ becomes a 
matter of contention in receiving contexts marked by post-colonial anxiety.   The 
objective of this research is to understand integration not as an organic process of 
adaptation, but as a form of politics that plays out in the spaces of everyday life.  This 
research moves beyond traditional preoccupations with immigrant clustering to consider 
the less visible ways that migrants move in and out of spaces, accommodating or 
subverting dominant norms and finding or creating spaces of belonging for themselves. 
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“I do not label myself in the same way in all situations. For example, I would 
insist on my Algerian roots if I am in a French context for three reasons. First, 
because I know that racism and contempt are very important in France and I want 
people to associate my academic and professional success with my [Algerian] 
roots. Second, because I know that the French nation that I admire (the 1960s 
France, where culture and republicanism were very important) is mythical and 
does not exist anymore—therefore I consider myself French in the sense that I 
want to belong to the community of philosophers and writers, but not in the sense 
that I have a common interest with all of my compatriots. Let’s say that I feel 
“Frenchness” as an esthetic demand, never reachable, and as a consequence, I 
prefer to modestly highlight my Algerian origins. Third, because since my 
father’s death, I feel like I am required not to forget him and his [Algerian] 
origins.” 
    - Abdel, 25-year-old son of Algerian immigrants 
 
 Abdel’s narrative about identity and belonging illustrates the complicated reality 
of identity and the tangled relationships that migrants and their children have with places. 
Abdel’s sense of self is bound up with multiple places and with the difficult histories that 
bind them together. Migrants are often described as living between two different worlds, 
but in this case, the ‘worlds’ in question are not entirely separate. France and Algeria are 
not simply connected; rather, they have come to define each other over the course of 
nearly two centuries. In articulating who he is and where he is, Abdel refers to the 
‘mythical aspect’ of French republicanism, the persistence of racism in French society, 
and a familial loyalty to Algeria. We can see in his statement some of the ways that 
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people of Algerian origin engage with identity categories and find a sense of belonging in 
a sometimes-hostile context. In this example, Abdel mentions membership in different 
communities and polities, recognizing the terms and conditions associated with each. He 
outlines the boundaries of identities and communities, but then moves between them and 
muddles them.  
This dissertation focuses on Algerian-origin communities in France, examining 
how integration occurs in receiving contexts marked by anxiety and hostility toward 
immigrants. Integration is a key concept in the social sciences, and it frequently appears 
as a ‘problem’ to be solved by policy interventions. Since the early 20th century, the 
concept of integration has referred to a process of adaptation, adjustment, and 
acculturation, whereby immigrants become part of ‘mainstream,’ national society 
(Castles, et. al, 2014). The concept of integration (more commonly referred to as 
‘assimilation’ in U.S. literature) suggests that immigrants are absorbed into a host-society 
over successive generations in ways that render their behavioral patterns and identities 
indistinguishable from the majority group (Alba and Nee, 2003). The fundamental 
concern of scholarly and political discourse on integration has been the extent to which 
immigrants are ‘succeeding’ in disappearing as distinct socio-cultural entities—as ethnic 
colonies or clusters. This ‘success’ has typically been assessed and measured vis-à-vis 
indicators such as educational attainment, language acquisition, employment, 
intermarriage, naturalization, civic participation, and residential location (Crenshaw et al., 
1996; Nagel, 2009). 
Scholars have often misrepresented integration scholarship as supposing an 
inevitable march toward societal homogeneity. In fact, canonical accounts of integration 
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have often described the process of integration as multidimensional and incomplete, 
whereby a group can be incorporated into the mainstream in certain respects and to 
certain degrees, but not others (Gordon, 1964). But even the most subtle analyses take as 
given that there is an endpoint of integration, however difficult it is to achieve. This 
endpoint is absorption into a national host society, the boundaries of which are clearly 
defined and relatively static. This acceptance of a national host society as a natural unit of 
analysis has been heavily critiqued, and critics have often accused integration scholarship 
of playing into nationalist-assimilationist ideologies. In response, scholars in recent 
decades have sought to separate integration research from a political agenda of enforcing 
conformity among immigrants to a national norm (Alba and Nee, 2003). Yet the effort to 
measure migrants against a benchmark of ‘mainstream’ society is inevitably freighted 
with ideological meanings and assumptions.  
In France, discussions of integration have revolved around the notion of ‘failure’ 
of immigrants from North Africa (and their descendants) to assimilate into French society 
(Silverman, 1992). This interpretation of failed assimilation effectively places Algerian-
origin individuals—even those who are French citizens and born in France—as ‘internal 
outsiders’ (Costelloe, 2015; Driggers, 2018). In discussing ‘failed’ integration, most 
commentators and politicians put the blame on people of Algerian descent—failed 
integration, in other words, is a matter of the unwillingness of Algerian-origin people to 
shed their ‘homeland’ identities, particularly religious (i.e., Muslim) identities. In this 
sense, France’s assimilation discourse revolves less around the “spread of French 
customs” than on “the rejection of the cultural values and practices of migrants” 
(Sánchez, 2019, p. 1).  
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My work builds on the foundation laid by French critical scholarship on 
postcolonialism and migration. This includes Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and 
Sandrine Lemaire’s (2005) analysis of the contemporary extensions of colonial 
representation and the mechanisms that structure the relationship between colonized and 
colonizer. Their work describes the socio-spatial exclusion of postcolonial immigrants in 
France in terms of “a historical amalgamation of conscious and unconscious 
administrative and social practices that have been at work since the process of colonial 
independence got underway…and that are to be found in migration and urban policies in 
[modern] France” (2005, p. 2). French scholar Silyane Larcher’s (2015) work furthers 
this understanding of the ‘conscious and unconscious’ aspects of French society by 
directly addressing the power relations and social outcomes involved in systemic racism 
in France, tying the “racial issue” to French colonial history (p. 213). Abdellali Hajjat’s 
(2012) work identifies Islam to “constitute so many borders to the so-called ‘national 
identity’” (p. 1). These perspectives from French scholarship highlight the myriad 
connections between immigration, ‘race,’ postcoloniality, and integration within modern 
thought. 
This dissertation elaborates on existing critiques of integration scholarship, but it 
also attempts to salvage the concept and to offer a critical reading of integration that 
focuses equally on dominant and subordinate groups and their mutual, if somewhat 
antagonistic, production of ‘integration.’ I am concerned, first, with how dominant 
groups understand their own cultural values and the cultural values of racialized others. 
Focusing on the case of France, this dissertation scrutinizes the subjective judgments 
hidden beneath universalistic republican language and examines the structural 
5 
impediments and unrealistic expectations imposed upon immigrant groups. ‘French 
society,’ I will demonstrate, is a product of constant gatekeeping on the part of dominant 
groups—gatekeeping that politically and socially marginalizes and excludes immigrant 
groups. Second, the critical approach developed in this dissertation sheds light on 
immigrants themselves and their experiences of exclusion or partial inclusion. It asks 
how they and their descendants engage with the social constructs created by dominant 
groups—how they might conform to them or subvert them. This perspective overall 
views integration not as mere adaptation, but as a political relationship that works 
through discourses of difference and practices of social subordination. The focus of 
attention becomes the constant reconfiguration and negotiation of group identities across 
historical and present-day contexts and spaces. The politics of integration involves the 
policing, production, and re-working of socio-spatial boundaries to include certain types 
of people, but not others, within the national community.  
This research thus asks:   How do Algerian immigrants and their children enact 
identity and belonging in French society? How do they navigate systems of racialized 
exclusion within the context of a postcolonial history and society? What are the 
particular fields of political discourse and practice that become meaningful to 
integration politics in republican France? How do different groups of people imprint 
their identities on urban space and experience belonging and exclusion through urban 
space?  




Contexts of Belonging in Contemporary France 
A key argument of this dissertation is that the politics of integration in France and 
in other former metropole societies must be situated in a historical context of European 
imperialism. Though France officially ended its imperial rule over Algeria in 1962, the 
notion of ‘empire’ remains indelibly imprinted on relationships between France and its 
Algerian-origin communities. These (post)colonial relationships are not static but are 
constantly evolving. In Algeria, for instance, postcolonial political instability encouraged 
the rise of an Islamist political movement which, in turn, led to French intervention and a 
deepening of hostilities toward France. France, in turn, experienced its own ‘imperial 
hangover’ with the migration of hundreds of thousands of former colonial subjects to the 
former metropole (along with hundreds of thousands of European colonists, known as 
pied noirs) in the two decades after Algerian independence. In 2018, France was home to 
over 6.5 million immigrants, equal to 9.7 percent of the population, and many politicians 
(including those aligned with the far right) perceive immigration to be an intractable 
problem (INSEE, 2020; Benaissa, 2021). 
In France, immigration has been perennially politicized through highly publicized 
events like the ‘headscarf affair’ of the late 1980s, the ‘Sans-Papiers’ case in 1996, the 
2005 uprisings by immigrant youth against the police that struck major French cities, the 
renewal of the headscarf debates in the early 2000s, the Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks 
in 2015, the Nice Bastille Day attack in 2016, the Strasbourg Christmas market attack in 
2018, the Lyon bombing in May 2019, and, most recently, the 2020 beheading of a 
teacher who showed cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in a suburb north of Paris 
(Gatehouse, 2018; Williamson, 2020; Onishi and Méheut, 2020).  
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The problem of terrorism in France is real. Since the beginning of 2015, there 
have been 36 incidents of terrorism on French soil, totaling 252 killed and 943 wounded 
(Gatehouse, 2018; Breeden, 2019; Onishi and Méheut, 2020; Erlanger, 2020). But these 
recent dramatic events have allowed the French state to continue its framing of 
immigration as a cultural problem; terrorism, along with the appearance of the headscarf 
(treated as an epiphenomenon of Islamic radicalism), have come to signify the failure of 
immigrants to embrace French values. Postcolonial immigrants thus have come to 
symbolize the ultimate figure of strangeness and alterity—the Other who does not belong 
and who is a threat to national cohesion. Tellingly, the French-born children of Maghrebi 
immigrants are “still routinely (and unrealistically) imagined as ‘first’ generation” 
(Rosello, 2001, p. 89). To be sure, plenty of attention is given to the material conditions 
of Maghrebian immigrants and their families and the poor living conditions found in the 
immigrant-dominated banlieues1; yet this attention serves to reinforce the main narrative 
of immigrant deviance, rather than to compel a deeper reckoning with high 
unemployment, economic insecurity, social exclusion, and persistent discrimination in 
the labor market.    
The French government and society continuously draw “a line between ‘them’ 
and ‘us’: that is, between those they deem unworthy of, or unable to access, ‘Frenchness,’ 
and those who are seen as properly ‘French’ and ‘Republican’” (Tchumkam, 2015, p. 1). 
These practices of social bordering are inflected with republican concepts and 
sensibilities. French republicanism is against separation of people based on their social, 
 
1 The term ‘banlieue’ can be directly translated to ‘suburb’ in English. However, the term 
in French holds very heavy connotations of poverty, crime, immigration, and violence. A 
more appropriate interpretation of the term is ‘immigrant ghetto.’ 
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political, and intellectual views. Further, republican ideology posits that “living together 
in a society requires agreement on basic values” such that “citizens must all subscribe to 
the same values in the public sphere” (Bowen, 2007, pp. 11, 157). Public space, 
therefore, is shared space, where general interests and common ideals are valued over and 
above individual interests and diversity—an interpretation that places clear constraints on 
acceptable conduct and expression within that space (Bowen, 2007).  
The French concept of secularism, laïcité, has been especially important in 
constructing Frenchness and in creating a public sphere (and public spaces) that exclude 
people of Algerian origin. Laïcité is “a curious term with no satisfactory English 
translation…a relative neologism in the French language” that has emerged from 
centuries of contestation between the French state and organized religions (Lizotte, 2020, 
p. 1). This form of secularism is commonly explained as a principle of the republican 
social pact, and it continues to be a consistent object of political struggle (Bowen, 2007; 
Roy, 2007; Thomas, 2006; Lizotte, 2020; Selby, 2011; Benaissa, 2021).  
Understood broadly, laïcité refers to the state’s respect for the liberty of 
conscience and the non-interference of the state in religious matters. While it speaks to 
neutrality, it also insists on the creation and separation between public and private 
spheres. In recent decades, the concept has been used as a tool to discipline and punish 
people of immigrant origin who are visibly pious. This was seen most notably with the 
2004 ban on the hijab in public schools. More recently, in the wake of a terror attack, 
laïcité was again invoked to signal France’s “renewed fight against radicalism and 
challenges to the nation’s secular ideals” (Onishi and Méheut, 2020, p. 1). The French 
state, then, places Muslims and Islam at the center of its national self-ideation via laïcité. 
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It becomes crucial in this context to place religion alongside race, class, and gender in 
exploring the experiences of Algerian-origin people in France, regardless of individuals’ 
actual level of religiosity (Lalonde, 2018). 
While this context of colonialism, postcolonial immigration, and secularist 
republican ideology is crucial to understanding the politics of integration in France, there 
is also a need to look beyond the colonial and postcolonial drama to consider how 
immigrants themselves, in their day-to-day lives, negotiate membership in France, as well 
as in Algeria. The narratives of my research participants that I present in this dissertation 
provide insights into the socio-spatial practices whereby immigrants and their children 
conform with, challenge, re-work, or undermine French identities and attempt to shape 
and reshape the meaning of ‘Algerian’ in France. This dissertation examines how people 
of immigrant origin participate in the politics of integration—how they interpret culture 
and place and how they assert belonging and membership through their place-based 
behaviors and interactions. This dissertation goes well beyond traditional preoccupations 
with immigrant residential ‘clustering’ to explore the meanings that people find within 
certain places and how their movements through these places becomes part of their 
performance of membership and belonging. 
About the Study 
To investigate the research questions for this dissertation, I conducted intensive 
interviews with members of the Algerian-origin community in Paris. For the purposes of 
this research, Algerian-origin communities include first-generation immigrants from 
Algeria and their children born either in Algeria or in France (second-generation). At 
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times, I refer in general terms to the ‘Algerian community,’ but it is important to 
emphasize the generational, ethno-linguistic, and class differences within this group. 
The French state does not officially collect census data according to ‘race’ or 
religion owing to the republican commitment to universalism and its aversion to 
‘communalism’—an aversion that stems partly from the Vichy regime’s registration of 
Jews during World War II (Hargreaves, 1995). But the state does collect information by 
place of birth. According to the Institut national d'études démographiques (The National 
Institute for Demographic Studies, INED), there were 845,000 Algerian immigrants in 
France in 2018 (INED, 2020). Algerians represent the largest immigrant population in 
France, totaling 13 percent of all immigrants in France (the second largest group of 
immigrants is from Morocco with 11.9 percent) (INED, 2020). In 2011, there were an 
estimated 4.6 million people of Maghrebi origin (with at least one Maghrebi grandparent 
from Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia) living in France (up from an estimated 3 million in 
1999) (Tribalat, 2015, pp. 1-2). Between 2006 and 2008, an estimated 16 percent of 
newborns in France had at least one Maghrebi grandparent (Breuil-Genier, Borrel, and 
Lhommeau, 2011, p. 33). This population is not evenly distributed across the country. As 
in many immigrant-receiving societies, Maghrebi immigrants and their children are 
highly concentrated in certain districts within certain cities. In 2005, Maghrebi-origin 
young people under the age of 18 constituted about 7 percent of the population of 
Metropolitan France, 12 percent in Île-de-France, 22 percent in the department of Seine-
Saint-Denis, and 37 percent in 18th arrondissement of Paris (Tribalat, 2009, p. 436). 
While the site of Paris and the surrounding area provided ample access to a population of 
Algerian immigrants and their descendants, I chose the site of Paris because I had 
11 
established connections with respected members of the Algerian community during a 
previous stay in Paris (unrelated to this research).  
I conducted formal, semi-structured interviews in the summers of 2016 and 2017 
with members of the Algerian-origin community from a variety of class backgrounds, 
ethnicities (i.e., Arab and Berber), generations, and cohort groups. As detailed in Chapter 
Three, I used snowball recruitment to build a pool of 73 research participants. I had 
informal conversations with many others, as interviews were conducted in homes, cafes, 
restaurants, and other social spaces where friends and family members of my 
interviewees were often present. I used a series of semi-structured questions to uncover 
how immigrants and their children articulate their identities, how they describe their 
family history, how they position themselves in social categories, how they interpret and 
interact with different ‘communities,’ and how they go about their daily business in the 
spaces of Paris. My goal was to reveal the linkages between identity and everyday socio-
spatial activities and behaviors, and to explore how people draw upon both historical and 
present-day experiences to articulate their sense of membership and belonging.   
In some respects, this use of qualitative methods represents a return to the earliest 
years of ‘assimilation’ scholarship, when Chicago School scholars, many of them 
immigrants or the children of immigrants themselves, conducted in-depth, ethnographic 
studies of immigrant families and communities. This dissertation has sought to capture 
the richness of those early studies while interpreting empirical findings in a critical 
framework that interrogates the constant production of meanings around race, nationality, 
religion, and other modes of social belonging and exclusion. This dissertation has also 
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sought to engage more explicitly with place and space and to consider how immigrants 
and their children engage with different kinds of spaces in the course of everyday life.  
The Arguments 
While the overarching categories of ‘immigrant’ and ‘Algerian’ are very 
meaningful to my study respondents, my respondents are not a homogeneous group either 
in terms of their backgrounds or in terms of the ways they articulate their identities and 
relate to specific socio-spatial contexts. In their varying engagements with discourses and 
forms of belonging and exclusion, they both reinforce and blur the central French-
Algerian binary. Their social geographies—the places they frequent and avoid, their 
perceptions of and attitudes toward different places and the people in them—reflect their 
different understandings of belonging and exclusion, self and other.   
While my aim is to capture a range of behaviors, identities, and experiences, I do 
identify some patterns and similarities in the responses, and I do attempt to draw some 
linkages between generation, legal and class/educational status, and identities, attitudes, 
and actions. These are always tentative, and I make no deterministic claims about cause 
and effect. The analysis of my empirical findings points to the following 
conceptual/theoretical points:  
(1) My respondents learn what it means to be ‘French’ and ‘Algerian’ through 
everyday actions and encounters; ‘integration’ for them involves negotiating a 
social position vis-à-vis Frenchness and Algerianness. This negotiation involves a 
creative interplay of identity whereby respondents qualify, reformulate, subvert, 
discard, and/or rework identities and the meanings attached to them. Practices of 
being French and/or Algerian both reinforce and destabilize these categories. 
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Respondents draw upon stereotypes and essentialized notions of ‘community,’ but 
they can also view themselves in more hybrid terms or position themselves in the 
interstices of these broad categories. This finding, in the first instance, indicates 
the need to interrogate and take apart the two key social units—immigrant group 
and host society—that are at the core of most research on immigrant integration. 
(2) The politics of integration are rooted in historical dynamics, but the meaning and 
relevance of ‘history’ changes. This dissertation shows how colonial memory and 
postcolonial dynamics permeate the everyday lives and encounters of Algerian-
origin people in France and inform the ways they conceive of, and experience, 
social membership and belonging. Entering the national community of France 
requires mastery of the attributes, habits, dispositions, and mores of French 
society and culture, as defined by the French political elite. Some of my 
respondents are able, willing, and even desirous to do this; for some, being 
‘French’ comes somewhat ‘naturally.’ But for others, French ‘culture’ is a 
constant affront, one that they might resist (for instance, by creating alternative 
spaces of community), even as they conform to its strictures in certain contexts. 
This analysis highlights the political, rather than simply adaptational, nature of 
integration. Integration does not have any clear trajectory or end point; instead, it 
continuously unfolds, altering the significance of historical relationships.  
(3) Religion and citizenship are two key social fields in which my respondents 
negotiate belonging. Religion is not a black-and-white condition: people practice 
faith in various ways, and they may also reject spiritual belief while treating 
religion as a cultural identity. Likewise, citizenship is not a simple matter of being 
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‘legal’ or ‘illegal’: citizenship involves a whole range of claims about rights, 
obligation, loyalty, and membership vis-à-vis one, two, or more polities. This 
dissertation explores how Algerian-origin people engage with these social fields 
and how they imagine and practice integration in relation to them. The findings 
show how French secularist ideology (laïcité) is meant to privatize religion, yet, 
in fact, it politicizes religion by making it the object of public discussion and 
deliberation. The findings also highlight how people conceive of citizenship as 
encompassing different dimensions, and how this dimensionality allows people to 
conceive of themselves as at least partial members of two (or more) polities.   
(4) Traditional discussions of integration have usually fixated on residential patterns 
(in both academic and political arenas). In contrast, I argue for a more fluid 
approach to identity and place. While there are certainly immigrant ‘clusters’ in 
Paris and the surrounding area, not all immigrants live in these clusters, and the 
existence of these clusters must be viewed in a broader metropolitan context of 
social/class/racial difference and inequality. Immigrant neighborhoods in the 
Parisian suburbs are an important touchpoint for discussions of identity and social 
membership, but my respondents have relationships with many different kinds of 
places, and they move in and out of places over the course of the day or week. 
Rather than emphasizing the singular importance of the banlieues as an 
‘immigrant’ space and/or a space of non-integration, this dissertation explores the 
multiple meanings attached to the banlieues and the very different ways that study 
respondents relate to the city overall. The point here is that the politics of 
integration unfold across city spaces and involve sometimes subtle adjustments in 
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comportment to establish sameness (or to avoid being seen as different). 
Integration involves intentional responses to places and the meanings embedded, 
whether through avoidance or through the practice of appropriate behaviors.    
This research overall suggests that integration is less a pathway of adaptation than a 
politics of negotiating identities, membership, and belonging in place. It advocates a 
more critical approach that understands integration “not only as a pattern of sameness but 
as a relational process of making sameness” (Nagel, 2009, p. 401). For people of 
Algerian origin in France, this politics is shaped by present-day experiences and by the 
colonial past; it relies upon stark binaries of identity and difference, but it also disrupts 
these binaries, creating new openings and new closures that can be seen and felt within 
neighborhoods and across Paris. Algerian-origin individuals have little choice but to 
define who they are in relation to the unmarked French polity; in this sense, they are 
subordinate participants in a contentious co-production of difference and sameness—a 
process through which the boundaries of self and other are defined and redefined. Still, 
we cannot dismiss the agency they exercise in positioning themselves within social 
categories and the ‘communities’ they represent.  
This study is geographical at different levels: it considers the complex 
geographies of colonialism and the ways these geographies are still taking shape today; it 
highlights the importance of spatial isolation and exclusion in the formation of identities 
and experiences, but it also emphasizes people’s movements through space and their 
negotiations of place-based identities. This work also touches on the significance of 
people’s transnational connections with Algeria, emphasizing that such relationships can 
be just as ambiguous as people’s relationships with France.  
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Organization of this Dissertation 
 I begin this dissertation by creating a conceptual framework for integration that 
moves away from traditional, ecological conceptions of adaptation. My framework, 
presented in Chapter Two, critically engages with mainstream literature on integration 
and builds an alternative understanding of integration by drawing upon postcolonial and 
critical race theory, theories of identity and belonging, and critical-geographical 
theorizations of space and place. This review of the literature shapes the theoretical 
framework that guides the analysis of this empirical research.  
 An overview of the methodology of this research is presented in Chapter Three. 
This chapter outlines the qualitative methods used to gather and analyze the data 
collected during fieldwork including the methods used to identify and recruit study 
participants and conduct interviews. This chapter also deals with researcher reflexivity 
and power dynamics involved in interview data collection, and how these relationships 
can influence qualitative data collection and analysis.  
 Chapter Four focuses on the historical relationship between France and Algeria 
and the ways this relationship continues to shape the lives of Algerian-origin people in 
France. This chapter explains how French imperialism, despite its sense of engaging in a 
so-called ‘civilizing mission,’ conceived of the indigenous Algerian population as 
fundamentally incapable of being French. This chapter traces the experience and 
development of immigration of Algerians to France and their social, political, and spatial 
marginalization in French society. 
 Chapters Five, Six, and Seven draw on interviews to investigate the ways that 
Algerians in France articulate their identities, conceptualize belonging, and interact with 
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the spaces and places of Paris, France. Chapter Five begins by analyzing immigrant 
identities, as they function along prescriptions of ‘Frenchness’ and ‘Algerianness.’ Here, 
I pay special attention to the postcolonial aspect of Algerian identity via iterations of 
oppression, revolution, and victory. Chapter Six examines how the French state, and my 
respondents articulate belonging through religion and citizenship, and how my 
respondents’ identities and actions both support and subvert secularism and republican 
models of citizenship. This chapter explores the connection between present day 
discourses of membership and the colonial past, while also showing how my 
respondents’ identities and social practices are formed in relation to present-day 
experiences. Finally, Chapter Seven expands the analysis by observing a wide range of 
social behaviors and interactions in spaces and places, and how they tie into the 
integration experiences of Algerians in France. This chapter shows the connectedness of 
urban space to performances of identity and citizenship practices. I highlight how some 
of my participants view the banlieues as spaces of comfort and cultural authenticity, 
while others view them as undesirable spaces or even spaces of foreignness; I also 
highlight how my respondents variably seek out, avoid, or modify their behavior in 
French-coded public spaces.  
A concluding chapter summarizes these arguments and draws out main lessons 
from this study for our understandings of identities, integration, and the geographies of 
immigrant incorporation into host-society contexts. Together, these chapters argue that 
immigrant integration is constituted through everyday practices and is connected to 
contentious histories of nation- and empire-building. For Algerian-origin individuals in 
France, the immigrant experience cannot be disentangled from France’s colonization of 
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Algeria. But the significance of the colonial experience varies across the Algerian-origin 
community. The postcolonial legacy, in other words, is not monolithic or static. 
Intersectional analysis provides a helpful framework for considering differences that exist 
within Algerian-origin communities, though my analysis indicates that relationships 
between class, generation, religiosity, and other axes of difference are not entirely 
straightforward. Integration, as I explain it, is heterogeneous and contingent upon the 
varied situations and standpoints—it is not a measurable or coherent set of actions. 
Individuals of Algerian descent are practicing ‘integration’ in France through their day-
to-day actions and in their encounters and interactions with different people and places. 
The concluding chapter of this dissertation draws out the main lessons from this research 
for our understandings of identities, belonging, integration, and it looks forward to the 
ways that geographers can continue to change the terms of debate about the ‘problem’ of 




This research analyzes integration politics in France and notions of identity, 
belonging, and place among Algerian-origin people in France. While traditional 
approaches to immigrant incorporation—that is, how newcomers become more like a pre-
existing ‘host-society’—address some of the parameters of immigrant integration, they 
do not adequately consider the constant production (and re-production) of the host-
society and of immigrant ‘minorities.’ I argue that the categories of host-society and 
immigrant group cannot be taken as givens. Rather, they are constantly in the process of 
being created. This work advances this dynamic approach to the formation of social 
categories in geographically complex contexts that include (but are not limited to) the 
receiving society and the sending society. I approach assimilation and integration as 
processes of negotiation between dominant and subordinate groups that involve the re-
working of socio-spatial boundaries to include certain types of people, but not others, 
within the national community. Thus, the parameters of immigrant incorporation are 
defined by acts of differentiation that marginalize and exclude certain individuals while 
including others.  
 Algerian immigrants and their descendants living in France occupy multiple 
socio-political positions that are rooted in multiple historical and geographic contexts. 
Discourses and hierarchies relating to immigration, (post)colonial relationships, and race 
circulate through and structure individuals’ everyday experiences in France. Questions of 
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integration, identity, and belonging intersect constantly with postcolonial and racial 
discourses. Rather than following a single trajectory of integration, Algerian immigrants 
and their descendants negotiate diverse and shifting conceptions of social membership 
and belonging in France. This dissertation presents a discussion of the varying discourses 
of national belonging that circulate in French society, the spatial and institutional settings 
in which people encounter these discourses, and the ways in which diverse, intersectional 
experiences shape people’s understandings and expressions of identity and belonging. 
The discussion aims to expand ideas of what happens when ‘foreigners’ join a ‘national 
society’ by focusing on the formulation and reformulation of societal membership. 
 Academic studies of immigrant incorporation implicitly focus on the moment of 
encounter between host-society and arriving newcomer and follow the trajectory of 
immigrant incorporation from the point of arrival. But the postcolonial relationship 
between France and Algeria requires that any treatment of immigrant incorporation must 
begin long before the moment of encounter and must consider the fraught colonial 
relationship between the two countries. The French colonization of Algeria (discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four) means that Algerian immigrants and their descendants speak the 
French language and recognize French cultural habits and norms. But many Algerian-
origin people also are marked for exclusion by their association with Islam, their use of 
Arabic and Berber languages, and their visible, racialized difference. Algerian 
immigrants and their children thus experience belonging and exclusion in complex ways; 
there is no single trajectory or path by which they ‘become French.’ Concepts of 
adaptation and acculturation are not to be entirely dismissed, but they must be viewed in 
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light of conflict and acts of accommodation between politically dominant and subordinate 
groups. 
 This literature review begins with an overview of mainstream assimilation and 
integration scholarship before turning to the more critical perspectives on intergroup 
dynamics offered by critical race theory and postcolonial studies. This literature review 
then turns to theories of identity and belonging, and of the ways ‘community’ is 
constituted within particular sites of encounter and experience. The key arguments that I 
wish to develop are: (1) that the dynamics of belonging unfold across a long temporal 
scale, not just in the immediate context of immigration or over a set number of 
generations; (2) that belonging is a political construct and not the endpoint of an 
ecological process of adaptation; and (3) that belonging is a fundamentally spatial process 
that operates translocally, connecting streets, neighborhoods, towns, cities, regions, and 
nation-states in an uneven landscape of personal and collective experiences. 
Integration, Assimilation, and Transnational Theory 
 Studies of immigrant experiences often begin with conceptions of ‘integration’ or 
‘assimilation’, and scholars across the social sciences routinely use these terms to 
describe and make sense of immigrants’ lives and experiences. While there has been 
much formal theorization of these terms, scholarly works can also make reference to 
assimilation and integration (or ‘incorporation’) in an off-handed or ‘commonsense’ way. 
Therefore, it is important to consider explicitly how the framework of 
assimilation/integration has shaped the way we think and talk about immigrants.  
The concept of integration, or assimilation, as devised by American sociologists 
and geographers starting in the early 20th century, has been conceived as a “process of 
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interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, 
sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups” with the outcome being their 
incorporation into a “common cultural life” (Park and Burgess, 1921, p. 735). Integration 
theories were originally developed through observations of European immigrant 
settlement in the United States, though they borrowed from theories of urbanization and 
modernization developed by Georg Simmel and other, mainly German, scholars. In these 
studies, integration2 involves the process by which immigrants become part of the 
‘mainstream’ of modern, urbanized American culture. This body of theory was pioneered 
by members of the Chicago School of Sociology, namely Robert Park and Ernest 
Burgess, who argued that there was a universally identifiable cycle of ‘race relations’ that 
immigrants passed through on their way to incorporation into an implicitly national 
‘mainstream.’ While initial contact through immigration or conquest might lead to 
violence and domination, dominant and subordinate groups would learn to coexist over 
time, with the smaller or weaker group adopting the language and customs of the larger 
group.  
The work of the Chicago School also outlined specific obstacles to assimilation, 
notably, racial prejudice and discrimination—and described assimilation as a process 
laden with conflict, especially between generations of immigrants. But despite 
recognizing such conflict, classic assimilation theory posited that immigrants and 
 
2 The terms integration and assimilation have been used and criticized in academic and 
public discourses. Integration is often viewed as a less-aggressive form of assimilation 
where an immigrant is incorporated into the host society without forced cultural 
homogenization, whereas assimilation demands immigrant sameness with the host 
society by abandoning cultural traits from the home-country. In this dissertation, I treat 
the concepts similarly as they are concerned with the extent to which immigrants come to 
resemble society at large. 
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majority groups would eventually converge and become more similar over time in mores, 
norms, characteristics, and behaviors (Brown and Bean, 2006). In short, immigrants 
residing in the host society for longer periods of time as well as members of later 
generations would, as a matter of course, exhibit more similarities with the majority 
group than newer arrivals (Brown and Bean, 2006).  
Assimilation “refers, above all, to long-term processes that have whittled away at 
the social foundations for ethnic distinctions” (Alba, 1995, p. 4). But this is not to say that 
scholars have not recognized a more heterogeneous set of outcomes. In the early 1960s, 
sociologist Milton Gordon advanced assimilation theory by postulating several stages that 
follow the acquisition of culture and language (Alba and Nee, 2003). Cultural 
assimilation (also called acculturation), or the immigrant’s adoption of the language and 
cultural patterns of the core group, is the first assimilation process to occur (Gordon, 
1964). Acculturation, Gordon argued, was virtually inevitable; ideally it would be 
followed by ‘structural assimilation,’ by which he meant acceptance into the host 
society’s social sphere, including clubs and institutions. Structural assimilation would 
involve close social relations with the host society, which would lead to large-scale 
intermarriage, ethnic identification with the host society and finally the ending of 
discrimination, prejudice, and value conflict (Gordon, 1964). But writing in the 1960s, 
Gordon did not see structural assimilation on the horizon. In his work, he outlined that 
the U.S. was a collection of three major subgroups—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. 
Each of the three groups held similar ways of life, but they did so within their own social 
milieu (Gordon, 1964). He also saw other subgroups—Black Americans, Puerto Ricans, 
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and others—who had acculturated to Anglo-Protestant norms, but who formed distinctive 
subcultures that were unlikely to fade over time.   
Sociologist Herbert Gans (1992) further complicated the straight-line assimilation 
model (i.e., ‘classic’ assimilation theory) with the ‘bumpy-line theory of ethnicity,’ which 
posited that assimilation is dynamic, that each subsequent generation of immigrants faces 
different and distinctive sets of difficulties relating to larger society, and that the 
resolution to these difficulties creates a distinctive pattern of acculturation (Gans, 1992; 
Alba and Nee, 1997). Gans (1992) also suggested a pattern of ‘second generation decline’ 
that challenged the ‘straight-line’ assimilation immigrant success story, whereby “a 
significant number of the children of poor immigrants, especially dark-skinned ones, 
might not obtain jobs in the mainstream economy” (p. 173). These children of 
immigrants do not share their parents’ willingness to take low-wage, long hours, ‘ethnic 
niche jobs,’ owing to a perceived change in their work and status expectations (as they 
compare/equate themselves with the majority culture) (Gans, 1992). This is an example 
of what Zhou (1997) later referred to as the ‘second generation revolt’ that involves the 
oppositional culture of the children of immigrants who feel excluded from mainstream 
society owing to institutional discrimination and segregation that leads to social isolation 
and deprivation.  
Sociologists Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1993) elaborated on Gans’ work, 
describing assimilation as a segmented process shaped by ethnicity, race, and income. 
Their segmented assimilation model explored differences among immigrants and status 
hierarchies within the ‘host society.’ Portes and Zhou theorized segmented assimilation 
as involving one of three outcomes: (1) increasing acculturation and parallel integration 
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into the white middle-class; (2) assimilation into the marginalized, non-white underclass; 
or (3) rapid economic advancement explicitly tied to the preservation of the immigrant 
community’s values and solidarity (1993, p. 82). Portes and Zhou connected these 
different outcomes to varying levels of social capital (interpersonal relationships of 
reciprocity and obligation within social groups that act as a resource for the group’s 
members) and human capital (individuals’ skills and credentials) that played heavily into 
the ‘assimilation outcome’ of migrants (1993). Segmented assimilation theorists have 
been keen to identify factors that might hinder upward mobility of the second generation 
(Portes and Zhou, 1993), and they have extended their analysis to understanding cultural 
dynamics within families that can ease or prevent assimilation. This research overall 
suggests that assimilation is not a unilinear path, rather, multiple adaptations are possible.  
Mainstream integration approaches have been critiqued from many angles, but at 
this point, I want to emphasize the near total focus of these approaches on the ‘host-
society’ and its ability to absorb ‘foreigners.’ Even as recent iterations of assimilation 
theory have offered a somewhat more complicated conception of the receiving context 
(for instance, by recognizing racial and class hierarchies within it), assimilation theorists 
have been overwhelmingly concerned with the ‘host society,’ treating it as a relatively 
static, if expandable, entity (in contrast to immigrants, who undergo change3). One 
important challenge to this host-society-centric view has come from the scholarship on 
transnationalism, which emerged in the 1990s to bring attention to the transnational ties 
that migrants maintain with their homelands. Whereas assimilation/integration 
 
3 Postcolonial studies critique this assumption—that colonists and settlers changed 
colonized peoples but themselves remained unchanged by their interactions with 
colonized people.  
26 
scholarship has been predicated on the notion of long-term settlement and the severing of 
ties between immigrants and their homelands, transnational theory suggests that 
immigrants are no longer severing their ties with their places of origin and are instead 
participating in dense ‘social fields’ that cross-cut boundaries. Guarnizo (1997) thus 
describes ‘transmigrants’ as forming a “continuous transterritorial social 
formation…evident in the incessant back and forth traveling and multidirectional 
exchanges of material and intangible resources and symbols between” home and host 
country (p. 281). This perspective shifts the focus of analysis from the host-society 
(country) to the enmeshment of migrant networks within broader processes of economic 
and cultural globalization (described sometimes as globalization ‘from above and below’) 
(Smith and Guarnizo, 1998).  
Scholars of transnationalism suggest that migrants may identify as members of 
multiple societies (home/host-society) leading to multifaceted cultural outcomes (Basch 
et al., 1994; Vertovec, 2001). Further, these scholars emphasize that those living in 
transnational social fields experience and negotiate multiple forms of power located in 
sending and host-society contexts (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). For some, 
transnationalism is a positive adaptation and form of resistance to oppressive economic 
and political environments (Glick Schiller, et al., 1992). Because immigrant populations 
often face new forms of poverty and racial oppression in host-societies, transnational 
scholars explain that the maintenance of a bond to their homeland through frequent 
communication, visits, and participation in hometown associations is a form of resistance 
to those oppressions and a means of exercising agency rather than passively adapting to 
conditions forced upon them. 
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While transnationalism avoids the tendency of assimilation theory to fixate on the 
absorption (or lack thereof) of immigrants into a monolithic national host society, 
transnational ideas have also tended to reproduce some of the same problems as 
assimilation theory, such as taking national identity (now including both the sending 
society and the host society) as paramount in the lives of immigrants. Thus, 
transnationalism perpetuates the assumption that immigrants are a priori members of 
national groups (e.g., sending countries, homelands), and it takes national boundaries and 
national identities for granted rather than making those the very categories as the object 
of inquiry. So, rather than challenging the binary host-society/immigrant dichotomy that 
has characterized mainstream approaches to assimilation and integration, 
transnationalism offers an image of migrants as permanently having one foot in two 
countries. Transnationalism thus does not depart entirely from the ‘old’ assimilation 
narrative. (As I describe below, geographers have worked to overcome some of the 
limitations of transnationalism by employing the concept of translocality, which de-
centers the nation-state and which highlights socio-spatial interconnectedness and 
simultaneity (Greiner and Sakdapolrak, 2013; Brickell and Datta, 2011; Castree, 2004; 
Verne, 2012)). 
This dissertation recognizes the importance of nationalism and nation-states as 
social-territorial entities in the lives of migrants and the places that receive migrants. But 
‘national society’ (like all socio-spatial categories) is neither static nor fixed but contested 
and always in the process of becoming. The idea of host societies and ethnic/minority 
groups as cohesive cultural units must be interrogated rather than taken as a given. This 
dissertation thus advocates a more critical approach that understands integration “not 
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only as a pattern of sameness but as a relational process of making sameness” (Nagel, 
2009, p. 401). Rather than a natural, taken-for-granted, and inevitable process of 
immigrant adaptation that can be measured through a standardized set of indicators, 
assimilation can be construed as an “uneven and contentious process by which 
immigrants and host societies negotiate the boundaries of social membership” (Nagel, 
2002, p. 982). To reiterate, the idea of ‘making sameness’ does not negate the importance 
of national imaginaries, but it takes the on-going construction of these imaginaries in 
particular contexts as the object of study (Leitner, 2012; Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006).  
This perspective shifts attention to the everyday, power-laden interactions through 
which individuals and groups debate, contest, challenge, and accommodate what counts 
as difference and sameness, especially as these become framed in terms of ‘race.’ While 
traditional integration studies have recognized the existence and persistence of 
discrimination and the continuation of racial identity and consciousness, they have 
generally not focused on the racialized structure of societies or on the ways in which 
dominant groups mark minority groups and their characteristics as racially proximate or 
distant vis-à-vis ‘the nation.’ Rather than simply a ‘complicating factor,’ race, from a 
critical perspective, is central to integration politics. Critical race theory, intersectionality, 
and postcolonial approaches have brought into focus the ongoing and indeterminate 
production of social hierarchies and disparities within historical and geographical 
contexts of Western colonialism and imperialism. These perspectives allow us to re-think 
integration as a political, not ecological, process that unfolds in the exchanges between 
dominate and subordinate groups.  
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Critical Race Theory and Intersectionality 
Critical Race Theory (CRT) has its roots in the fields of sociology, history, 
anthropology, philosophy, and politics and emerged as a formal body of scholarship in 
the mid-1970s (Mitchell and Stewart, 2013). The theory gained broad acceptance in the 
legal profession in the 1990s—specifically, Critical Legal Studies—with the goal of 
providing a critical analysis of race and racism from a distinctively legal point of view 
(Crenshaw et al., 1996). One of the key assumptions of CRT is that racism is more than 
just unconnected isolated acts by individuals, rather, racism is endemic to American 
society, entrenched within the legal, cultural, and psychological spheres (Mitchell and 
Stewart, 2013). The application of CRT has extended into many social science 
disciplines, including geography (Price, 2010; Domash, 2015; Esson and Last, 2019). 
Here, I engage CRT to understand power relations, media and discourse influences, 
citizenship practices, and intersectional identities as they pertain to the French context.  
CRT works to interrogate the ways of seeing, understanding, and thinking about the 
world that are based on racialized and colonial assumptions that are unremarked upon, 
normalized, and perpetuated (Domash, 2015).  
Critical race theory focuses on the reformulation of race and the embeddedness of 
racial formations within institutions and legal structures, drawing on ideas of ‘racial 
formation’ outlined by Omi and Winant (2015), among others. Omi and Winant 
understand race as “a way of ‘making up people’” and “race-making” as a process of 
defining groups of people as “Other” (2015, p. 105). Racial formation is “the 
sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and 
destroyed,” and race itself “is a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and 
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interests by referring to different types of human bodies” (Omi and Winant, 2015, p. 109-
110). In the case of the U.S., Omi and Winant (2015) assert that race is a master category, 
“a fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history, 
polity, economic structure, and culture of the United States” (p. 106). In short, inequality 
and difference in the U.S. have been built upon concepts of race (Omi and Winant, 2015). 
CRT scholars study the relationship between race, racism, and power in a way 
that departs from mainstream/traditional approaches to immigrant integration, which tend 
to treat race as a variable (or a characteristic that applies to particular migrants) rather 
than as an active process that operates across society (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). As 
outlined by Bell (1992), racism is ordinary, not aberrational, and dominant groups 
racialize different groups at different times, often in response to the shifting needs of the 
labor market. Critical race theory questions existing power structures that function to 
shore up white privilege and to perpetuate the marginalization of people of color through 
systemic, institutionalized racial inequalities (Crenshaw et al., 1996). White supremacy, 
or white cultural and political hegemony, is “authorized in different ways by 
governments, [and] has been a source of cultural integrity, political leverage, and 
economic gain for those imperial and white settler groups armed with the power of 
definition” (Anderson, 2000, p. 5). Dominant groups thus tend to disregard the tacit 
forms of racism embedded in the thoughts, discourses, and structures that they create 
(Delgado and Stefancic, 2012).  
 Critical race theory often focuses on the binary opposition of white versus black 
racial categories, especially in the U.S., but it can be applied across contexts to 
marginalized groups in order to understand the situations of structural racism, 
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subordination, and domination. Mathias Möschel (2011), for instance, offers that CRT 
can “problematize Europe’s widespread reluctance to frame issues in terms of race,” 
especially in France, where discussions of inequality flow from a color-blind ideology 
based on the premise that “races do not exist and that the legal language should not 
perpetuate the idea of their existence” (Möschel, 2011, p. 1651). In France race has been 
rendered invisible by state practices that forbid the recognition of race as a structural 
reality, even though Algerian immigrants and their descendants have experienced levels 
of segregation and discrimination similar to those experienced by African Americans in 
the US South (Begag, 2007). Such practices stem from republican ideologies that view 
any recognition of ethnic-cultural differences as undermining national, civic cohesion. 
Discussions of race in France presuppose a conflict between universalist French 
Republicanism and communitarianism (Möschel, 2011). According to Begag (2007), this 
willful invisibility of race is, in turn, linked to powerful discourses of liberalism 
predicated on ideas of 
individualism, which accords primacy to the individual over the group of which 
he or she is a member; meritocracy, which valorizes individual merit and talent in 
the competition for social goods; and universalism, according to which all 
individuals competing for such goods receive equal treatment (p. 96, emphasis in 
the original). 
Critical race theorists give particular attention to the construction of racialized identities 
and the reproduction of racial inequalities through public and media discourse (Mason, 
2017). The media, from this perspective, “serve as a hegemonic device for the purposes 
of securing, for the ruling class (and other dominant groups in society), a continued 
position of power and leadership” (Jay, 2003, p. 6). Racialized groups are commonly 
portrayed as “motivated in their conduct by naked impulse rather than rational 
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deliberation” and as “savage peoples…deemed either beyond, or potentially improved by, 
the cultivation of self-government” (Anderson, 2000, p. 3). In France, dehumanizing 
media portrayals of immigrants include the depiction of immigrant Others as “savages,” 
“wolves,” and “beasts,” reinforcing pervasive fears about minority groups (BBC, 2015; 
Crenshaw, 1995). Those groups with a vested interest in the perpetuation of racist 
attitudes present a fundamental impasse to immigrant inclusion (Jay, 2003). 
 Immigration and citizenship laws are also crucial to understanding racial 
formation and oppression. As Kevin Johnson (2004) notes, 
It is society, with the assistance of the law, that defines who is an ‘alien,’ an 
institutionalized ‘other,’ and who is not. It is a society, through [government], that 
determines which rights to afford ‘aliens.’ Like the social construction of race, 
which helps to legitimize racial subordination, the construction of the ‘alien’ has 
helped justify the limitation on non-citizen rights imposed by [the] legal 
system…alien terminology helps rationalize harsh, perhaps inhumane, treatment 
of persons from other countries (pp. 154; 268).  
 
The social construction of immigrant status “is not complete without policing and 
surveillance” (Romero, 2008, p. 28). The process of racial profiling is indicative that 
“citizenship status is inscribed on the body” (Romero, 2008, p. 28). So called “stop and 
frisk” police procedures in France require little more than “reasonable suspicion,” often 
merely a person’s physical appearance as “Algerian” or “Arab,” to request proof of 
citizenship4 (Welch and McGongale, 2013). Police aggression exemplifies the way 
racism is reproduced and reinforced during common, daily, normalized interactions 
between a racialized (minority) person and a person from the dominant group (Essed, 
1991). As Essed (1991) remarks, “When racist notions and actions infiltrate everyday life 
 
4 I offer an in-depth overview of policing and surveilling Algerians in France in Chapter 
Four.  
33 
and become part of the reproduction of the system, the system reproduces everyday 
racism” (p. 50). Critical race theory thus provides a framework for identifying and 
interpreting the structural conditions that produce ‘race’ and racial inequalities. Later in 
this literature review, I will discuss how geographers have applied these insights to 
conceptualizations of space and place. 
 Ideas of racial formation in recent decades have been complicated by an 
intersectional analysis that views individuals as positioned within multiple identity 
categories and as embodying privileges and oppressions associated with each of these 
categories. Intersectionality, then, rejects the concept of a unified, individual subject and 
instead acknowledges the layered positionalities and multi-dimensional relations involved 
in identity formation (Hopkins and Noble, 2009). This approach looks beyond racist 
oppression to consider how immigrants negotiate membership, and it interrogates how 
the process of “becoming” involves a negotiation of multiple signifiers of difference. 
This approach works to understand how immigrants negotiate belonging and position 
themselves in complex (racialized, but also gendered, sexualized, nationalized, and class-
based) hierarchies and systems of structural oppression. In doing so, it draws on Said's 
(1978) ideas of the Other—an individual or group with conflicting beliefs, values, and 
aspirations (I discuss Said’s work further in the following section). The attributes of 
otherness are fundamental to representations of identity. Identity, then, is a relational 
concept that involves the definition of Self in relation to an Other—an Us in relation to a 
Them. Groups uphold this type of differentiation through borders and bordering practices 
that are at once spatial, social, temporal, and discursive (Newman and Paasi, 1998). Such 
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borders are instruments of power that make the inclusion of 'insiders' and the exclusion of 
outsiders visible and real (Paasi, 2001). 
 Intersectional analysis, along with critical race perspectives, allows us to move 
away from the more traditional focus in immigration literature on ethnicity (typically 
treated synonymously with nationality). The term ethnicity is often applied to “minority” 
groups and those viewed as distinctive vis-à-vis an unmarked national society. Ethnicity, 
however, must be understood as a product of both Other-definition and of Self-definition. 
It does not merely consist of maintaining one's distinct traditions or customs; nor is it 
fixed in identifying some kind of “roots” from which the immigrants come from (sending 
or home-society) (Castles and Miller, 1993). Rather, ethnicity can be seen as the active 
production and reproduction of collective identity (Cohen and Bain, 1988). This process 
is relational, whereby, on the one hand, dominant groups play a key role in the 
determination of who is (or is not) “ethnic,” and on the other hand, those identified as 
ethnic also produce a bounded sense of identity and belonging. 
Ong (1996) refers to this dual process as “self-making and being made” (p. 738). 
The classification of an ethnic minority created by dominant groups, also involves the 
subsequent self-creation (self-identification) of ethnicity by the minority group. In this 
way, the dominant group has a key role in defining ethnicity as something separate from 
‘mainstream,’ national culture. Hutchinson (2000) connects ethnic identity to memory, 
noting that “central to ethnicity is the question of origins, the recovery of memory, and of 
a ‘usable past’ by which to negotiate the problems of the present” (p. 653). Thus, ethnic 
identities are fluid, situational, they are constantly being negotiated and re-constructed, 
and change over time (Neils Conzen et al., 1992). As I describe in greater detail below, 
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this relational identity construction takes shape through the everyday spaces and practices 
of immigrants and reflects the intersectionality of each immigrant experience.  
  I have alluded here to the importance of agency within intersectional analysis. A 
key concept relating to agency is subjectivity, which refers to an individual’s sense of 
selfhood and membership; subjectivity refers to an “active agent that shapes and is 
shaped by prevailing social, cultural and political spaces” (Blackman et al., 2008, p. 16). 
In the case of Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France, a critical subjectivity 
that plays into identity creation is the historical colonial relationship between France and 
Algeria. Identities forged under (post)colonial conditions are multi-faceted identities that 
“cannot be accounted for by binary oppositions” rooted in one nation-state or another 
(Grewal and Kaplan, 1994, p. 10). Rada Hegde (1998) addresses the powerful role of 
colonialism in the formation of identities, describing colonialism as having “seeped into 
the lives of people globally” (p. 276). For Algerian-origin individuals in France, a 
postcolonial identity is forged from “the crosshatched trajectories of colonialism and 
globalization as they come to demarcate quotidian understandings of postcolonial 
identity, which is to say, within the recurrent practices of everyday life” (Ganguly, 2001, 
p. 2). It is in everyday social situations that individuals “use culture to express and give 
meaning to our identity, which in turn is used to construct affiliations with and 
boundaries between other individuals and groups” (Joshi, 2006, p. 11). 
The importance given to historical context requires that we consider critical race 
and identity theories in relation to postcolonial theory, which connects contemporary 
power relationships and inequalities to the legacies of European imperialism. 
Postcolonial theory, as I explain below, offers a more specific way of thinking about 
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racialization, the experiences of racialized minorities, and the identity practices in a 
postcolonial context, such as that of France and Algeria. 
Postcolonial Scholarship 
Postcolonial approaches explore the economic, political, and cultural legacies of 
European imperialism and colonialism and ongoing processes of racialization and 
subordination between former colonizers and colonized people—including former 
metropole contexts (like France). The idea here is that postcolonial states and metropoles 
remain inherently and complexly entangled in their colonial pasts long after formal 
decolonization (Yeoh, 2000). Postcolonialism engages with the production of knowledge 
in colonial and postcolonial environments and addresses questions of identity among the 
colonized and colonizers. It is especially interested in the ways colonial powers used the 
“optic of race” to “represent, reflect, refract and make visible native cultures in inferior 
ways” (James, 2018, p. 1). At the same time, postcolonialism designates a politics of 
transformational resistance to the unequal power relations (including the production of 
knowledge) formed by colonial practices (Ashcroft et al., 2000).  
Postcolonial scholar Gayatri Spivak (2005) defines colonialism as “when an alien 
nation-state establishes itself as ruler, impressing its own laws and systems of education 
and rearranging the mode of production for its own economic benefit” (p. 828). Colonial 
processes of domination by force through civilizing and military missions produce and 
reproduce ideological discourses that subjugate colonized populations. The colonies 
became the Other against which the industrial modernity of the West defined itself, and 
colonies then became entrenched in an inferior position that, in many cases, continues to 
this day (Gilbert and Tompkins, 1996). Colonialism, in this respect, involves much more 
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than the domination of markets and political institutions. It has far-reaching effects that 
shape language, education, religion, art, and social interactions (Gilbert and Tompkins, 
1996). Postcolonialism thus involves an engagement with (and contestation of) 
colonialism’s discourses, power structures, and social hierarchies (Gilbert and Tompkins, 
1996).  
Scholars widely regard Franz Fanon as bringing the concept of the postcolonial 
into being (Golden, 2015). Fanon was a freedom fighter in Algeria during the 1950s and 
1960s. A psychiatrist by profession, Fanon was born in French Martinique and moved to 
France, and then to Algeria during his professional career. Through his patients, Fanon 
encountered the clinical effects of colonial domination on the psyche of the colonized 
people—what he called the colonization of the mind (Fanon et al., 2005). He focused on 
the identity of colonized peoples and followed the trajectory of identity development, 
whereby colonialists proclaimed European culture superior to native culture and used 
violence to impose European culture and to suppress native culture and identity and 
create a subjectivity rooted in all-encompassing inferiority (Fanon et al., 2005). Fanon 
claimed that the “colonized acquire a peculiar visceral intelligence dedicated to the 
survival of body and spirit” (Fanon et al., 2005, p. ix). Fanon’s work called for the use of 
violence by the colonized in order to expel their colonizers (as was the case in Algeria). 
Yet for Fanon, decolonization was not a simple solution to colonialism, as colonialism 
left the colonies bereft of social structure while leaving intact the effects of the colonial 
language, the colonial state bureaucracy and colonial attitudes and ways of thinking 
(Fanon et al., 2005). 
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 French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre worked with Fanon to uncover the structural 
provenance of racial relationships, referring to the “constitutive gaze through which the 
Self and the Other are made” (Kobayashi, 2014, p. 1102). Sartre sought to understand the 
totality of the French conquest of Algeria, including the complex political, social, and 
economic structures put in place during colonialism and then abandoned upon 
decolonization. Sartre laid bare the truth of the French conquest of Algeria by, “showing 
the congruence between economic spoliation, cultural imperialism, and political 
domination of the native Muslims by the French invaders and colonizers” (Sartre, 1956; 
Smith, 1973, p. 428). Sartre furthered the understanding of colonialism as a process of 
dehumanization working through forced labor and intimidation. For Sartre, colonization 
triggered a moral problem of the rights involved in the French interpretation of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity. He argued, “By rejecting metropolitan universalism, [French] 
soldiers overseas apply the numerus clauses to the human species: since none can rob, 
enslave, or kill his fellow man without committing a crime, they lay down the principle 
that the colonized subject is not a fellow man” (Sartre, 1963, p. i). Sartre also elaborated 
the concept of racialization, arguing, “one of the functions of racism is to compensate the 
latent universalism of bourgeois liberalism: since all human beings have the same rights, 
the Algerian will be made subhuman” (Sartre, 2001, p. 45). 
Along with Fanon and Sartre, scholar Edward Said is considered to be the 
“originator and inspiring patron-saint of postcolonial theory and discourse” owing to his 
contribution of “Orientalism” (San Juan, 1998, p. 1). Drawing on the work of Michel 
Foucault, Said exposed the Eurocentric universalism that assumes the superiority of the 
West. He described Orientalism as a particular mode of knowledge, power, and cultural 
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representation—a way of identifying the East as the Other and inferior to the West (Said, 
1978). In articulating Orientalism, Said, moved culture, which he defined as “all those 
practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation that have 
relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in 
aesthetic forms,” to the forefront of critical theory (Said, 1994, pp. xii–xiii). Culture, 
from this perspective, is not a bounded or static social entity. Rather, culture refers to 
social imaginaries, norms, and ideals that define who “we” are vis-à-vis an ‘Other.’ Said 
understood that in situations of unequal power relations, like colonialism, the dominant 
group has the power to produce knowledge about itself and the Other. Certain ways of 
seeing, knowing, and describing Self and Other thus become naturalized and taken-as-
given in colonial societies.  
Importantly though, dominant ways of knowing can also be contested and 
subverted. By shedding light on dominant forms of knowledge production, one can 
destabilize them and create alternatives to them. Homi Bhabha’s (1983) discussions of 
mimicry, hybridity, and ambivalence speak to this possibility. Colonialism was a fragile 
project, one that functioned on a desire for the “subjugated others…to look or at least act 
the same as the occupiers” yet held the balance of this fearful outcome “because it would 
dilute their own sense of difference and superiority” (James, 2018, p. 2). Thus, mimicry 
was the way that subjugated members of a colonized society imitated and took on the 
culture of the colonizers—a metonym of presence (Bhabha, 1984). Bhabha (1990) argued 
further that the interdependence of colonizer and colonized renders all identities hybrid 
and thus resistant to the imposition of fixed and singular identity classification 
(hybridity). Bhabha explained his concept of ambivalence to describe the difficult 
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situation of the subaltern subject “torn between the material benefits colonization 
sometimes brings (e.g., jobs in colonial administration) and the crushing weight of the 
loss of national sovereignty” (James, 2018, p. 2). For Bhabha, there is always a state of 
ambivalence, contradiction, and self-alienation built into human agency, so that agency is 
more an effect of rhetorical and discursive social processes than a product of individual 
self-consciousness (Bhabha, 1994). In this way, the subject becomes individuated, or 
enabled, only after being situated into the symbolic order (colonized versus colonizer). 
Postcolonial studies have influenced some discussions of migration and 
transnationalism, with colonialism and imperialism understood to be key components of 
the global contexts in which contemporary migrants are enmeshed. Stuart Hall (1996) 
described colonialism “as part of an essentially transnational and transcultural global 
process [which] produces a decentered, diasporic or ‘global’ rewriting of earlier, nation-
centered imperial grand narratives” (p. 247). Tying transnationalism to postcolonial 
theory offers a way to think about immigrants’ homeland affiliations and the mutual, 
power-laden processes that underly immigrants’ relationships to different places. When 
viewed through a postcolonial lens, the division between homeland and host-society 
becomes less salient when colonized territories are subsumed within the colonizer’s 
territory, as was the case of Algeria and France—where colony and metropole were 
mutually constituted and remained tied together. Following Hall’s work on race and 
culture, Paul Gilroy (2004) notes the tension between postcolonial ‘multiculturalism’ and 
the persistent language of race in Britain and other postcolonial societies. Like Hall, 
Gilroy is concerned with how postcolonial affiliations continue to shape modern political 
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structures and how the social formations of colonialism persist and are incorporated into 
postcolonial societies.  
The enduring legacies of colonial relationships manifest themselves in deep-
seated structural processes of racialization and subordination in metropolitan contexts, 
which have become sites of settlement for many postcolonial subjects. Working within 
the idea of ‘postcolonial predicaments,’ Basch et al. (1994) further Hall and Gilroy’s 
observations, stating that the “layered intertwining of color, class, and culture that mark 
the historical processes within [colonized] societies” create a “filter through which 
immigrants…interpret and respond to the structures of [the imperial] society” (pp. 104–
105). The impossibility of erasing centuries of cultural subordination is crucial to 
understanding the dynamics of identity in postcolonial immigrant contexts, in which the 
formerly colonized Other is now living among the former colonizer.  
It is important to note here, however, that dominant groups are not always 
inclined to recognize the on-going relevance of colonialism to contemporary politics, 
especially in relation to immigration. As Forsdick (2005) argues, 
The ‘postcolonial,’ often perceived in France as an Anglo-Saxon invention 
emerging from an obsession with the ‘politiquement correct,’ is held at bay, 
however, despite—or even as a result of—the potential illumination it offers to 
the culture and institutions of contemporary France. Ideological attempts to 
exclude the Other range from the radical centralization of Republicanism to the 
desire for ethnic homogenization on the Far Right, but Frenchness has never 
successfully been constructed as a core, seamless identity. However, the 
postcolonial problematic rarely emerges from the French discourses of politics or 
culture (p. 35-36). 
 
Discussions of postcolonialism in the French context inevitably revert to the 
contributions of the republican tradition to former colonies, namely the policy of 
assimilation. The centrality of these republican values is one possible reason for the lack 
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of interest shown by French scholars in postcolonial theoretical contributions. As recently 
as 2018, a (in)famous manifesto signed by 80 French academics claimed postcolonialism 
to be “a hegemonic strategy” that attacks the ideals of republican universalism, using 
“methods of intellectual terrorism reminiscent and far [exceeding] what Stalinism once 
did to European intellectuals” (Guesmi, 2020, p. 1). 
Postcolonial scholarship allows us to push past the limitations of integration/ 
assimilation scholarship by problematizing identity categories and ideas of culture that 
inform everyday attitudes toward, and ways of seeing, immigrant Others in receiving-
society contexts. Postcolonial theory rejects the idea of a uniform “host-society culture” 
as a historical given, demanding attention to the historical and relational processes that 
have given rise to “national societies” and the criteria used to define them. Postcolonial 
theory also draws attention to the complicated ways immigrants understand their place in 
the receiving/postcolonial society and their relationship with dominant groups, who are 
their former colonizers.  
This approach asks how relationships of power and domination persist and how 
politics interfere in the efforts by immigrants to seek entrance to national society. In the 
case of Algerians, dominant constructions of French society can be subverted by 
referencing Algeria’s rebellion against and defeat of French colonialism5. This shared 
sense of solidarity among a ‘victorious’ Algerian population is sometimes shared with 
immigrants from other former colonies. Yet, despite memories of French defeat, 
immigrants find themselves in a subordinate position to their former colonizer, which 
 
5 I offer a detailed account of the Algerian victory in the war of decolonization in Chapter 
Four. I discuss the internalized identity of revolution among Algerian immigrants and 
their descendants in France in Chapter Five.  
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frames its particularisms as the universal traits of citizenship. This can motivate some 
racialized immigrants and minorities to adopt assimilatory behaviors (i.e., conformity) 
rather than experience marginalization and exclusion from the spheres and spaces of 
mainstream French society. Others, of course, might bristle against dominant 
constructions of host-society identity. In either case, postcolonial scholarship urges us to 
recognize the political acts involved in the everyday life of immigrants.   
With its focus on domination, subordination, and the production of knowledge 
about “Self” and “Other,” postcolonial scholarship overlaps with CRT and intersectional 
analysis. Both postcolonial and critical race theories focus on the racialization and 
subordination of particular groups and the incompleteness of legal equality between 
dominant and subordinate groups (Thomas, 2000). Moreover, both sets of theory work to 
“expose the insufficient integration of historically subordinate populations into the 
dominant legal system” (Thomas, 2000, p. 1198). Together, these theories push forward 
the notion that race and racism, along with nationalism, gender, and other hierarchical 
social constructs, are intrinsic parts of social history and larger social orders, and they 
allow us to re-think integration as a political, not ecological, process that unfolds in the 
exchanges between dominate and subordinate groups (Crenshaw et al., 1996). 
Still, there is further need to look beyond the historical drama of colonialism and 
structural racism and to consider in more detail the ways that immigrants themselves 
negotiate membership in contexts of settlement and origin. To understand the experiences 
of Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France, it is necessary to contextualize 
their experience within a historical-structural framework that includes postcolonialism. 
The grand narrative of colonial and postcolonial analysis can erase the individual agency 
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of immigrants and the fluid co-production of contemporary national societies. To avoid 
the decontextualized analysis that assimilation studies are often faulted for, this research 
seeks to engage not only with the global level of postcolonialism, but also with the more 
intimate scale of individual existence and experience—to consider what race, identity, 
and the postcolonial mean in the innumerable encounters between immigrants and non-
immigrants that occur in everyday places and spaces. This research aims to understand 
integration by bridging the scalar gap between global postcolonialism and personal 
everyday politics, and by exploring social interactions that take place simultaneously 
across urban landscapes and nation-state borders. In order to engage more fully with the 
ways in which immigrants operate within systems of oppression and negotiate belonging 
and position in racialized hierarchies, I now turn my attention to concepts of belonging 
and ‘the everyday’ that emphasize the agency of subordinate groups and the daily politics 
of negotiating membership in a thoroughly racialized, yet contestable, ‘host-society.’   
The Everyday Practices and Spaces of Belonging 
  Classic assimilation scholarship from the early 20th century made heavy use of 
ethnography to describe the immigrants’ difficult adjustment to American society and to 
explore immigrants’ (and their children’s) changing social and cultural practices (e.g., 
Burgess, 1926; Young, 1928; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927). By the 1950s and 1960s, 
however, the field of immigrant research had moved to more quantitative approaches, and 
fewer studies involved detailed understandings of the nuances of everyday immigrant 
life—the ways newcomers learn social cues from their environment; the ways they 
struggle for acceptance and inclusion; the ways they confront discrimination. This 
dissertation returns to the model built by earlier researchers and uses the idea of the 
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‘everyday’ as an entry point into understanding the dynamics of membership in 
postcolonial, immigrant-receiving contexts. Following Lefebvre (1991), Bourdieu (1977), 
and de Certeau (1984), the ‘everyday’ is understood here to connect experiences and 
practices, including the ways people conduct themselves in their daily routines, how they 
think about the social world around them, how they interact with dominant members of 
the national society, and how they comport themselves in certain spaces. In engaging 
with the everyday, this dissertation highlights immigrants’ encounters with, and 
responses to, institutionalized racism and subordination. This work explores how and 
where people encounter and engage with dominant cultural practices, and how they 
respond to daily cues that they belong or do not belong. The links and interactions 
between immigrant experiences and identity formation are central to understanding how 
immigrants negotiate and rework the socio-spatial boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
in contexts of settlement (Ranek, 2017).  
Scholars explain belonging as an emotional attachment (Yuval-Davis, 2006), as 
feelings of being at home (Hage, 1997), at ease (May, 2011) and as rooted in an 
individual’s, or group’s, desire to feel and create an attachment to a place (den Besten, 
2010). But as Yuval-Davis et al. (2005) note, belonging does not flow naturally or 
unproblematically from ‘ethnicity’ or nationality. Instead, belonging is a dynamic 
process, one that “like other hegemonic constructions...tends to become ‘naturalized’ and 
thus invisible in hegemonic formations...” (Yuval-Davis et al., 2005, p. 528). Thus, 
belonging is “formed through the interplay of the subjective self, individual agency and 
structural position,” and it is negotiated and claimed at different scales, from the 
intimately personal (the everyday), to the level of a nation-state (Hamaz and Vasta, 2009, 
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p. 7). It involves a process and dialogue in which individuals and communities, insiders 
and outsiders, newcomers and natives work to negotiate and renegotiate competing 
claims and attachments to the places and spaces they inhabit. Belonging, in short, is 
political (Antonsich 2010).  
In the context of immigration, one of the more relevant fields of belonging is 
citizenship6—a legal designation that also signals membership in a national community 
(or polity) bound together both by core political values and common origins and 
destinies. Citizenship, along with other forms of membership, community, and identity, 
are continuously produced and reproduced through daily practices (Ranek, 2017). 
Integration policies are also key modes of producing belonging in immigrant-receiving 
contexts. In many Western states, such policies rest upon particular conceptions of 
belonging that tend to frame “white, middle-class culture as the implicit norm” that 
immigrants must strive to emulate (Nelson and Hiemstra, 2008, p. 321). Immigrants must 
negotiate these established narratives about what, and who, is perceived as the ‘norm’ by 
the dominant group and they must learn the ‘local habitus’—referring to the dispositions 
tacitly performed and accepted by the dominant group (Bourdieu, 1977). At the same 
time, immigrants might create a sense of belonging that stands apart from this dominant 
habitus and that draws upon so-called “ethnic resources”—social ties based on places of 
origin, common language, common religion, or other forms of community that stand out 
as ‘foreign’ or distinctive in the place of settlement. The spatiality of these communities 
 
6 I discuss the complexities of citizenship for Algerian immigrants and their descendants 
in France in Chapter Six. 
47 
and the feelings of belonging they engender can be complex and create their own 
exclusions.   
Connecting immigrant experiences and social interactions to the spaces and places 
in which they occur is key to understanding how immigrants navigate the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion (Staeheli, 2003). This research works to uncover the multiple 
meanings, complex constructions, and contested associations of everyday spaces to 
understand the societal dynamics we associate with integration. For the purposes of this 
research, space refers abstractly to the material, inhabited realms produced by social 
actors, while place is defined as a specific materialization of identities and social relations 
in a given location. This study begins with the assumption that people’s experiences of 
exclusion and/or belonging are spatialized, and that places materially convey membership 
or exclusion. Certain places are “produced and stabilized by the dominant groups who 
occupy them” in order “to mark out those who are in or out of place” (Valentine, 2007, p. 
18). People, depending on their positionalities in multiple social hierarchies, can 
accommodate, resist, subvert, or conform to the social cues that dominate certain places. 
 Geographical scholarship on immigrant integration has often focused on the 
distribution of immigrant populations across urban space, most notably through studies of 
residential clustering and segregation (e.g., Massey, 1985; Wright et al., 2005; Allen and 
Turner, 1996; Logan et al., 2002). Following the logic of traditional assimilation theory, 
spatial assimilation studies assume “that ethnoracial segregation in the city is a temporary 
step in the socio-spatial dynamics that eventually lead to the mainstream and minority 
groups to share urban space” (McAvay and Safi, 2018, p. 46; though see Peach, 1997 for 
an opposing argument). Thus, residential mobility is considered to be a sign of 
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“successful” social assimilation (Massey, 1985). As with assimilation research overall, 
however, the past few decades have seen various efforts to complicate the standard 
spatial assimilation narrative. For some, this is largely an empirical exercise, with 
scholars questioning whether, for instance, certain racialized immigrants are ghettoized or 
whether patterns of outward dispersion of immigrants over time still holds (for instance, 
Peach, 2009; Brettell and Nibbs, 2010). Others have given more specific attention to the 
ways racist policies, especially in the real-estate, mortgage-lending, and housing sector, 
have created unequal, stratified urban landscapes and that “consistently hinder 
desegregative dynamics for the most disadvantaged groups” (McAvay and Safi, 2018, p. 
46; Alba and Logan, 1993; Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour 
l'Egalité, 2006; Housel, 2007). In France, for instance, racialized minorities have been 
“segregated into public housing complexes in the suburban communities,” or the 
banlieues (Ware, 2015, p. 186). A key point here is that patterns of segregation reflect not 
so much “non-assimilation” on the part of racialized minorities, but the choices made by 
the upper class to self-segregate (Grzegorczyk, 2013, p. 22; Préteceille, 2006). 
Still other geographical literature has tried to look beyond broad patterns of 
segregation to understand how “socially created difference is actually organized and 
reconstituted in space,” and how space organizes people’s lives along the lines of social 
difference (Anderson, 1987, p. 129). Anderson’s approach requires that we look over 
time at the discourses and social dynamics that produce spatial patterns and that, in turn, 
convey meanings about Self and Other. An example of this approach is Phillips’s (2006) 
examination of housing in northern British cities. Responding to claims in the early 2000s 
that British Muslims were self-segregating in British cities and leading “parallel lives,” 
49 
Phillips and her colleagues found that institutional racism within public and private 
housing markets “together with popular racist sentiments, expressed through racist 
harassment, continued to reinforce existing patterns of minority ethnic segregation” 
(Phillips, 2006, p. 27). Yet they also explore the choices of minorities to form cultural 
communities where they feel a sense of security and belonging as the white majority acts 
to exclude them and to disinvest in inner-city neighborhoods (Phillips et al., 2007). At the 
same time, Phillips’ research reveals increasingly complex motivations and patterns, as 
many British Asians and other non-white groups attempt to gain a foothold in 
predominantly white suburban neighborhoods. For these individuals, residential mobility 
is an outcome of socio-economic gains, but it also reflects a process whereby individuals 
must constantly consider whether they can, in fact, belong in white suburban space.  
As Phillips’s research indicates, scholars, while noting the effects of racism in the 
urban landscapes and the negative structural forces that constrain residential choices for 
minorities, have also worked to bring to light the geographical agency of minorities and 
immigrant groups and the choices they make (given various constraints) to build 
communities in place. So, for instance, while the formation of ethnic enclaves reflects 
social and economic disadvantages, it also reflects systems of social and economic 
support, as well as the workings of vibrant transnational cultures. Immigrant enclaves are 
geographically defined spaces that contain concentrations of residents who share an 
identity and have specialized stores and institutions that provide local support for 
residents (Abrahamson, 1996). Ethnic enclaves offer benefits, mainly in terms of 
employment, but also in terms of fostering a sense of belonging for immigrants who see 
these ethnic places as representations of home with strong social, cultural, or emotional 
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associations. This type of spatial engagement with ethnicity can be seen in Paris’s 10th 
arrondissement, where there is a small area (about three square blocks) with a high 
concentration of Algerian tea houses, halal restaurants, and Algerian-owned cafés—
effectively demonstrating how Algerians have created a transnational “home” for 
themselves in Paris by enacting the neighborhood as “Algerian” and placing their 
identities both in the public and private spaces of the neighborhood (Ehrkamp, 2002).  
Conversely, in emphasizing the transnational relationships that work through 
urban space, some scholars note the existence of “heterolocal” communities—
communities that function and maintain a degree of cohesion across space and borders 
without any clustering at all (Zelinsky and Lee, 1998). This is especially relevant to 
higher-income immigrants, like the aspiring, middle-class Asian families identified by 
Phillips, et al. (2007), who have moved in recent decades into white-dominated suburban 
neighborhoods. But this kind of dispersal is not limited to the middle classes. According 
to Silverstein (2004), while many lower-income immigrants reside in the banlieues, 
significant segments of the Algerian immigrant community in Paris are diffused 
throughout the city per the ‘mixité sociale’ (social mix) policies implemented by the 
French government with the aim of reducing social exclusion7. Thus, Algerian-origin 
individuals in Paris participate in aspects of heterolocalism on an everyday basis, going 
occasionally to areas of immigrant concentration to share a meal with friends and family 
or perhaps to attend worship services or cultural events. These areas of Algerian 
businesses inhabit a different sense of locality through the visual landscape (Wise, 2011). 
Following Wise’s understanding of ethnic areas like this, the “presence in the urban 
 
7 These policies have been highly debated on both their intent and success.  
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domain of familiar shops and signage…means it is a much more homely place for 
[immigrants] than other parts of the city, and this sense of home…incorporates a 
translocal sense of belonging” (2011, p. 152).  
The variety of social dynamics associated with different spatial patterns in 
immigrant settlement contexts indicate that it is difficult to read a single meaning from 
spatial patterns and illustrate the complicated relationship between community and place. 
Whereas immigrant clustering can reflect discrimination and racism, it can also signal 
immigrant agency, community, and mutual aid. Shifting residential patterns, combined 
with renegotiations of societal membership, offer new insight into the spatial politics of 
belonging in immigrant-receiving societies (Mavroudi and Nagel, 2016). These 
approaches suggest, first, that scholars must consider the contested meanings and 
motivations behind spatial patterns, as well as the ways such patterns are represented by 
dominant groups within discourses of social membership (Anderson, 1987). Second, 
scholars must look beyond residential patterns to examine mobility across urban space 
and people’s engagements with heterogeneous urban environments. Integration is not just 
a matter of where people live but how they relate to and negotiate a broader urban 
environment that embodies and materializes multiple class and racial identities. 
Consequently, the discussion must be taken further to attend to the contested identities 
inscribed in place(s) and the mobilities across space for different groups of individuals. 
Who decides whether the banlieues are vibrant immigrant communities or so-called 
“badlands”? How is a place determined to be a ghetto or a community? Who (and how) 
are the terms of entry to particular places decided? Why (and how) are some individuals 
“stuck” in place, lacking mobility while others (as the concepts of heterolocalism and 
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translocalism suggest) move across space, changing behaviors and comportments through 
the course of the day? 
Trudeau’s (2006) exploration of political conflicts surrounding a halal 
slaughterhouse in a rural Minnesota town highlights these complex questions, showing 
how negotiations of place and belonging for immigrant Others emerge when a behavior 
or action is identified as a transgression of the unspoken rules attached to places. Trudeau 
(2006) notes that “transgressions provide a context in which the orthodoxy of dominant 
groups (re)creates landscape in order to revitalize a sense of community and belonging” 
(p. 437). Dominant groups that codify landscapes and define the terms of belonging 
within the spatialized boundaries of urban landscapes; but newcomers can contest that 
exclusion both by claiming the right to be different and by insisting that their difference 
falls without the boundaries of membership in a given place/community. Likewise, 
Nelson and Hiemstra (2008) examine the regional political and economic dynamics 
surrounding farmworker housing in Colorado and Oregon in two non-metropolitan 
communities that have experienced a significant increase in Latino immigration. Nelson 
and Hiemstra’s (2008) work illustrates the complexities of community and belonging in 
the ways that assimilationist discourse privileges whiteness, obscures hierarchies of class, 
race, and legal status, and in some ways, prevents a sense of belonging among 
immigrants. In these ways, the dominant groups set the terms of belonging and determine 
the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.  
Geographers focus on the ways powerful actors produce space as a means of 
control, domination, and power over subordinate groups (Lefebvre, 1991). But as these 
examples demonstrate, space is not solely produced by dominant groups; subordinate 
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groups, as well, can attach their own meanings and identities to places, and create spaces 
of alterity to resist or challenge dominant meanings and identities. Subordinate groups 
can also demand access to dominant spaces, both by accommodating or re-working the 
dominant meanings of spaces (Bolt et al., 2010). Illustrating these complex relationships 
between belonging and place is Elizabeth Chacko’s (2013) examination of the ways that 
immigrants affirm their sense of belonging to the nation through annual (immigrant) 
celebrations. Representations of ethnic immigrant history and culture in public spaces, 
she shows, “can serve as important markers of an immigrant community’s sense of self” 
(Chacko, 2013, p. 443).  
In sum, the marginalization of cultural Others is deeply woven into spaces and 
places. In the case of France, the marginalization of North African and other immigrants 
can be seen as a historical remnant of France’s colonial relationships. To account for the 
complexities of this case, we must understand that places are caught up in larger histories, 
struggles, and connections. Following the approach of Doreen Massey (1991), “there is 
the specificity of place which derives from the fact that each place is the focus of a 
distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations…[T]his very mixture together in 
one place may produce effects which would not have happened otherwise” (p. 29, 
emphasis in original). Massey (1991) focused on how “all these relations interact with 
and take a further element of specificity from the accumulated history of a place, with 
that history itself imagined as the product of layer upon layer of different sets of linkages, 
both local and to the wider world” (p. 29). Massey’s approach allows us to see that the 
places and spaces of immigrant life in France are sites of multiple interactions and 
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contests over belonging, and that they are uniquely defined by the accumulated struggles 
of Franco-Algerian history (Massey, 1991; Cresswell, 2004).  
Nowhere is this more evident than in France’s ostensibly neutral ‘public spaces,’ 
which have become fiercely contested in the context of heightened anxieties around 
immigration and Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ and terrorism. Public (i.e., state-controlled) 
spaces in France are governed by French republican ideology (i.e., shared political values 
and a commitment to democratic principles)—and the concept of laïcité, which requires 
the separation of religion and politics (Welch and Perivolaris, 2016; Bowen, 2007). There 
are two aspects of public space that are important to consider in the context of this 
research: The first is the idea of ‘the public,’ which includes notions of the boundaries of 
public space and ‘common life’ (notably ideas and policies about religion and space) 
(Bowen, 2017). The second idea is related to the idea of an indivisible French people 
whereby “a common life in public space facilitates the recognition by each of the other 
persons as a member of a shared French peoplehood” (Bowen, 2017, p. 1). This 
normative idea of the universality of French subjects makes it difficult to recognize 
categories of religion, ethnicity, or race (Bowen, 2017). As I will discuss in Chapters Six 
and Seven, these ideas, and the dramas they generate, become central to negotiations of 
belonging in France. As Algerians move in and out of these public spaces, how do they 
accommodate (at least temporarily) dominant French meanings and directives? How do 
those marginalized in this environment resist particular readings of public space and try 





 In this chapter I have attempted to create a conceptual framework for 
(re)interpreting the social dynamics that take place when migrants enter a nationally 
defined host society—dynamics that have traditionally been interpreted through the lens 
of integration and assimilation. This account of migrant experience and interactions takes 
into account the legacies of France’s colonization of Algeria, formal systems of inclusion 
and exclusion (as seen, for instance, in naturalization and citizenship laws and in public 
housing policies), and patterns of institutional racism (evident, for instance, in policing 
and the banishment of headscarves from ‘public’ space). It accounts for spatial patterns of 
exclusion and marginalization, while also exploring the ways that migrants, in variety of 
ways—including accommodation, resistance, avoidance, and politicized engagement—
contend with racism and dominant discourses and practices of social membership. If 
space is “a simultaneity of stories-so-far” then the spaces of everyday engagement for 
Algerians in France are inclusive of the tumultuous stories of colonization and 
decolonization (Massey, 2005, p. 24). It is important, however, not to interpret these 
colonial linkages in a static way. Rather, the importance of these linkages is continuously 
transformed in contexts of economic change and insecurity, growing anxieties about 
terrorism, and right-wing sentiment and contestation of the European Union. The colonial 
legacy still exists, but the significance of colonialism has changed and been obscured by 
reconfigured controversies over Islam, fundamentalism, and terrorism. 
The historical Franco-Algerian relationship has created a situation in present-day 
France characterized by institutionalized racism and marginalization. Immigrants and 
their descendants must find a place for themselves in this context and must create a sense 
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of belonging through their personal relationships and their everyday encounters in 
urban space. Both critical race theory (CRT) and postcolonial theory provide an 
interpretive framework that highlights the workings of racial ideologies and 
processes of Othering in postcolonial contexts, including the ongoing racialization 
of particular groups. These theories emphasize the creation of ideologies, 
representations, and discourses, and the ways these produce and take shape within 
laws, institutions and policies. Theories of identity, belonging, space, and place 
meanwhile, highlight individual and collective negotiations of representations, 
discourses, and institutional policies and practices. These theories move the 
analysis beyond the structural perspective and bring agency into consideration. 
This interaction between structure and agency in producing and subverting 
particular social formations is central to a critical approach to integration. While 
traditional approaches to immigrant incorporation emphasize a gradual and 
somewhat inevitable process of sameness, this critical approach emphasizes the 
constant re-working of the boundaries of difference as migrants and non-migrants 
negotiate the boundaries of membership in ‘the community’ (usually, but not 
exclusively defined in terms of ethnicity and/or nationhood).  
 I have argued that the categories of host-society and immigrant groups cannot be 
taken as givens, rather, they are constantly in the process of being created and are 
influenced within specific geographical contexts. This research approaches assimilation 
and integration as processes of negotiation between dominant and subordinate groups that 
involves the re-working of socio-spatial boundaries to include (and exclude) certain types 
of people. Postcolonial dynamics and ideologies of race permeate the everyday lives and 
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encounters of Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France, requiring them to 
develop diverse approaches to social membership and belonging in France—whether 
some strive to accommodate and conform to dominant French social norms while others 
resist, or whether some may alter their behaviors in certain places to conform while 
creating alternative spaces of community. These foundations allow for a complete 
understanding of the entirety of the immigrant experience for individuals of Algerian 
descent in France. In the following chapter, I describe the methods used in this research 
project to collect and analyze data to explore the localized contexts and experiences of 
belonging and membership for Algerian immigrants (and their descendants) and 








For this dissertation, Paris’s Algerian-origin population serves as an empirical 
case study to explore theoretical issues involving identity, belonging, and integration in a 
postcolonial society. This dissertation examines immigrant integration from a place-based 
perspective, focusing on the ways in which Algerian immigrants and their descendants 
participate in the building of community and societal membership within mainstream 
social categories. This research draws on qualitative data gathered from in-depth and 
semi-structured interviews and is centered on a qualitative case study of Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants living in Paris, France.  
Traditional studies of integration have often employed quantitative data and have 
been valuable in measuring the degree to which members of immigrant groups are 
participating in key spheres—e.g., labor markets and housing markets—within societies 
of settlement. These studies assess levels of integration by collecting quantitative data on 
residential location, intermarriage, social contact, political participation, and language 
use, among other indicators (Van Tubergen, 2006; Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003; Phalet 
and Swyngedouw, 2003). While useful for understanding the link between integration 
policies and societal outcomes (e.g., monitoring the beneficiaries of policies and 
conducting impact evaluations) (Huddleston, Niessen, and Tjaden, 2013), it is 
problematic for understanding the lived experience of integration for immigrants. 
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Quantitative studies of this kind tend to oversimplify the immigrant experience by 
isolating identity or cultural traits that do not account for the variability of identity and 
belonging or the contestability of ‘integration’ itself. Another problematic feature of 
quantitative studies of immigrant integration, as identified by Schinkel (2013), is the 
tendency to presuppose an essentialized notion of bounded cultures, to treat social 
inequalities (e.g., lower levels of education) as cultural problems, and to position 
integration as an individual (not group or relational) process. Quantitative studies cannot 
measure or analyze the non-quantifiable experiences and actions involved in the 
formation of immigrants’ understandings of identity, belonging, and integration through 
everyday encounters.  
In contrast, qualitative research interrogates immigrant experiences and seeks to 
capture the complexities of social membership and integration. Qualitative research 
methods are useful when research questions focus on research subjects’ frames of 
reference and try to explain the ambiguities that arise from complex social interactions 
(Taylor et al., 2015). The important contributions of qualitative studies in immigrant 
research are that they allow for both significant understandings of highly contextual 
phenomena and essential engagement with theory. Qualitative methods provide insights 
into the ways people perceive their own experiences and actions, and the experiences and 
actions of others, and they excel at collecting evidence about “values, opinions, 
behaviors, and social contexts of specific populations” (Yamey, 2017). While qualitative 
research has been criticized for lacking scientific rigor with small and unrepresentative 
samples of the broader population with results that cannot be generalized, findings from 
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qualitative research can contribute to the refinement of theoretical concepts and provide a 
basis for theoretical abstraction (Yin, 1992).  
A growing body of literature uses qualitative data to understand the meanings 
embedded in immigrant behavior and experiences. Silverstein (2004), for instance, uses 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with Algerian immigrants and their descendants in 
Paris to examine the formation of identity and the influence of life experiences, family 
history, and sociocultural factors in the formulation of Algerian transnational politics and 
identity. Ehrkamp and Nagel (2012) likewise use qualitative methods to investigate 
questions relating to the politics of citizenship in immigrant-receiving contexts and to 
illustrate social practices of faith communities both in destabilizing and reinforcing the 
social boundaries of race and legal status. More recently, Beaman (2017) similarly uses 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with North African immigrants and their 
descendants in Paris and surrounding banlieues to understand how French republicanism 
(citizens are free from ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’) in fact imposes, rather than erases, ethnic 
boundaries in the construction of a French national identity.  
Following the above approaches, this research starts from the premise that social 
categories like ‘race,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘ethnicity’ are constructs. That is, people actively 
produce the boundaries of these groups through a variety of social and discursive 
practices. The techniques I have chosen are particularly suited to uncover the social 
processes that underlie the formation and transformation of social categories and the 
meanings that people project onto everyday life. This chapter outlines my data collection 
and analysis techniques and explains the research context and research sites. I also reflect 
on my positionality as a researcher in the data collection process. 
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Research Questions 
 This project’s data collection and analysis took place around three major research 
questions: 
(1) How do Algerian immigrants and their descendants understand and practice the 
idea of ‘integration’ in France?  That is, how do people of Algerian origin 
interpret and evaluate various identity categories (i.e., French, Algerian, Arab, 
Berber, Muslim, immigrant, etc.); how do they learn what it means to be members 
of various identity categories through everyday experiences and social 
encounters; and how, through their observable socio-spatial behaviors, do they 
position themselves within or outside of different identity categories? 
(2) How does the postcoloniality of Algerian immigrants and their descendants shape 
their interactions with dominant institutions, groups, and discourses in France? 
That is, how do memories and interpretations of colonialism inform the identities 
of people of Algerian origin? What are the contexts in which memories of 
colonialism are fostered, circulated, and expressed? And to what extent do 
postcolonial imaginaries and community bonds facilitate, or provide alternatives 
to, participation in ‘mainstream’ French social, political, and economic 
institutions? 
(3) What is the spatiality of integration among Algerian-origin communities in 
France?  That is, how do people of Algerian origin ‘read’ or interpret space as 
belonging to particular social groups? What are the tangible, visible, and audible 
ways in which they participate (or attempt to participate) in ‘mainstream’ social 
spheres and spaces? How might they challenge or accommodate dominant 
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identities inscribed in spaces? How and to what extent do ideas of gender, race, 
class, legality, and postcolonial status influence their movement within and across 
space? And to what extent do Algerian immigrants and their descendants create 
subaltern spaces as an alternative to engagement with dominant spaces and 
realms? 
To answer these research questions, I use qualitative methods within a narrative case 
study structure. A case study approach is a detailed analysis of a person or a group as a 
model of a social phenomenon that can be used to illustrate and shed light on theoretical 
concepts like gender, race, or integration (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011). The case study 
is best to use when analyzing an individual situation to identify structures, forms, and the 
order of interactions between the research population in a specific situation (Starman, 
2013). Narratives are event-centered stories depicting human action and activity, they “do 
not merely describe what someone does in the world, but what the world does to that 
someone” (Mattingly, 1998, p. 8). Narrative case-study research requires the researcher 
to distinguish narratives from discourse—the former being a “retrospective meaning-
making—the shaping of ordering of past experience” that may not follow a set 
chronological timeline, but instead follow the memories of the participant as the story or 
narrative is told (Chase, 2005, p. 656). The information collected in this process must be 
interpreted as socially situated interactions that are produced within the interviewing 
process and analyzed accordingly (Chase, 2005).  
Study Population and Research Context 
 This research is intended to uncover the everyday politics of immigrant 
integration in France, the role of a postcolonial history in these politics, and the space(s) 
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within which these engagements occur. Owing to their significant role in the history of 
French colonization and immigration8, Algerian immigrants and their descendants are 
highly visible in the politics of immigration, race, and identity, and they have been 
studied at length. Recent literature in France has focused on many aspects of the Franco-
Algerian relationship, including, most recently, the alarming exclusion and 
disenfranchisement of banlieue residents (Aissaoui, 2009; Begag, 2007). French 
scholarship has also focused on immigration management and control vis-à-vis Algeria 
(Cohen and Lacroix, 2016). But French scholars are now calling to “refine the analysis 
beyond a strict binary opposition” between France and Algeria to understand “other 
logics of social structuring” that are not based on legal or racial relationships (Cohen and 
Lacroix, 2016, p. 1). This dissertation aims to address this need to understand Algerians 
in France, not as a homogeneous group but as a varied group of people who are working 
to articulate their identities and belongings in highly specific socio-spatial contexts. 
People of Algerian origin in France do not constitute a singular cultural or political entity; 
rather they engage with multiple discourses and forms of belonging that cross-cut French 
and Algerian spaces and that operate over time in concert with each, and at other times in 
conflict or tension.  
 Because the Parisian area has “welcomed a disproportionate share” of immigrants 
from former colonies, especially Algeria, the city (and surrounding banlieues) has been 
shaped and reshaped by their presence (Kaplan, 2015, p. 23). Whereas immigrants and 
the second-generation make up 20 percent of the population of metropolitan France, in 
 
8 Colonial Algeria held two unique characteristics—being a settler colony and a 
constitutional part of the national territory. No other territory outside France held this 
status. 
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Paris they comprise 43 percent of the population, in some neighborhoods of Paris, that 
number is even higher, such as the département of Seine Saint Denis, where the 
immigrant population is as high as 30 percent of the population, a majority of which are 
of Maghrebi descent (18 percent of the population) (Beauchemin et al., 2010; Simon, 
2012, p. 14; INED, 2020b). Further, approximately 40 percent of Algerian immigrants in 
France live in the Paris metropolitan area, and 33 percent of second-generation Algerians 
live in the Paris metropolitan area (Beauchemin et al., 2010, p. 17). The presence of such 
a large Algerian immigrant group in Paris, coupled with the city’s place in Algerian 
history (see Chapter Four) where a massacre of Algerian immigrants occurred in 1961, 
Paris makes for a complicated environment in which to study immigrant identity. I argue 
that it is this complexity that gives this research significance and relevance in broader 
theoretical discussions of citizenship and integration in the contemporary world.    
Study Population 
I chose to focus my research on the city of Paris, France, due to its large 
immigrant population. Of the 12 million people living in the metropolitan area of Paris, 
over four million people are either immigrants (17 percent) or identify as having at least 
one immigrant parent (18 percent) (IAU, 2011). The Algerian immigrant community in 
Paris is diffused throughout the city. There are noticeable spatial patterns to immigrant 
settlement in greater Paris, as shown in Figure 3.1. In this figure, the 20 arrondissements 
of the city of Paris are shown in orange, the outlying districts, ‘departements’ are shown 
in red (92, 93, and 94). The immigrant population of each geographical unit is shown as a 








Figure 3.1 Migrant Population Rates in the Greater Paris Region. (Krause, 2021; OECD, 2018) 
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For example, the northeastern sections of the city are home to more immigrants 
from former French colonies in the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) than other 
areas; immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa have also settled in these areas, primarily in 
the 18th, 19th, and 20th arrondissements; there is a small Turkish population in the 2nd and 
10th arrondissements, and a Chinese population in the 13th arrondissement—though all of 
these neighborhoods (including “Arab neighborhoods”) tend to be multicultural in 
character and are not contiguous across the Parisian urban landscape (Kaplan, 2015, p. 
28; Silverstein, 2004, p. 91). Where certain neighborhoods of the city, such as Barbes (in 
the 18th arrondissement) or St. Denis (in the 93rd département), do have a particular 
Algerian character, they also show the influence of the other immigrant groups from Asia 
and Africa. This diffusion of immigrant groups was part of a concerted effort by France 
to “break down structures based on mechanical solidarity and to foster social integration” 
(Silverstein, 1998, p. 3).  
This research began with two designated sites: the 13th arrondissement in Paris 
and the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue (in the 94th département). These sites were 
chosen during the pilot study in June 2015. The sites were selected for their different 
situation relative to central Paris—one an arrondissement within the city limits of Paris, 
and the other, a banlieue, outside the city limits of Paris9. Both sites were neighborhoods 
with significant immigrant populations but were quite distinctive in terms of access to 
 
9 There is a great deal of economic and ethnic unevenness within the Paris metropolitan 
area—one main source of disparity is the difference between the city of Paris itself and 
the banlieues (Kaplan, 2015). While not all banlieues are poor (there are several wealthy 
suburban neighborhoods outside Paris), there are “large swatches of neighborhoods 
marked by a great deal of social housing, a larger mix of industrial land uses, and a 
heightened immigrant presence” (Kaplan, 2015, p. 27). 
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social, cultural, and educational resources. Economic growth has been concentrated 
inside the périphérique of Paris; banlieues have been effectively isolated from this 
growth due to a lack of public transportation (Driggers, 2018). Some banlieues have 
unemployment rates as high as 40 percent (Driggers, 2018). Furthermore, educational 
expectations and opportunities are vastly different between the two sites.  Access to 
higher education, employment opportunities, and other life chances are tremendously 
lacking in the banlieue (Selby, 2011). 
  
Figure 3.2 Map of Initial Study Sites. (Google, n.d.) 
As the research continued in 2016 and 2017, I visited prominent centers of immigrant 
religious and cultural life (e.g., the Algerian Cultural Center, the Berber Cultural 
Association, the Paris mosque, etc.) and attended communal events (e.g., a book reading, 
a storytelling event, a Berber festival, etc.) that my participants informed me about that 
were associated with the Algerian or broader immigrant community that were located 
outside of my initial two study areas. At these places and events, I encountered people of 
Algerian backgrounds from different areas of Paris who desired to participate in the 
research. Following the approach of snowball sampling (outlined below), I was able to 
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make further connections with other Algerian-origin individuals in Paris who both 
participated in culturally identified organizations and also those who did not but 
identified in various ways as Algerian. As I gained access to research participants that 
lived all over the city of Paris (and its suburbs), I eventually abandoned my initial 
attempts to limit participation to people of Algerian descent who physically lived only in 
the 13th arrondissement and the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue. By including 
participants from varying places in the Parisian area, I was able to understand broader 
patterns of movements—for example, many Algerian-origin individuals have a small 
‘everyday mobility’—that is, the places they live, work, and socialize—by including 
participants from other areas, I was able to contextualize their spatial movements in a 
broader context, rather than in isolation (in only 2 locations). However, I did work to 
ensure that as the geographic distribution of the research participants grew, the type of 
neighborhood stayed true to the initial intention to collect participants from either an 
immigrant neighborhood within the city limits of Paris (similar to the 13th 
arrondissement) and from a disadvantaged immigrant neighborhood on the outskirts of 
town (similar to the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue).  
My interest also homed in on the connections between these neighborhoods and 
broader relationships and mobilities across urban space toward the goal of capturing a 
broader set of spatialities by not assuming that people are contained in their 
neighborhoods. While the direct statistical comparisons were not purely equal, the socio-
spatial aspects of the neighborhoods were, in fact, quite comparable in terms of 
immigrant population, access to (or lack of access to) various socioeconomic entities like 
transportation, education, housing, employment, etc. 
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For this portion of my analysis, I categorized each interview participant’s 
locations (i.e., home, interview, etc.) into one of my two locational parameters—
immigrant arrondissement or immigrant banlieue. This approach is not without 
shortcomings, in that the findings from my research cannot be generalized as indicative 
of any specific arrondissement or banlieue. Yet, I found this to be an opportunity to 
greatly enhance my understandings of life for Algerian immigrants and their descendants 
in Paris by expanding the geographies that I included in my analysis. In so doing, I was 
able to find patterns in experiences that occurred within and across different spaces. 
During data collection, I lived with an Algerian-origin family in the 20th 
arrondissement of Paris. The population of the 20th arrondissement in 2016 was around 
200,000 people; of that total, over 43,000 residents were immigrants (OECD, 2018). 
 
Figure 3.3 Map of Residence Location in the 20th Arrondissement. (Google, n.d.) 
The household in the 20th arrondissement in which I lived during my fieldwork was 
headed by Kahina10, a woman that I met through a mutual acquaintance, Said (whom I 
discuss below). The family is atypical of most Algerian-origin families, comprised of 
only a mother and a daughter (born in 2001). Kahina, whose life-story I discuss in greater 
 
10 All names used to describe participants in this research are pseudonyms. 
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detail in later chapters, immigrated to Paris (in the mid-1990s) following her marriage in 
Algeria to a French citizen born in Algeria. Kahina’s immigration path—involving a 
move to France after marriage to a naturalized French citizen —is extremely common 
among Algerian families in France. Kahina herself was born in Algeria just after the 
Algerian War in the mountainous Kabyle region. Her mother did not register the birth, a 
common practice in Algeria. Today on her French identity card, Kahina’s birthday is 
listed as July 5, a day that she chose for its significance as Algerian Independence Day. 
Kahina’s remaining sibling stayed in Algeria; she has one cousin, Malik, who lives in the 
Paris metropolitan area, with whom she keeps regular contact. Kahina and her husband 
divorced in the mid-2000s, and he now lives in the Alsace region of France with his new 
wife, though he and Kahina stay in contact and remain friends. The absence of a male 
family member means that Kahina’s male cousin, Malik, visits regularly and stays over 
on many occasions as a father figure for Kahina’s daughter, Aida (though Aida dislikes 
Malik intensely). Both Kahina and Aida had their own bedrooms, and I slept in the third 
bedroom. The apartment was on the third floor of a set of buildings within a gated social 
housing complex. This section of the neighborhood was characterized by older buildings, 
and a relatively high concentration of immigrants for the 20th arrondissement. 
As mentioned above, I met Kahina through a mutual acquaintance, Said, who, 
along with this wife, Fadila, served as my primary gatekeepers. Said and Fadila were 
familiar with me as I had spent many hours in their café during the preliminary research 
stage of this work. Said’s café in the 13th arrondissement is a meeting hub for Algerians 
and other North African immigrants in the area. Said enjoyed his role in my research and 
took pleasure in introducing me to possible participants. He provided space for me to 
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meet, interview, and interact with the local Algerian population. The special relationship 
that I shared with Said, Fadila, and their children greatly assisted me when meeting 
possible interview participants and gave me credibility and a level of trust that would 
have been difficult to achieve without their assistance.  
I also invited assistance from academic colleagues at universities in Paris, namely 
a graduate student (also an interview participant) Sarah, who assisted me in meeting other 
Algerians in banlieue areas outside of Paris11. I enlisted the help of my host-mother, 
Kahina, asking her to inquire with her friends and family to find people interested in 
talking with me—either formally for an interview, or informally to offer their opinions on 
my research. The informal conversations with Kahina started as brief and polite 
conversations about the nature of my research and interests; over time, these 
conversations became great debates (mostly friendly but sometimes contentious) that 
grew to include Kahina’s friends and family.  
My insertion into the intimate everyday life of an Algerian immigrant family 
living in Paris, and my relationship with Kahina and her daughter, in particular, was 
indispensable to this research project. Kahina’s frustrations of life in social housing, with 
a fixed income, and as a single woman became clearer to me over time. The constant 
interaction with Kahina’s family and friends, and with Said and his café customers, also 
allowed for more casual and natural conversations, rather than simply interview-style 
questions and answers, as well as greater acceptance by and familiarity with the people 
whose lives I was studying.  
 
11 Sarah, as I will describe in the coming chapters, was conducting research in an 
Algerian neighborhood north of Paris. Additionally, she was from the Champigny-sur-
Marne banlieue and took me to visit and interview members of her family.  
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When my data collection concluded and I left France to return to the U.S., I was 
invited to join Kahina, Fadila, and their children on a trip to Algeria the following 
December (in 2017). When I arrived in Algeria, I met people that were connected to 
many of my research participants, and I travelled with or visited six of my actual 
participants themselves. My long engagement in the field, over the course of many years, 
and my extensive knowledge of Franco-Algerian relations was found to be incredibly 
endearing to my hosts and others that I interacted with. Algerians seemed to appreciate 
my interest in their life and culture in a heartfelt way. This personal trip to Algeria 
offered insights into the transnational components of Algerians’ everyday lives and 
experiences. The trip provided an understanding of the many cultural nuances of Algerian 
life and culture that I only understood as being ‘out of context’ in the French 
environment—things like hospitality, reciprocity, kinship, and the vivid memory of 
French Algeria that lives on today, even in rural Algeria. This additional aspect of my 
education of Algerian culture and experience provided tremendous contextual 
understanding of my work and research. 
While I ended my months of fieldwork in Paris in August of 2017, I remained 
(and remain) closely connected to my interviewees’ lives and struggles. I have been able 
to stay in contact with many of my research participants via email, Facebook, and 
WhatsApp over the years. These forms of long-distance fieldwork do not replace the 
direct observation of and participation in the everyday lives of Algerian immigrants and 
their descendants in Paris, they do, however, show that geographic fieldwork is a 
“multiply mediated endeavor” that spans geographic space and time (Silverstein, 2004, p. 
x). This manner of research also functions along the same conduits of communication 
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that the Algerian immigrants that their families use to stay in touch—effectively adding 
me, the researcher, into the social network of activity between France, Algeria, and now, 
America.  
Sample Description 
Through the sampling techniques described previously, I was able to build a pool 
of 73 research participants. I wanted to capture the intergenerational transmission of 
cultural practices and values of the Algerian community to their children, 
intergenerational tensions, and differences in viewpoints by class and education level, 
gender, and legal status. Of the interview respondents, 45 were men (62 percent), and 28 
were women (38 percent). Forty-six participants were born in Algeria (63 percent), and 
27 were born in France (37 percent). Forty-six participants were first-generation 
immigrants (58 percent), 25 were second-generation (34 percent). Two additional 
interviewees were unique cases—one was the descendent of a pied noir12 and the other a 
French woman who culturally identified as Algerian. Two participants were under the 
age of 20 (3 percent), 28 participants were in their 20s (38 percent), 20 were in their 30s 
(27 percent), 10 were in their 40s (14 percent), six in their 50s (8 percent), five in their 
60s (7 percent), and two in their 70s (3 percent). The levels of educational attainment of 
the respondents included seven (10 percent) elementary, 21 (29 percent) high school, 28 
(38 percent) university degree, 13 (18 percent) master’s degree, and four participants (5 
percent) held PhDs. The class status13 of the respondents included 35 working class (48 
 
12 Pied Noir is a term that describes the European colonists that lived in Algeria during 
French occupation. I discuss this group further in Chapter Four.  
13 Following the “Subjective Social Status” measures outlined by the American 
Psychological Association, I determined class status from the recommended 
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percent), 18 middle class (25 percent), and 20 upper class participants (27 percent). Of 
the respondents, 22 held only Algerian citizenship (30 percent), three had only French 
citizenship (4 percent), and 48 had dual citizenship in France and Algeria (66 percent). 
All 22 respondents with Algerian citizenship (only) expressed a desire for French 
citizenship. Thirteen of the 22 respondents with Algerian citizenship (only) were illegally 
residing in France; two of these were women in their 30s who were born in Algeria 
during a family holiday and were not able to complete the necessary requirements for 
French citizenship14. These two cases represent what I call ‘split families’ in which 
members have different legal statuses. All but four of those living illegally in France 
were actively working to regularize their status, and all identified as ‘Algerian’ (and not 
Berber or French). The 48 respondents who hold dual citizenship in France and Algeria 
include all but one of the second-generation participants and the majority of the first-
generation respondents.  
Thirty-six participants identified as ‘Algerian’ (50 percent), 20 participants 
identified as ‘French’ (27 percent), and 17 identified as ‘French-Algerian’ (23 percent). 
When asked to identify their heritage, 48 respondents claimed Algerian heritage (66 
percent), 23 claimed Berber descent (31 percent), and two respondents (mentioned 
above) had special circumstances (3 percent). The primary language preferences of the 
interview respondents were 50 (69 percent) French, 17 (23 percent) Arabic, and six (8 
percent) Berber. The religious affiliations of the research participants included one Jew, 
52 (72 percent) practicing Muslims, and 20 (27 percent) non-practicing Muslims. Of the 
 
measurements of education, income, occupation, and family size and relationships 
(American Psychological Association, 2015).  
14 I discuss both of these cases in the empirical chapters.  
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20 non-practicing Muslims, 9 described themselves as ‘culturally Muslim,’ that is, 
Muslims who are non-practicing but retain an attachment to elements of Islamic culture15.  
In addition to my Algerian-origin interviewees, I also interviewed a French social 
worker, a French veteran of the Algerian war, four Moroccan immigrants, and a Tunisian 
immigrant—these interviews occurred from a misunderstanding of my research invite 
(e.g., if I was looking for ‘Maghrebi’ immigrants or just Algerian immigrants), another 
that overheard me interviewing someone in Said’s café (war veteran), and another that I 
encountered while in an Algerian neighborhood (French social worker). I did not include 
these in my formal analysis, but I did draw on these interviews to create a broader sense 














15 I further discuss the idea of a ‘cultural Muslim’ in Chapter Six.  
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Table 3.1 Description of Sample Participants and Key Social Factors 
Social Factor Number of Participants Percentage of Total 
Male 45 62% 
Female 28 38% 
First Generation 42 58% 
Second Generation 25 34% 
Low Education 7 10% 
High School Education 21 29% 
University Education 28 38% 
Graduate Education 17 23% 
Working Class 35 48% 
Middle Class 18 25% 
Higher Class 20 27% 
 
The study population recruited for this research may not be representative of Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants in a way that would allow for inferences across the 
entire population of Algerians in France, or even in Paris. Because data relating to 
ethnicity and religion is not collected by the French government, there is an overall lack 
of data available for comparison or analysis of the level of representation of this 
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population sample (Simon, 2012). France has, however, collected data on incoming 
immigration—so called “foreign entries”—since the 1990s (Thierry, 2004). Additionally, 
a landmark study titled the “Trajectories and Origins survey” was undertaken in 2008 by 
the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) and the National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) on a sample of 21,000 people including 
immigrants, individuals born in French overseas départements, their descendants, and 
persons born in metropolitan France without immigrant parents (Beauchemin, et al., 
2010, p. 5).  
The Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey found that education levels varied 
widely according to origin, time of arrival, and reason for admission (Beauchemin, et al., 
2010). Among descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb, “the proportion of men 
with low or no [educational] qualifications is almost twice as high as for the mainstream 
population” (Beauchemin, et al., 2010, p. 37). Accordingly, 43 percent of Algerian 
immigrants aged 18-50 have no qualifications or only primary or lower secondary school 
education levels (Beauchemin, et al., 2010, p. 38). Among Algerian immigrants and their 
descendants, the study found an unemployment rate of 16 percent (Beauchemin, et al., 
2010, p. 54). Accordingly, the TeO study found that “42% of immigrants will become 
French…among descendants of immigrants born in France, 97% have French 
nationality…just over 20% of immigrants and one third of their descendants have dual 
nationality” (Beauchemin, et al., 2010, p. 115). The survey reported that 33 percent of 
Algerian second-generation participants held dual citizenship (although they found that 
Algerians, more than any other immigrant group, held dual citizenship) (Beauchemin, et 
al., 2010; Simon, 2012). From this information, it can be determined that the interview 
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participants for this research do reflect important demographic traits of the broader 
immigrant population in France and in Paris. Therefore, while the findings of this 
research may not be statistically representative, per se, the experiences described by the 
participants of this research are likely not atypical.  
Research Context 
Prior to my arrival in the field, Paris experienced a series of terrorist attacks that 
greatly influenced the research. In January of 2015, terrorists attacked the Charlie Hebdo 
satirical newspaper’s headquarters and killed 11 people. Two days later, the Charlie 
Hebdo terrorists took a hostage at a printing office while another terrorist killed four 
people and wounded four others in a kosher supermarket16 in the 20th arrondissement 
(Chatignoux et al, 2018). The Charlie Hebdo attacks occurred 6 months before my first 
fieldwork experience, another terrorist attack occurred 6 months afterwards; yet another 
incident occurred around the same time in Nice (in the south of France). 
The attacks framed my work, affected my interviewees’ participation and 
responses, and provided a sense of urgency to the work I was undertaking. The attacks 
were all perpetrated by men of North African descent, either Algerian or Moroccan, and 
all were tied to Islamic extremism. These events fueled the distrust in France toward 
North African immigrants and their descendants, and toward Islam (which French 
political discourse often views as a monolithic set of beliefs and practices). The attacks 
featured prominently in the presidential election in the spring of 2017, as candidates 
positioned themselves as ‘tough’ on Islam and immigrants in French society. Such 
 
16 The kosher supermarket was one block away from my residence for the preliminary 




political posturing compounded the general unease among Parisians with regard to North 
African immigrants and Islam and created a sense of embattlement among many North 
African immigrants. This is reflected in my research interviews.  
The city of Paris also changed over the course of my research in ways that 
reflected a suspicion of terrorism. These changes included things like increased security 
all over the city (and an increase in weapons used by police and security forces) and took 
the physical form of fencing around specific locations like the Eiffel tower—fencing to 
control and manipulate crowds in a way that allowed for increased security. These 
changes affected me in practical terms (e.g., longer transportation times because of 
increased security) and emotionally (e.g., sadness at the loss of a beautiful scenic 
landscape around the Eiffel tower, a heightened sense of general anxiety). A particular 
incident stands out in my memory when, after a French loss to Portugal in the World Cup 
soccer tournament, I was in a crowded public area in Tours, France. A large wooden 
pallet somehow fell onto the concrete, making a loud crashing sound, akin to gunfire. The 
crowd reacted sharply; some people screamed, and everyone ran for cover in kitchens, or 
locked themselves in public bathrooms with other people. This sense of being constantly 
‘on-guard’ and of assuming every loud sound was an attack of some kind permeated the 
everyday lives of people in France for a long time.  
These experiences and the situational effects of socialized fear likely influenced 
my research outcomes. The relative frequency with which acts of terror were occurring 
during the research timeframe was a topic of discussion in nearly every interview and 
conversation. Following the first few interviews, I added questions to the survey 
questionnaire about the attacks. Interview participants seemed generally comfortable 
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speaking about this topic, albeit with furtive glances to our surroundings before they 
spoke of the terrorism occurring across France. The 2017 presidential election was also a 
fruitful discussion topic, and I used it to probe my respondents’ ideas about belonging 
and integration in French society. The feelings of urgency surrounding terrorism, the 
election, and the place of (Algerian) immigrants in French society during this time, I 
think, offered richer data from my study population than might otherwise have been 
possible owing to the significance of the experience of immediate marginalization (as 
opposed to historic), coupled with a presidential election centered on racism and 
immigration.   
Reflexivity: Power Relations in Interviews and Participant Observation 
 Scholars of qualitative research methods have addressed the relationships of 
power that exist between interviewer and interviewees during the collection and analysis 
of qualitative data. The unequal relationship between interviewer and respondent along 
the lines of gender, race, and class can influence responses to interview questions by 
participants (Kobayashi, 1994). As a white American woman with a secure legal and 
racial position in U.S. society, I had to be attentive to the difference in societal security 
between myself and the research participants who, in general, occupied subordinate 
positions in French society. This situation placed me as an ‘outsider’ but one, arguably 
with more political/cultural capital at my disposal. At the same time, I was entirely 
dependent upon them to connect with people, to open themselves and their homes to me, 
and to share their life experiences with me. Therefore, power flowed between me, the 
researcher, and the research participants in different ways.  
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I often found that my Americanness was associated with a notion of a celebrity of 
sorts for many people of Algerian backgrounds. Repeatedly, I was greeted with confusion 
as to why a Christian American female with no connection to Algerians in a familial 
sense would ever be interested in conducting the sort of research that I was conducting. 
Many of the respondents found my interest in their struggles and experiences endearing. 
As a female outsider, my access to male-dominated spaces was limited in some ways, but 
my gender gave me to access the very feminine domestic spaces, which gave me 
particular and valuable insights into women’s lives. I had to be cognizant of the cultural 
codes of conduct—whether that included my dressing in a very conservative manner (in 
Algeria), wearing a headscarf (to visit a mosque), or meeting single men in public areas 
only (Valentine, 2005). 
One of the greatest challenges of conducting qualitative research is getting close 
enough to research participants to develop interpersonal connections strong enough to 
earn trust and be able to gather “deep, meaningful data” without getting too close with 
respondents (Maier and Monahan, 2010). Problems can arise if researchers become so 
intimately involved with respondents that the ability for “dispassionate inquiry or 
analysis is compromised” (Maier and Monahan, 2010, p. 2). For example, I was often 
caught between my host-mother and her daughter—in one instance, I was asked by 
Kahina to read her daughter’s journal, which was written in English to keep her Mother 
from reading it. I had to scramble in order to keep the daughter’s confidence and 
protecting her privacy while doing my best to assuage Kahina’s fears of the content of the 
journal. Another problematic aspect of this research in particular is that many of my 
interview participants were living in France with tenuous immigration status (illegal 
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residence), and overcoming their initial suspicion took time. In multiple cases, 
participants would not admit their illegality until later in the interview—illegality is a 
way of life for many Algerians in France and while it was a sensitive subject, I did not 
feel that I was endangering them or taking undue advantage of them for this research at 
any time. 
Qualitative research necessarily involves the researcher entering a social world, 
where in my case, I witnessed the hardships faced by people of Algerian origin in Paris in 
a way that made me sympathetic to their struggle. In the months following my immersion 
in the field, I worked to detach myself emotionally from the situation so that I could 
approach the information I had collected more analytically. I achieved this by cross-
checking my ideas with others and by looking at my ideas from the opposite perspective 
(Adler and Adler, 1993). But I also recognize that detaching myself completely was 
impossible. Following feminist research ethics, I have tried to remain cognizant of my 
role in the research and the ways my personal relationships with the study participants 
may have impacted the results (Ackerly and True, 2008, p. 699). These impacts are real, 
and they pervade my analysis; still, I do not believe they make the findings less valid, 
trustworthy, or meaningful.   
Primary Data Collection  
Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the primary data collection technique 
for conversations with research participants. Semi-structured interviews consist of several 
key questions that outline the subject areas of the research but allow for the participant to 
diverge from the main topic to elaborate an idea or respond in more detail (Gill et al, 
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2008). The advantage of using semi-structured interviews for this work involves the 
flexibility to adapt to each individual interview—while the questions were ‘structured’ 
(predetermined), the nature of open-ended questions allows for the participant to take the 
discussion into areas not initially determined by the survey. Data collected during the 
interviews included demographic information and also narrative information that often 
came in the form of storytelling. Stories are “social artifacts, telling us as much about 
society and culture as they do about a person or group” (Reissman, 2008, p. 105). As 
described above, the interviewing process began with the selection of key informants and 
proceeded through snowballing (Longhurst, 2010). As I have noted, I was able to create a 
varied study population, while not statistically representative, captured a range of class, 
generational, and legal status in the Algerian-origin community.  
 The interview included questions of origin, arrival experiences in France (where 
pertinent), and perceptions of and engagements with various institutions and social spaces 
in France. Toward the goal of exploring the range of possible identities, I began by 
asking how participants identified themselves in their everyday lives, which typically led 
them to describe their (often intersecting) identities and religious affiliations. 
Interviewees were then presented with a series of questions about space and place. 
Respondents were asked to discuss their sense of ‘home,’ feelings about their 
neighborhoods, their sense of belonging in Paris, and whether (or not) they avoid certain 
spaces. Additionally, the interview included questions about social groups and affiliations 
with group members. I also asked respondents to describe their understandings of 
integration—that is, what do they feel they are integrating into, and what is it that is 
required of them to integrate. The final set of questions dealt with contemporary issues of 
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belonging in modern-day France. These questions evolved over the development of this 
research to follow the current events and political situations that directly involved 
members of the Algerian community, as outlined previously. However, the general order 
and layout of the survey questionnaire stayed largely consistent over time. The survey 
questionnaire is attached as Appendix A.    
 Prior to the start of every interview, I discussed the anonymity and confidentiality 
of the interview in this research and obtained their permission17 to record the interview. I 
recorded the interview on a digital recorder and took handwritten notes during the 
discussion. I asked follow-up questions for clarification of particular points of their 
narratives and worked to verify my impressions and understandings of the interview 
conversation (member-checking) (Glesne, 2011). Promptly after the interview, I 
documented general observations ranging from the tone of the conversation, my personal 
feelings about the discussion, and anything that surprised or interested me during the 
course of the interview. I typically told interviewees beforehand that the interview would 
take about an hour, and some interviews did take an hour (or less), but more often than 
not, I spent multiple hours with participants. Many participants initiated subsequent 
meetings or conversations, in cases where I did interact with a participant again, I did not 
use my digital recorder but took handwritten notes. In some instances, as noted 
previously, some of these ‘follow-up conversations’ are still ongoing, via email, 
Facebook, or WhatsApp. Frequently the follow-up conversations and meetings were 
intended to be social rather than for research purposes; and in other cases, what I 
 
17 Not all participants gave permission to record their interviews, in those cases, I took 
handwritten notes only. 
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interpreted to be a social gathering was in fact for my research purposes—like being 
invited for an iftar celebration, or when I was invited for a coffee and a participant had 
(unbeknownst to me) invited her sister over for an interview.  
 I attempted to conduct the interviews in the language that the participants chose 
(French or English). However, my French skills were not to a level of fluency that I could 
communicate the vast detail of my research in French alone without an interpreter, an 
aspect that I discuss in more detail below. Interviewees also chose the location for the 
interview, if they did not have a location in mind, I invited them to my key informant, 
Said’s, café in the 13th arrondissement. The location of the interview was a very 
interesting aspect of the research as I often found that participants chose locations far 
from their homes. This seemed to be a matter of what made them feel comfortable, or 
what they thought would make me feel comfortable as an American (e.g., a popular 
tourist place in the heart of Paris, in a neighborhood with a very low immigrant 
population, or in a Starbucks café rather than a local place). Sometimes, though, 
interviews or follow-up conversations took place in people’s homes, where I was often 
invited for a coffee or a meal. In one case, I was entertained by the female members of a 
family for an iftar celebration while the only male family member (the son, Karim) ate 
separately from us. I was allowed to interview Karim after over a year of association with 
the family, but only in the presence of his mother and sisters. Elwood and Martin (2000) 
have found that such “choices made by participants about interview locations revealed 
information about the social geographies of the neighborhood,” and “were central to 
understanding the community’s struggles” (p. 654).  
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 Some of the interviews were conducted entirely in English or French (a few of 
them also involved Arabic and Berber languages when translators were readily 
available); a majority of the interviews were conducted in a hybrid communication style 
of French and English. Many of the interviewees spoke excellent English, thus decreasing 
the possibility for miscommunication and linguistic barriers. Conversely, the interviews 
conducted in French were often shorter, less detailed, and held a high possibility for 
miscommunication owing to my lower ability to communicate in the French language. 
For many of these interviews, I had an interpreter present. I worked with two young 
women (both second-generation Algerians) specifically as interpreters. Both were 
relatives of interview participants that helped with an initial interview and offered to help 
with additional interviews. While I offered to pay each of them for their time, both 
refused (I suspect that they were influenced by their families) and instead allowed me to 
purchase a hot beverage (tea or coffee) for them during the interviews. Having an 
interpreter present certainly affected the flow of the interview with frequent interruptions 
to interpret the conversation, though I did not notice a change in the comfort level of the 
participant. Interviews with interpreters continuously changed between languages—
English, then French, Arabic or Berber, then back to French.  
Interviews with an interpreter were longer and often covered less material, owing 
to the additional time that translation took. However, with the help of translators, I was 
able to interview individuals that I otherwise would not have been able to communicate 
with (e.g., those that spoke only Arabic). Still, I acknowledge that communication 
problems detract somewhat from the robustness of my findings, insofar as I was not able 
to fully capture the views and stories of a significant segment of the Algerian immigrant 
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population that is not multilingual. The snowball sampling of my participants, I assume, 
involved a sort of ‘cherry-picking’ of participant’s friends and family that were known to 
speak English—that is, it is likely that my snowball method was directed at multilingual 
(English-speaking) participants. In some areas (as I discuss in later chapters) English-
speakers were rare (as the case of the banlieues), this may have affected my findings in 
that, I interviewed more highly educated Algerians than are representative of the general 
population.  
Data Analysis  
Evaluative Criteria and Coding 
 Following the fieldwork phase of the research, the recordings of the interviews 
were transcribed and prepared for analysis. The analysis of the data was organized around 
the topics that relate to the primary research questions outlined above and covered the 
following criteria: 
(1) Algerian Identities: Interviews and observations were evaluated according to the 
participants’ (a) self-identification (e.g., Algerian, French, Arab, Berber, and/or 
combinations of these); (b) explanation of the identity categories and relationships 
between identity categories (i.e., whether different identities are compatible or 
incompatible, whether they are ‘activated’ in certain situations or circumstances; 
whether they are ‘public’ or ‘private’; whether they are chosen or ascribed by 
others); (c) description of the terms of belonging or exclusion from certain groups 
(i.e., whether their friend groups included others with similar self-identification or 
if they possessed cross-cultural friend groups; whether they were welcome to (and 
did or did not) participate in what they identified as ‘mainstream French’ cultural 
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activities and groups); (d) understanding of how historical memories influence 
their notions of belonging and identity (i.e., does the postcolonial status of 
Algerians in France influence their perception of belonging to French or Algerian 
social groupings; does this status elevate them (or not) in mainstream or in 
immigrant groups); and (e) report of the everyday lived experience of being an 
Algerian immigrant (or from an immigrant background) in France (i.e., to what 
degree do transnational connections factor (or not) into people’s identities, sense 
of community and membership, and perceptions of belonging (or not) to different 
social groups).  
(2) Postcoloniality: Interviews and observations were analyzed according to (a) 
participants engagement with postcolonial ways of thinking, acting, and 
perceiving (i.e., in what ways do (or not) historical postcolonial mindsets come 
into play for Algerians in France; did participants exhibit or experience 
(post)colonial actions (e.g., acts of resistance, mimicry, hybridity), and 
perceptions (e.g., colonizer versus colonized); did participants recognize or ignore 
Franco-Algerian history; (b) the negotiation of group identities and the spaces 
associated with different postcolonial identity categories (i.e., to what extent were 
memories of French colonialism and the Algerian War meaningful to participants 
in the ways in which they understood their position in French society; to what 
extent did (or not) they articulate identities as they related to French colonialism 
and the Algerian War (e.g., acts of resistance or feelings of shame); and (c) does 
the postcolonial status of Algerians in France affect integration (i.e., does it 
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preclude their acceptance into French society, does it channel their place in 
French society into a ‘purgatory’ of integration). 
(3) Spatiality of Integration: Interviews and observations were further analyzed along 
the lines of (a) Algerians in Paris ‘reading’ or interpreting spatiality vis-à-vis 
social groups (i.e., how do Algerians understand where they belong (are ‘allowed’ 
or ‘welcome’); how do they understand where they do not belong (are excluded or 
‘unwelcome’); what spaces are seen as ‘theirs’); (b) participation in ‘mainstream’ 
socio-spatial spheres (i.e., do they avoid certain spaces and why; do they frequent 
certain spaces and why; do they alter their behaviors in certain places; do they 
struggle to gain entry into certain spaces; what are the ‘rules’ associated with 
certain spaces; are they willing or able to conform to these ‘rules’); (c) the 
creation of subaltern spaces of belonging (i.e., do they create (or imagine) spaces 
of belonging that exclude those from different social groups (i.e., French social 
groups); do their friend groups exhibit participation in exclusionary practices that 
create secure (i.e., coethnic) social groups; and (d) movement between different 
spaces (i.e., what factors allow for the movement between spaces; what factors 
influence spatial movements).  
From the above criteria, I began the evaluation of thematic qualities of the interview and 
observation data via data coding. Charmaz (2006) describes coding as a crucial bond 
between data collection and the explanation of the meaning of the data collected. A code 
works to capture the essence of a sentence, paragraph, expression, or larger section of 
text that was captured during data collection. Codes can be applied to interview 
transcripts, field notes, documents, journals, interviews, drawings, email correspondence, 
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etc. (Charmaz, 2006). The coded material for this research included the interview 
transcripts, the interview summary write-ups, personal reflections, and correspondence 
with interview participants.  
After I read and transcribed each interview, I made notes that related to the 
research questions and theoretical direction of the work. I then read each narrative 
interview a second time and analyzed for emergent themes using an open coding system 
that involved a line-by-line examination of the material from which I generated codes 
(Urquhart, 2000). When a theme emerged from the material, I created a coding category. 
I repeated this process for each interview participant, then revisited the interviews as I 
created new codes and coding categories until all of the data was comprehensively coded. 
Through this coding process, I identified patterns which revealed the most relevant issues 
and themes throughout the collected data. As the coding process continued, I categorized 
data into smaller topic areas, recoded, and then organized it into categorical ‘bins’ (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). An example of this process is as follows: from the demographic 
information and family story of migration, participants were funneled into the ‘bins’ of 
first- or second-generation, as residing legally or illegally in France, as ‘banlieue 
resident’ or ‘non-banlieue resident’—from here, the information collected could be 
further categorized under umbrella topics like ‘acts of resistance,’ ‘dedication to family,’ 
‘rejection of the old world,’ ‘cultural identification,’ and so on.   
I used the software analysis program QDA Miner Lite to code the data for 
analysis. The software increased the study’s validity with respect to coding consistency 
(rather than relying on manual coding choices) (Lewis, 2009). QDA Miner is a 
qualitative data analysis software package for coding, annotating, and analyzing 
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qualitative data. The demographic information (such as age, gender, marriage status, 
place of birth, etc.) for each participant was entered as ‘variables’ into QDA. I then used 
my initial set of codes to begin coding the data, these codes included things like ‘Algerian 
citizenship,’ ‘French culture,’ ‘dedication to family’ and so on. From these initial codes, I 
began to find other themes or recurring topics of the interviews such as ‘absent father,’ 
‘role of the mother,’ ‘split families,’ etc. and expanded my coding in this way. The 
coding guide assigned colors to responses to questions, including how interviewees 
identify themselves, and the types of participation and spaces of social interaction they 
are involved with. The coding also delineated the demographic traits of the research 
participants including age, gender, marital status, generation, citizenship, employment, 
language(s) used at work or at home, location of home, and so on. The coding tree 
(inclusive of all codes used in this research) is attached as Appendix B. The text was 
coded as shown below in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 Example of Coding Text from Interview Notes 
The coded and categorized data was then entered into an excel spreadsheet for analysis as 






Figure 3.5 Example of Excel Spreadsheet 
To establish patterns in narratives and identity discourses, I entered participant 
demographics and identity claims into multiple spreadsheets as the baseline comparative 
tool. Following this, I evaluated the interviewees’ responses to specific topics via the 
corresponding demographic and identity claims. For example, traits such as gender, 
generation, language, class, education, and citizenship were listed on each spreadsheet; 
then, the responses of participants according to the main topic were aligned with the 
identity trait. This sorting of data produced patterns within the data of the study 
population from which the themes18 of data analysis were founded. The data sorting 
established what, if any, connection existed between the demographic variables and the 
responses to thematic questions. Secondly, I conducted a reverse sorting of the above-
mentioned data where I first sorted the data via responses to the questions, then aligned it 
with demographic traits. This second action allowed for comparison between groups. 
 For example, it became clear that many second-generation Algerians expressed a 
strong connection with their relatives that participated in the liberation of Algeria from 
 
18 The themes found during data analysis are not suggestive of empirical generalizations 
across the Algerian-origin population in France. This research aimed to identify patterns 
that suggested certain relationships between people’s experiences, positionality, and their 
viewpoints, identities, and attitudes. These claims are suggestive only.  
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France (what I have identified as an attribute of postcoloniality) and that this connection 
influenced their self-identification as Algerian or Berber. But not all of the second-
generation respondents expressed this interpretation of their family history or identity; 
not all of the interview participants had a connection to the Algerian War at all; and 
therefore, this finding cannot be applied across the research population. However, by 
focusing on the participant’s historical memories (or familial memories) of the Algerian 
War or of colonization, I was able to investigate different ways that family history 
influences identity and that generational distance from historical events is important in 
notions of belonging for Algerians in France. This forward analysis toward general 
themes of the research and then again in reverse from themes to demographics, allowed 
for understanding of particular social relationships (and historical memories that 
influence them) that then influence Algerian identity and feelings of belonging. Analysis 
according to these specific traits and experiences allowed for an assessment of certain 
social relationships that might influence immigrant identities and actions. 
 Additionally, comparing and contrasting within and between groups based on 
their responses to different aspects of the interview offered insight into assumptions about 
linkages between different types of activities and perceptions of interviewees. This back-
and-forth approach to data analysis drew attention to the similar claims of identity and 
belonging that emerged among different types of people, and on the other hand, to the 
very different identity and belonging claims that occurred among similar types of people. 
From this analysis, I grouped the data to determine if certain clusters of interviewees 
appeared consistently with different types of questions. The intent of this work was to 
identify patterns among subgroups to assess how certain factors (e.g., gender, citizenship, 
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generation, etc.) might play into identities, senses of belonging, and engagement with 
social spaces. Again, the patterns that emerged from this analysis may not be applicable 
to the entire Algerian population in Paris. But the patterns illustrate possible connections 
between traits of interviewees, self-identification, experiences of integration, uses of 
space and so on.  
Conclusions 
 This dissertation applied qualitative research methods in the framework of a 
narrative case study and attempted to accomplish findings that are valid and reliable 
through meaningful ordering, organizing, and analyzing the data collected. The highly 
contextual and subjective explanations of the immigrant experience and the processes of 
identity creation and belonging presented by Algerian-origin indivuals in Paris required 
the use of qualitative techniques to produce substantive and thorough arguments about 
such abstract and unquantifiable subjects. This dissertation focuses on using conclusions 
to engage with and contribute to existing theories about immigrant integration, identity, 
and belonging in a postcolonial context, and I do not claim these findings to be 
generalizable to the entire Algerian-origin community in France. 
 What is clear from the existing scholarship on immigrant integration, identity, and 
belonging is that these ideas are not static processes or experiences, rather, they are 
constantly being formed and reformed in and through various spaces, places, and scales. 
In analyzing my collected data and investigating the potential trends that the data 
suggests, this dissertation intends to illuminate the ways in which Algerian immigrants 
and their descendants actively negotiate, mediate, and contend with multiple discourses 
and experiences of integration, identity, and belonging—including the rights and access 
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to the spaces in which these practices occur. These issues are the focus of Chapters Five, 
Six, and Seven, which use interviews to engage with contemporary understandings of 
immigrant incorporation. However, before the Algerian immigrant experience in France 
can be understood or analyzed, it is essential to first understand the historical context 
within which Algerian immigrants and their descendants are situated in France today. 






The postcolonial perspective on contemporary immigration and integration 
politics is crucial to understanding how present-day Algerians in France comprehend 
their position in French society—and the possibility of being ‘French.’ The tensions of 
postcoloniality19 are nowhere more acute than among Algerians who have now settled in 
France (Hargreaves, 1995). In France, Algerians are seen as “culturally distinct…still 
marked by exclusionary memories of the colonial period” (Hargreaves and McKinney, 
1997, p. 4). While they are long-term residents and often citizens of France, for many in 
the majority population, Algerians appear “to belong elsewhere” (Hargreaves and 
McKinney, 1997, p. 4) or are treated as outsiders, “denied ‘cultural citizenship’ because 
of their background” (Beaman, 2017, p. 1). Postcolonial cultures are “defined, even if 
only antithetically, with references to current or former relations between (ex)imperial 
nations and their overseas dominions” (Hargreaves and McKinney, 1997, p. 5). Any 
understandings about the place of Algerian immigrants and their descendants in 
contemporary French society thus needs to trace the historical roots of the conflictual 
relationship between France and Algeria from the moment of colonial encounter through 
present-day.  
 
19 In this context, postcoloniality refers to the process through which members of the 
Algerian-origin community incorporate into their lives and are conditioned by the 
sociopolitical and historical forces of their postcolonial existence in France. 
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 When French forces invaded the Ottoman regency of Algiers in 1830, they 
initiated a colonial relationship that has dominated France’s modern history and has 
shaped contemporary French society in fundamental, though sometimes hidden or 
forgotten, ways. A full understanding of the intimate relationship between colonial 
Algeria and postcolonial France requires an examination of the historical production and 
consumption of immigrant subjectivities (e.g., ethnicity, class, religion, generation) that 
inform the current discourses of identity and belonging. Therefore, this chapter focuses 
on two intersecting genealogies—the first relating to France’s 132 years of colonization 
in Algeria, the second tracing the history of immigration between France and Algeria.  
 Algeria occupies a singular position in the history of French colonialism as it was 
declared a French département—an integral part of metropolitan France, not merely a 
colony (like Morocco and Tunisia). Algeria functioned as a unique experiment of 
France’s assimilation policies wherein the land was entirely appropriated within the 
‘indivisible’ Republic and given over to a European20 population, while millions of 
indigenous inhabitants were excluded from political participation. This chapter attempts 
to illuminate the deep imprint that has been left on the collective and personal identities 
of those involved in the “long and often tortuous relationship between France and 
Algeria” (Hargreaves and Heffernan, 1993, p. i).  
 As a colonial power, France committed itself to making the idea of a universal 
French nation come to fruition; yet colonial subjects were denied the rights of citizenship 
 
20 The European population that populated colonial Algeria is referred to by different 
terminology from different time periods. At the time of colonization, the Europeans were 
called colons. After colonization, they became known as pied noirs which translates 
literally to ‘black feet’ but means European colonialists.  
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(Reding, 2017). Not only was the colonial experience in Algeria lacking in republican 
universality, but it was marked by violence that was explicitly racist and dehumanizing to 
Algerian Muslims (Aissaoui, 2009). This tendency of the French to disempower 
Algerians while insisting upon a Republican ideology of universality and inclusion 
continues to affect Algerians in contemporary France. It is from these roots of 
marginalization and colonial violence that the mental universe of Franco-Algerian 
relations was built and sustained over time. One objective of this dissertation is to 
understand the legacies of colonialism and to trace the institutional racism in France 
today to the brutality of the Algerian occupation, the war of decolonization, and France’s 
failure to deal with its colonial legacy. This dissertation means to show how ultimately, 
French colonial policies of assimilation for Algerian Muslims acted as a proxy for a much 
deeper existential debate about the ultimate compatibility of French and Islamic 
civilizations.  
This chapter begins with a discussion of colonial Algeria, followed by a 
description of the migration of Algerians to France and an overview of the Algerian War 
of decolonization. The final section is devoted to understanding contemporary French 
immigration and integration politics. This chapter explores how the lived experience of 
colonial policies affected Algerian political identity, how efforts to construct and defend 
French identity altered the position of (and undermined) the rights of Algerians in France, 
and how France’s colonial rule of Algeria shaped (and continues to shape) postcolonial 







Figure 4.1 Map of Algeria and France. (Google, n.d.) 
Prior to the arrival of the French in 1830, Algeria consisted of three Ottoman 
provinces, each governed by a dey that answered to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul 
(Silverstein, 2004, p. 40). The urban centers of Oran, Algiers, and Constantine oversaw 
an economy that historically relied on grain production and export but had “increasingly 
turned to the piracy of European vessels in the Mediterranean by the infamous ‘Barbary 
corsairs’ in the ultimate employ of the dey of Algiers” (Silverstein, 2004, p. 40). Algeria 
included a majority population of Muslims, and minority populations of Christians and 
Jews. Algeria’s cultural, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity was a testament to the 
long history of migrations and invasions of the area that included Phoenician, Roman, 
Vandal, Arab, Bedouin, and Andalusian conquerors and settlers to the region, “each 
having left their imprint on the social, linguistic, and physical landscape” (Silverstein, 
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2004, p. 41). Thus, early-nineteenth century Algeria was a place of striking ethnic 
diversity and “was comprised of multiple language, religious, and ethnic groups, 
including several distinct Berber tribes, Arabs, indigenous Jews, ‘Andalous’ (Muslims 
from Spain), Turks, Kouloughlis, freed African slaves, and Mozabites” (Smith, 1996, p. 
33). 
 French colonialism in Algeria began in 1830 with an attack on Algiers by French 
King Charles X’s naval fleet in retaliation for a perceived insult made by the Ottoman 
dey of Algiers to the French consul during an 1827 state visit (Stora, 2001). Relations 
between France and Algeria had been strained over a disagreement in the payment of 
wheat shipments and the high occurrence of pirate attacks along the Barbary coast of 
North Africa (Stora, 2001). Charles X’s successor, his cousin Louis-Philippe d’Orléans, 
sustained the military occupation of Algiers and oversaw its expansion into a colony with 
large-scale civilian settlement. By the time that Louis-Philippe was overthrown, the 
French military presence in Algeria had grown to nearly 100,000 troops, and the once-
temporary occupation had become a permanent settlement of over 100,000 civilian 
colonists (Ageron, 1991, p. 5). In 1848, Algeria became a French département, an 
integral part of France (Stora, 2001).  
 Over the next century, Algeria became the jewel of the French empire and its only 
colony with large-scale European settlement21 (Sessions, 2016). Over the course of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, French colons established modern Western 
settlements in Algeria that attracted Europeans from other Mediterranean nations (Sloan, 
 
21 By 1962, there were 1.5 million Europeans, colons or pied noirs, living in Algeria 
(Choi, 2016, p. 1). For reference, there were just 500,000 Europeans living in colonial 
Morocco (de Azevedo, 1994, p. 25). 
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2012). While the early imperialists intended on policies of assimilation of the indigènes 
(indigenous (native) populations), these were eventually abandoned in favor of racial 
segregation and imperial domination. This segregation was carried out both 
geographically and socio-economically as the colons established the boundaries between 
the European and native populations in Algeria (Sloan, 2012).  
In creating Algeria as a settler colony, France established ownership of the 
conquered lands during the mid-nineteenth century. The colonial government formalized 
the procedures of land transactions through official transfers and exchanges of titles “in 
recognition of France’s victory and right to the spoils of land” (Choi, 2016, p. 18). The 
expropriation of land was carried out in the manner of other settler colonies where native 
inhabitants were forcibly removed from their land via treaties and extra-legal transactions 
in order to make physical room for the colonists (Choi, 2016).  
Colonial powers in Algeria created laws that eliminated the influence of Muslim 
Algerian leaders, expanded the territory under French administration, and imposed an 
‘Arab tax’ on Muslim non-citizens (Silverstein, 1998). Under colonial legislation, most 
colons had the rights of French citizens (regardless of origin), while the Arab and Berber 
majority was governed according to a separate legal code (Barclay et al., 2018). Limited 
interaction between settlers and the indigènes “contributed to a deeply ingrained settler 
racism that was particularly hostile to any sign of Arabo-Berber social and political 
advancement” (Barclay et al., 2018, p. 118). The legitimating premise of this political 
system—which assured settler domination of Algeria—was that, at some future date, 
Algerians would be assimilable and therefore qualified for civic equality in the republic 
(MacMaster, 1997).  
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Concerning citizenship in colonial Algeria, in 1865, a mechanism in the form of a 
statute for the individual naturalization of Algeria’s indigenous Muslims and Jews was 
created by the French colonial authorities which required individuals to renounce their 
religion as well as their social and cultural identity (Smith, 1996). This statute created a 
secondary ‘subject’ category for Algerian Jews and Muslims that allowed them some 
civilian and military rights but excluded them from political rights (e.g., military duty) 
(Ageron, 1991, p. 39). In October of 1870, the 1865 statute was revised with the 
Crémieux Decree (named for the Jewish Minister of Justice, Isaac Crémieux) which 
granted full citizenship to Algerian Jews (Stora, 2001). The Crémieux Decree allowed for 
an awkward compromise that partially satisfied the French republican desire to extend 
French civilization to new groups, but also recognized that to do so for the entire 
Algerian population would negate the very economic and social basis for France’s 
colonial possession (Godley, 2006). In this case, Jews were perceived as more suitable 
and willing candidates for assimilation. Jews were “assimilated as a kind of vanguard—a 
variation on characterizations of them as an ‘intermediary race’ during the conquest 
period” that allowed French colonial authorities to claim advancement in assimilation 
while continuing to postpone (indefinitely) the “far thornier issue” of assimilation for the 
majority of Algerians22 (Godley, 2006, p. 25).  
Politician and colonial proponent, Alexis de Tocqueville discussed the progress of 
the French assimilation model in 1872 as passing through an initial stage of legal 
 
22 In addition to ‘assimilated Jews’ in Algeria, were ‘Gallicized Algerian Muslims,’ 
known as évolués—western educated Africans, literally the ‘evolved ones’” (Cooper, 
2002, p. 40). In Algeria, évolués were Arabs by tradition and Frenchmen by education 
This group of Algerians rejected the idea of an Algerian nation, rather identifying in 
terms of its economic and cultural relations with France.  
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pluralism and religious toleration where Algerians were governed by laws they could 
respect (e.g., laws tailored to their own social, economic, and developmental 
circumstances) the government would then gain the moral authority necessary for 
successful rule (Tocqueville, 1872). However, the system that was created within the 
social structure of French colonial society in Algeria was built upon the concerns of 
demographic trends, foreigner assimilation, and the stability of French rule in Algeria 
(Smith, 1996). Owing to the vast array of indigenous and European ethnicities and 
identities that were present in Algeria at the time of the French colonizing mission, 
problems arose in the clear establishment of the categories of ‘colonized’ and 
‘colonizer’—and the French state had to manage this extraordinary ethnic diversity 
(Smith, 1996). Thus, Tocqueville’s simple path of assimilation23 became unfeasible as 
French legislation in Algeria developed in a way that “would thoroughly interfere with 
Algeria’s ethnic complexity as the state busied itself with the engineering of the entire 
social field; new identities were developed, offered, and then finally imposed, while 
others were permanently erased” (Smith, 1996, p. 34). The French government set about 
the task of naturalizing the European settlers in Algeria—a way to “francify Algeria” 
(Smith, 1996, p. 36).  
In 1881, a Code de l’Indigénat (Native Code) was established to regularize the 
repressive measures of the French colonial government by legalizing an inferior legal 
status for natives of the Algerian colony (Stora, 2001). The Code de l’Indigénat made 
punishable by law (for natives only) such ‘crimes’ as “speaking disrespectfully to or 
 
23 Alexis de Tocqueville also had doubts about the feasibility of assimilation policies in 
Algeria and proposed racial segregation in Algeria with two separate legislations—one to 
govern the colons and one to govern Arab Algerians (Pitts, 2005; Tocqueville, 1872). 
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about a French official, traveling without a permit, begging outside of one’s commune of 
residence, avoiding compulsory labor, and not reporting a family birth or death” (Nickels, 
2007, p. 33). The administration of legal identities for Muslim subjects, combined with 
the continued confiscation of land, were indicative of the dual purposes of Algeria’s 
settler colonialism—the assimilation of the land and legal subjugation of Algerians (Choi, 
2016).  
Each subsequent law further solidified the separate treatment of Europeans and 
Algerians by extending French citizenship to the colons and to Algerian Jews and setting 
up a system where Muslim Algerians were governed by Muslim law and restricted to 
second-class citizenship. Early colonial European immigration and territorial expansion 
in North Africa was accompanied by the disproportionate entrenchment of settler power 
in parliament and the systematic disenfranchisement of Algerian Muslims on the basis of 
their religion (Mann, 2017). Consequently, while the 600,000 colons living in Algeria 
were granted universal suffrage and offered abundant and cheap land, the 3.4 million 
Muslims who had lived on that land were now subjected to repressive legislation and 
heavy taxes (Ruedy, 1992). The combination of disenfranchisement of Algerian Muslims, 
the citizenship (and attendant benefits) granted to the Algerian Jewish population, and the 
privileged position of the colons created a “triangular political conflict” between the 
settler lobby, the metropole, and Muslim elites in Algeria as they each “struggled for 
control over the direction, methods and objectives of French policy in Algeria” (Mann, 
2017, p. 5).  
France declared that its system of government, alone among the European 
powers, had a special mission to civilize the indigenous peoples under colonial control—
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the mission civilisatrice24 (Conklin, 1997, p. 1). France’s civilizing mission was founded 
on Enlightenment philosophy with its beliefs in progress, rational advancement, and 
European (Western) superiority (Allen, 2010). The mission civilisatrice was a secular 
notion that rested upon certain fundamental assumptions about the superiority of French 
culture and the “perfectability of humankind,” and it implied that the French were 
particularly suited to carry out this task by temperament and by virtue of their 
revolutionary past and their industrial strength (Conklin, 1997, p. 1). The French believed 
that the people of Algeria were “hungry for liberty” and were “weary under the yoke of 
tyranny at the hands of barbaric and despotic” governments—the people of Algeria were 
“ready for the political and social advantages of free society, the rule of law, and respect 
for personal property” (Allen, 2010, p. 11). The mission civilisatrice assumed that France 
had a “duty and a right to remake ‘primitive’ cultures along lines inspired by the cultural, 
political, and economic development of France” (Conklin, 1997, p. 2). 
Functioning under the settler colonial ideology of la mission civilisatrice, the 
boundaries between citizen and native, created by late nineteenth century legislation, 
worked to rationalize, and justify the gross inequalities that the distinctions represented. 
French citizenship implied modern, rational individuals whereas natives were “deemed 
not yet modern, not quite rational, and not fully individuated—akin to an undifferentiated 
mass of children or primitives molded in a society echoing the ancient past of Europe’s 
present” (Nickels, 2007, p. 34). Further, the perceived difference in levels of 
development of culture and civilization were tied to religiosity and religious traditions25 
 
24 The timeframe of the mission civilisatrice is generally 1870-1930 (Conklin, 1991). 
25 France officially became secular in 1905, well after these initial struggles between 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in colonial Algeria.  
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and the religion of Islam became increasingly viewed as ‘backward’ (Said, 1978). The 
boundary between citizen and native became racialized between ‘white’ Europeans and 
‘dark’ or ‘Arab’ natives.  
Over the course of sixty years, between 1870 and 1930, there were two significant 
changes in European political thought that were particularly important for this shift in 
thinking about colonial rule: first, there were transformations in the way that the French 
understood progress and societal development; second, there were new and urgent 
concerns about how to establish viable liberal governments in a democratic age (Pitts, 
2005, p. 240). To begin, French theories of “progress became more triumphalist, less 
nuanced, and less tolerant of cultural difference, as a sense of civilizational—and more 
specifically national—self-confidence came to pervade political discourse” in France 
(Pitts, 2005, p. 240). The liberal “turn to empire” in this time period (the end of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries) was accompanied by an “eclipse of nuanced and pluralist 
theories of progress as they gave way to more contemptuous notions of “backwardness” 
and a cruder dichotomy between barbarity and civilization” (Pitts, 2005, p. 2). Changing 
perceptions of race and new forms of racism (e.g., biological, or ‘scientific’ racism) 
contributed to the dramatic shift in France’s perception of Algeria, additionally, the 
religion of Islam was seen as “backward and imperfect” (Pitts, 2005, p. 216). Thus, while 
liberalism presupposed equality, the endorsement of radically different political standards 
for different people (as implied by imperialism) required theoretical justifications that 
formed “an often unexpected and indeed uncomfortable element in liberal thought in the 
nineteenth century” (Pitts, 2005, pp. 4-5). It is only through this lens of seemingly 
contradictory political thought that the French treatment of Algerians can be understood.  
 
107 
According to French imperial assimilationist thought (in the late nineteenth 
century), French institutions would offer Algerians access to a legal system, training, and 
education premised in universal principles and rationality, thus ending the irrationality 
and religious fanaticism (e.g., Islam) that prevented Algerians from becoming citizens 
(Shepard, 2006). However, in reality, most French politicians believed that Algerians 
could never become French citizens because they were too different (Shephard, 2006). 
Colonial authorities considered the exclusion of the majority of Algerians from the polis 
as temporary, and the characteristics that set Algerians apart from other French nationals 
“regrettable and surmountable, not complementary, natural, or necessary” (Shepard, 
2006, p. 21). Following ideas of assimilationism, “the state and its local agents would 
break down what they described as local traditions and structures that promoted 
superstition and ignorance,” which they believed were conditions that prevented men 
from acting as individuals (Shepard, 2006, p. 22). 
In managing the diversity and disunity of the varied population of Algeria, the 
French also relied on evolving ‘ethnic’ and ‘socio-geographic’ dichotomies that 
privileged the Kabyles26 over the Arabs, and they embraced religious categories that 
could be more broadly applied across ethnic lines (Lorcin, 1995, p. 2). A map showing 





26 Kabyles are the residents of the region of Kabyle in Northeastern Algeria. Alternative 




Figure 4.2 Map of the Kabyle Region of Algeria. (Google, n.d.) 
 
French colonial authorities depended on the ‘Kabyle Myth,’ (or ‘Berber Myth’) 
which perpetuated the idea that ethnic Berbers from the Kabyle region of Algeria were 
“superior and sedentary over backward and rural nomadic Arabs” (Lorcin, 1995, p. 2). 
The Kabyle myth involved the idea of the Berbers’ alleged Christian European ancestry 
and the perceived ease of assimilating Berbers as Frenchmen (Camiscioli, 2009). The 
myth engendered a viewpoint where Berber people from Kabyle were seen as the least 
physically and culturally alien of North Africans (Lorcin, 1995). Mirroring the scientific 
racism of the late 19th century, French colonial scholars argued that Berbers “exhibited 
somatic features identified with a variety of geographic regions, from the dark skin of 
Africa to the high cheekbones of Asia to the green eyes of Northern Europe” and, that 
“each successive invasion of the North Africa region had laid a sediment of cultural 
heritage absorbed and preserved in the social memory and everyday practices” of Berber 
peoples (Silverstein, 2004, p. 56; Rinn, 1889, p. 189). In this respect, the Berbers were 
identified “in their cultural, linguistic, and physiognomic hybridity, as exemplars and 
vessels of a particular North African history and identity, one in which Europeans and 
Arabs had played only a marginal role” (Silverstein, 2004, pp. 56-57). The Kabyle 
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Myth27 presented Berbers as hardworking individuals, pitting them against Arab 
Muslims, who were presented as lazy, dishonest, sensual, stupid, and lecherous 
(MacMaster, 1997). The colonial agenda to divide the Kabyles (Berbers) and the Arabs 
(favoring the former over the latter) aimed to separate the population of Algeria into 
groups, making it easier to rule the colony (a common strategy in colonial governance) 
(MacMaster, 1997). 
During the mission civilisatrice (1870-1930), the French were sowing divisions 
between the Arabs and Berbers, and between the colons and Algerians, creating deep 
distinctions between and disempowering native Algerians through these processes. At the 
same time, they were also actively working to find ways of controlling the population of 
Algerians in ways to make them more ‘French.’ The colonial civilizing mission worked 
to abolish slavery, to advance humanity through education, to reform unsavory cultural 
practices, to curb superstition, and to establish political and economic institutions and 
laws in colonial societies (Daughton, 2002). Toward assimilating the indigenous peoples 
of Algeria, French officials sought to suppress undesirable Algerian mores and to replace 
them with desirable French mores. For example, indigenous languages, law, and religion 
(i.e., Islam) were to be replaced with French values of freedom, social equality, and 
liberal justice (Conklin, 1997). French colonial authorities forced new definitions of 
ethnic identity on the Algerian population built on assumptions about the capacity of 
different groups of people to embrace the future and become masters of their own history 
(Cole, 2012). 
 
27 The Kabyle Myth, first created in the late 1800s, continues today in modern France. 
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Toward achieving the incorporation of Algeria into France, colonial authorities 
established markets, caravanserails (road-side inns), and roads in the countryside of 
Algeria; they also imposed a common currency, the metric system, and civil law to foster 
the process of assimilation (Hill, 2006). The French colonial authorities attempted to 
assimilate indigenous Algerians, and to foster cultural transformation, by re-shaping the 
routines of everyday life. For the state agents, workers, settlers, and local tribespeople, 
assimilation entailed “the dialectics of everyday life,” or “the reciprocal determinations” 
of the colonial engagement (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, p. 29). In this way, colons 
and indigenous Algerians alike remade themselves by “deflecting and appropriating 
various aspects of political and economic assimilation, thus creating new forms of 
hybridity, mimesis, and difference” (Hill, 2006, p. 23). These forms of assimilation were 
intended to make nomads stationary in the new socio-cultural order of liberal 
proprietorship and labor (Hill, 2006). The task of making a nomadic population into a 
stationary population was at the forefront of the colonizing mission for France.   
Another vehicle for assimilatory activities in colonial Algeria was education. 
Colonial education is an example of the opportunities (or lack thereof) for civic equality 
in colonial Algeria. Schools were viewed as the most important instrument in the process 
of integrating colonial space into a centralized national structure (Silverstein, 1998). 
Military leaders identified as teachers rather than soldiers and the French called for “an 
army of soldier-instructors” (Le Glay, 1921, p. 13). Parochial schools and secular state 
schools were established across Algeria, and maps were printed to show Algeria as part 
of France (Lorcin, 1995, p. 190). Secular textbooks were brought to Algeria from France 
and stated that the students’ history began with “our ancestors, the Gauls” (Citron, 1994). 
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For the most part, though, these schools were attended by children from European settler 
families, and only a small number of Muslim children (mostly from elite indigenous 
families) were allowed to attend (Gosnell, 2002). The Kabyle region was the only part of 
Algeria that “experienced deep Western acculturation through French-targeted schooling” 
where “Western-style education led to the formation of a Kabyle elite intended by the 
French colonial rulers to be used instrumentally to increase friction at a local level” (Fois, 
2016, p. 207). Outside of Kabyle, the majority of Muslims who were educated during 
French colonial rule instead attended ‘indigenous’ schools that were run either publicly 
by French teachers under the authority of colonial administrators or privately by 
indigenous educational or religious associations (Gosnell, 2002). An estimated five 
percent of Muslim children were in school in 1870—and few Muslims went beyond 
primary school during the entirety of French colonization (State, 2018). 
Between 1870 and 1930 a wide range of politicians, theorists, colonial 
administrators, and Muslim Algerians engaged in protracted and heated debates over 
what was variously called la question indigène (the indigenous question), la question 
musulmane (the Muslim question), la question algérienne (the Algerian question), or la 
question d’assimilation (the assimilation question) (Mann, 2017). These ‘questions’ 
pertained to whether Algerian Muslims should be subject to French laws, whether they 
should receive French or Arabic education, whether they could be conscripted, how and 
to what extent they could be incorporated into French political bodies, and whether they 
should be allowed to become French citizens while maintaining their ‘personal status’ as 
Muslims (Mann, 2017). Ideas of assimilation shifted to ideas of association near the end 
of the nineteenth century, in part due to colon and indigenous opposition to social and 
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political integration (which, as I have indicated, were deeply problematic and never 
intended to create equality). Eventually, the French colonial administration “rejected the 
notion that part of its civilizing mission was to make Africans into Frenchmen” (Conklin, 
1997, p. 47).  
Despite legal and political marginalization, Algerians actively participated in 
negotiations over the cultural boundaries of French colonial rule throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Mann, 2017). In the early 1900s, the place of 
Islam in French colonial society demanded a reassessment of “the meaning and content 
of assimilation itself” (Mann, 2017, p. 76). Thus, theories of association rather than 
assimilation became the norm. Association policies engendered new class, racial, and 
gender relations and categories with differential obligations and rights (Hill, 2006). 
Though contradictory in many ways, the assimilation and association paradigms were 
“two sides of the same strategy to establish French sovereignty” in a way that addressed 
the refusal of the colons to integrate socially or politically with the indigenous Algerians 
(Hill, 2006, p. 20). Policies of association emphasized the acceptance of differences 
between colonial subjects and the French, the policies stressed the teaching of ‘authentic’ 
or ‘traditional’ cultures in colonial schools and channeled civic rights through local 
traditional structures (Genova, 2004). Through association, then, colonial subjects would 
still benefit from French culture and progress, but they would no longer aspire to have the 
same status as the French and therefore no longer challenge the hierarchy of the empire 
by attempting to apply French republican values of equality and universalism (Genova, 
2004). In the case of French Algeria ‘assimilation’ was an ambiguous program both in 
theory and in implementation as the policies carried out under the name of assimilation 
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were often actually associationist, “while France continued to insist until the end of its 
empire that the ultimate goal of associationist policies remained assimilation 
(reconceived in the postcolonial era as integration)” (Mann, 2017, p. 11).  
In sum, the creation of French Algeria was predicated on an ongoing political will 
in France to carry on with (or at least not to abandon) a financially, physically, and 
psychologically costly military occupation that made space available for European 
immigrants (Sessions, 2005). This political will was sustained by the conviction that 
national honor and the basic identity of the nation hinged on the Algerian colonial 
project. Algeria’s two unique characteristics—being a settler colony and a constitutional 
part of the national territory—came out of this colonial ideology. While defining French 
Algeria, these characteristics also placed the “colony into a liminal, not-quite-
metropolitan, not-quite-colonial space” (Sessions, 2005, p. 18). In this way, Algeria both 
was and was not a part of France, and the “Algerian question” would preoccupy French 
thinkers and French political discourse for decades.   
Migration and Revolution 
 Colonialism not only destroyed indigenous forms of governance and behavioral 
codes, but also undermined local economies. The introduction of the Native Code in 1881 
(the segregationist and punitive code applied to Muslims) in addition to the imposition of 
the European tax system and of individual ownership, “devitalized and dislocated the pre-
colonial economy” (Aissaoui, 2009, p. 42). The dispossession of the most fertile lands by 
the French colonial authorities led to large-scale rural exodus (Bourdieu and Sayad, 
1964). Migration of Algerians to France began in early colonial times in the late 
nineteenth century, owing to increased “pauperization and debt, along with population 
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growth, caused more farmers to emigrate to France to become day laborers on French 
farms or to work in the factories in French towns and cities,” and emigration “offered 
some reprieve from the forces of dispossession” (Aissaoui, 2009, p. 42). Migration was 
also, in many ways, a political act against the oppressive colonial regime, insofar as it 
laid bare the social, political, and economic marginalization of indigenous Algerians in 
colonial Algeria (Aissaoui, 2009). 
 In the early 1900s, the migration of Algerians to France increased markedly when 
the demand for labor increased in France and the French state granted Algerians freedom 
of movement to France (MacMaster, 1997). Loosened restrictions on movement mainly 
benefited men from the Kabyle region (Camiscioli, 2009). Returning to the Kabyle Myth 
(aka Berber Myth), the Berbers were highly encouraged to migrate to France because of 
their perceived Caucasian features, which French colonizers believed would render them 
more readily assimilable in France (MacMaster, 1997). Also, Berbers from Kabyle had a 
history of participating in seasonal labor migrations prior to French colonization. These 
historic Berber migrations involved “ancient and extensive patterns of internal migration, 
of pilgrims and scholars, nomadic tribes, trans-Saharan traders, and seasonal laborers and 
peddlers” (MacMaster, 1995, p. 190). Kabyles made up the “single largest flow of 
seasonal migration…during the 1860s and 1870s teams of Kabyle harvesters descended 
into the plains…onto the farms of the Algiers region” (MacMaster, 1995, p. 192). 
Therefore, the transition from their historic temporary (seasonal) migrations within 
Algeria to temporary migrations to France was uncomplicated owing to the relatively free 
movement between France and Algeria and the higher wages in France. 
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 World War I (WWI) brought new and larger waves of Algerian immigrants to 
France, as Algerians were mobilized as soldiers and as industrial workers (Sloan, 2012). 
In 1912, France instituted obligatory military service (though most conscripts were 
voluntary) and nearly 300,000 Algerians were sent to France as workers and as soldiers 
in the French Army, and the entire Algerian economy was mobilized for the war effort 
(Mann, 2017). By the end of the war, more than one third of Muslim Algerian men 
between the ages of 20 and 40 were in the metropole (Ageron, 1991, p. 262). The 
experience of large-scale migration to France exposed the paradox embodied in the ideas 
of a republican colonial regime in Algeria (Mann, 2017). Through their conscription into 
the war effort in France and greater Europe, Algerian colonial subjects learned a new 
language of citizenship and rights in the factories, cafés, trenches, and prisons of Europe. 
This radically transformed Algerian society and led to the swift emergence of modern 
Algerian nationalism (Bouchareb, 2006).  
The military service of Muslim Algerians during WWI both obliged the French 
government to scramble for new ideological justifications for the persistence of 
inequality—which inadvertently provided colonial subjects the conceptual tools with 
which to contest this inequality (Mann, 2017). The resolute refusal of the colonial 
administration to extend equal political and legal rights to Algerians after the end of 
WWI “fatally undermined the validity of the French assimilationist discourse, 
fundamentally changing the nature of power relations between Metropole and colony and 
fueling the emergence of more radical forms of contentious politics in interwar Algeria” 
(Mann, 2017, pp. 10-11). Following the war, a group of Algerian veterans sought to hold 
France accountable to the republican ideals of universalism and directly lobbied the 
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highest levels of French colonial authority to equalize their status with French settlers and 
enable a path to citizenship without abandoning their adherence to Muslim law—
ultimately, the movement was unsuccessful but the “debates and subsequent mass 
conscription of Muslims during the Great War opened up a new page in French-Algerian 
contentious politics” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2018, p. 126). Forcing colonial troops to fight 
(and die) for liberties that they themselves did not possess gave rise to the nationalist and 
anti-colonial movements in the mid-twentieth century. 
 After the Armistice, economic lobbies in Algeria feared losing their colonial 
workforce to mainland France and began hostile press campaigns in France “that 
denounced the supposed criminality and sexual aggressiveness of Algerian men” (these 
stereotypes formed an indelible image of Algerians in France that continue today) 
(House, 2006, p. 2). Regardless of the hostile press campaigns and the high level of 
surveillance in France, Algerians continued to arrive in France, reaching 100,000 
Algerian immigrants in France by 1924 (House, 2006, p. 3). During this time, the 
government commissioned studies of the aptitudes of different races under the auspices 
of matching suitable employment with different groups of foreigners (Camiscioli, 2009). 
Stereotypes of Algerian Muslims as backwards, impulsive, and predisposed to criminality 
then justified the extension of the racist colonial system of administrative control to the 
metropole and formed the basis for new forms of institutionalized racism against 
Algerians (Sloan, 2012). France imposed travel restrictions on Algerians in 1924 by 
requiring special papers, including a work contract from the Ministry of Labor and a 
clean tuberculosis test in order to apply for a travel permit (certificate d’embarquement) 
(Amiri, 2004). However, this measure did not have the intended effect of decreasing the 
 
117 
number of Algerians travelling to France; rather, it triggered an increase in clandestine 
immigration.  
In reaction to this increase of Algerians in France, the immigration service was 
reorganized at the Prefecture of Police, which then created a new surveillance network 
solely for North Africans (Rosenberg, 2006). After the first World War, French 
authorities “began to transform an anti-Arab prejudice that was broadly similar to the 
prejudices most other migrants encountered into something fundamentally worse” 
(Rosenberg, 2006, p. 12). From the years 1925-1945, the special police force tasked with 
surveilling North Africans—the North African Brigade—followed Algerians in France 
by patrolling immigrant neighborhoods, checking residency papers, conducting 
background checks, questioning those who looked out of place, and routinely 
confiscating work and residency papers (Amiri, 2004). By 1935, North Africans were 
being arrested at four times the rate of the general population (Rosenberg, 2006, p. 162). 
Despite their French nationality (if not citizenship), Algerians were excluded from 
protections such as legal status and work permits that were extended to other immigrants 
(France remained an important destination for labor migrants and political exiles from 
around Europe during the interwar period) (Rosenberg, 2006). It was under these 
circumstances that Algerians (in France and in Algeria) became politically mobilized and 
that the movement of Algerian independence was born. The Etoile nord-africaine (ENA), 
the first prominent North African political organization was formed in June of 1926 
(Aissaoui, 2009). Led by Sorbonne-educated, Messali Hadj, it partnered with the Parti du 
people algérien (PPA) in the interwar period (Aissaoui, 2009). Importantly, though, not 
all activists supported full independence. During the interwar period, for instance, the 
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Jeune Algérien (Young Algerian) movement, led by Ferhat Abbas, demanded equal 
rights within the framework of French sovereignty and championed rights for Muslim 
Algerians to be equal to those of the European settlers in Algeria (Stora, 2001). 
According to Stora (2001, p. 17), Ferhat Abbas,  
expressed a longing for the true France, which exemplified the principles of 1789. 
France, the country that had invented democratic culture via the Great Revolution, 
could impose on the Europeans of Algeria, respect for the indigenous person 
deprived of rights. He therefore [championed equal rights], but remained attached 
to Algeria’s religious personality: for him, a person could be simultaneously and 
fully French and Muslim. 
The onset of World War II once again involved the conscription28 of Algerians for 
the war machine as soldiers and factory workers. During the war, with the creation of the 
carte d’identité militaire (military identity card), Algerians and other colonial 
populations—though not technically French citizens—became eligible for conscription 
into the French military. Of the 400,000 men who served in the Armée Française in the 
Provence offensive, two-thirds were from French colonies (Amiri, 2004, p. 29). The 
Vichy government, in collaboration with Nazi Germany, took control of colonial 
holdings in Africa and Asia. In 1942, the Allies (led by U.S. General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower) landed in Algiers, Casablanca, and Oran and occupied North Africa 
(Canzano and Cohn, 2009). The occupation forces acted as “agents of emancipation” by 
promising a new world for formerly subjected peoples, and French General Charles de 
Gaulle declared that France was under an obligation to the Muslims of North Africa 
because of the loyalty they had shown during the war (Canzano and Cohn, 2009). Yet, 
 
28 Conscription of Algerian soldiers during WWII was not a uniform process (owing to 
the Nazi occupation of France) and military leadership was not consistent. Further, much 
of the Algerian force of soldiers was voluntary (there was an assumption of civil reward 
for service, a so-called ‘blood tax’).  
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following the Allied victory in Europe in 1945, it became clear that the French 
government—though sapped of its imperial authority—did not intend to uphold their 
promises of freedom and equality for Algerians (Sloan, 2012). 
In the aftermath of the Allied liberation of France, “just as Algerians were hoping 
for significant reform—if not outright independence—the post-war Republican consensus 
in Paris moved in the other direction in order to revitalize France’s severely dented 
colonial grandeur” (House, 2006, p. 3). In December of 1942, Ferhat Abbas drafted the 
Algerian Manifesto seeking recognition of political autonomy for Algeria. In response to 
Abbas’ manifesto, France began instituting important changes to the legal status of 
Muslim Algerians, these changes corresponded with the shift in European thinking about 
race in the aftermath of the Nazi defeat. The Statute of Algeria in 1947 instituted 
unregulated passage between Algeria and France, and France extended citizenship status 
and equal rights to all Algerian men living in France with local civil status in 
metropolitan France (House, 2006; Sloan, 2012). Tens of thousands of Algerians took the 
opportunity to emigrate—to escape the colonial oppression (and famine) in Algeria in the 
hopes that metropolitan France “would provide new economic opportunities and a 
different, better form of social relations” (House, 2006, p. 3). The flow of immigrants 
changed in three significant ways: first, for the first time in the Algeria-France 
immigration history, Arab Algerians began to migrate at the same rates of Kabyle-
Berbers (who had long dominated Algerian immigration); second, entire (nuclear) 
families started to emigrate; and third, immigrants began to be less focused on 
communities back home in Algeria and thus stayed longer in France, attempting to 
integrate into the French working class (House, 2006). 
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 The expansion of equal civil status did not extend to Algeria itself, and Arab-
Berber Algerians in France and Algeria were now officially called ‘French-Algerian 
Muslims,’ an ethnically inspired sub-category of citizens that Algerians resented (House, 
2006). These post-1944 reforms were attempts, by France, to “reconcile republican 
values and imperial conquest” but they did little to appease the Arab-Berber Algerian 
population (Shepard, 2006, p. 45). Ironically, it was French-educated Algerians—
especially those from Kabyle, who had been favored by the French colonial state and 
who had initially migrated to France in greater numbers than their Arab counterparts—
who led the nationalist movement in Algeria (Fois, 2016). During the war era, this group 
of educated Algerians had led the revival of the ‘national culture,’ the birth of a 
nationalist press, the formation of political groups among the Algerians, and violent 
resistance to compulsory military service under the French flag (Saadallah, 1965). After 
the war, Algerian nationalism gained momentum as Algerian parties reached maturity 
and were capable of clarifying their objectives and operational strategies (Fois, 2016).  
A defining moment for these nationalists was the 1945 Sétif massacre in Kabyle, 
in which a post-war victory celebration with Algerian nationalist overtones turned into a 
violent confrontation with police that left 103 Europeans dead (Stora, 2001, p. 22). In 
reprisal for those deaths, the French army conducted shootings and summary executions 
among the native population that continued for several days. The French reported 15,000 
deaths among the Muslim population, while Algerian nationalists claim a figure of 
45,000 deaths (Stora, 2001, p. 22). Edward Behr (1961, p. 52-55) described the Sétif 
massacre as, 
an event which, in one form or another, has marked every single Algerian Muslim 
alive at the time...and the after-effects of the Sétif uprising cannot be 
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underestimated. Every one of the “new wave” of Algerian nationalists prominent 
in the National Liberation Front today traces his revolutionary determination back 
to May 1945. The moderate, French-educated Algerians who had hoped for 
progressive evolution towards self-government had their hopes dashed by French 
violence. Among the current leaders of the FLN…there is general agreement: 
each of them felt after May 1945 that some form of armed uprising would sooner 
or later become necessary.  
After Sétif, Algerian nationalists became increasingly radical and the paramilitary 
group, the Organization Spéciale (Special Organization, OS) was formed in 1947 but 
most of the underground militants were arrested in 1950 and many of its leaders were 
imprisoned (Stora, 2001). In 1954, a group of former OS members formed the Comité 
Révolutionnaire pour l’Unité et l’Action (Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action, 
CRUA) (Stora, 2001). The CRUA later became the Front de Libération Nationale (The 
National Liberation Front, FLN), established in October of 1954 (Stora, 2001). The FLN 
launched the insurrection of November 1, 1954, “which inaugurated the war of Algerian 
independence and marked the end of colonial Algeria” (Stora, 2001, p. 27). The FLN 
successfully brought the cause of revolution to Algerians with the primary aim of a single 
democratic and socialist Algerian Republic (Barei, 2003). 
The Algerian War began with the November 1, 1954 coordinated attacks of the 
FLN of 30 individual targets against police and military targets (Stora, 2001). The attacks 
were meticulously planned, orchestrated, and carried out by Algerian revolutionary 
fighters (this attention and focus were hallmarks of the Algerian revolutionaries). 
Following the attacks, the FLN issued a proclamation to all Algerians “to rise and fight 
for their freedom” (Entelis, 1986, p. 50). After the start of the war, Algerian Muslims 
were arrested and regularly tortured by the police and were subjected to increased 
measures of racialized subjugation. The question of torture during the Algerian war for 
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independence, and the “Algerian Question” more generally, soon attracted international 
attention and was raised at the United Nations Security Council in January of 1955 
(Entelis, 1986). The United Nations ordered France to implement Algeria’s right to 
independence immediately (Horne, 1977). Instead of honoring this demand, France 
increased its military presence in Algeria from 80,000 troops in 1954 to 400,000 in 1956 
(Aldrich, 1996, p. 294). 
Paradoxically, immigration to France did not stop during the Algerian War. 
Migration continued to be driven by a labor shortage in France and an employment 
shortage in Algeria (Stora, 2001). By 1954, one in seven Algerian men of working age 
and ability was living and working in France—212, 000 people, equal to 1/20th of the 
entire Algerian population (Sayad and Gillette, 1976, p. 40). Algerians worked in 
numerous fields, with high concentrations the industrial sectors of mining and metallurgy 
and other heavy industry such as automobile manufacturing during the 1940s-1950s 
(Stora, 2001; Samers, 1997). In the 1950s, a construction boom overtook the other sectors 
and by 1954, nearly thirty-two percent of Algerians in France worked in construction, 
and twenty percent in mechanical and electrical industries (Lyons, 2013, p. 69). Algerian 
families fled the violence and instability of the war by migrating to France. By 1956, 
there were 300,000 Algerians in France (House, 2006, p. 3).  
The Algerian diaspora in France played a leading role in the Algerian War, with 
the FLN turning the structural economic inequalities between the colony and the 
metropole to their advantage by “funding the majority of their military campaigns against 
the French state through regular taxes forcibly raised on Algerians in France” (House, 
2006, p. 3). The presence of the FLN on French soil led to a steep increase in police 
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surveillance and identity-check operations in France. The police “rounded up literally 
thousands of people on the street whom officers judged to be of ‘Algerian’ appearance” 
(House, 2006, p. 3). The combination of repressive policing tactics in France, news of 
atrocities in Algeria, structural discrimination of Algerians in the French workplace, and 
a sustained attempt to forcibly assimilate Algerians all worked to reinforce Algerian’s 
resistance to colonial rule and fostered support for the FLN (House, 2006).  
 In 1956, the war took on a new aspect of warfare in Algeria—urban terrorism 
(Barei, 2003). Famously known as the ‘Battle of Algiers,’ bombings occurred in public 
civilian areas in Algiers where most Europeans resided. These attacks were especially 
notorious because of the part played by three Algerian women, Zohra Drift, Djamila 
Bouhired, and Samia Lakhdari, who placed bombs in places frequented by Europeans 
(Barei, 2003). In response to these bombings, French General, Jacques Massu directed his 
men to find and destroy the terrorist network “through any means at their disposal” 
(Barei, 2003, p. 69). This action gave the French military the authority to arrest Muslims 
at random. It was at this time that “institutionalized torture became the regular French 
police and army intelligence policy of interrogation” (Barei, 2003, p. 69). The United 
Nations continued to pressure France for a peaceful and democratic end to the conflict 
(Stora, 2001).  
 The social and political turmoil of the Algerian War led to the fall of France’s 
Fourth Republic in 1958, at this time, General Charles de Gaulle came to power (Stora, 
2001). During the summer of 1958, General de Gaulle visited Algeria five times to set 
out his political agenda for French colonies and to establish personal contact with 
Algerians (Barei, 2003). De Gaulle announced that all Muslims were now Frenchmen, 
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and he presented a five-year plan that guaranteed the redistribution of land, the 
construction of housing and infrastructure, and the creation of jobs for hundreds of 
thousands of Muslims (Betts, 1991). He also sought to reduce the political power of the 
army in Algeria. In 1959, when the FLN rejected de Gaulle’s offer of a truce, his policy 
approach shifted to achieving military victory (Tyre, 2004). On September 16, 1959, de 
Gaulle publicly outlined three options for the situation in Algeria to come to a peaceful 
end: complete independence, integration, or self-determination in close association with 
France (Evans, 2012). This was the turning point in the war, signaling de Gaulle’s 
willingness to loosen France’s ties with Algeria. Algeria chose self-determination, and 
both sides accepted a ceasefire (Evans, 2012). 
 In Algeria, the colons were devastated and promptly denounced de Gaulle’s 
speech and declared his actions as betrayal. In 1960, the Europeans in Algeria built 
barricades around the city of Algiers in protest to the growing realization that Algeria was 
headed toward independence. Protests began to take on a violent nature and the 
Europeans in Algeria began their bid to save French Algeria. They viewed de Gaulle’s 
policies and attempts at reconciliation as “France’s abandonment of her military and 
political obligations to the European population in Algeria” (Barei, 2003, 129). A state of 
siege began throughout Algeria. At the heart of this new addition to the French-Algerian 
battle was the newly created French right-wing body, the Organisation Armée Secrète 
(Secret Army Organization, OAS) (Stora, 2001). The OAS began a campaign to destroy 
not only the Algerian rebellion but also to gain power from the French army in Algeria 
(which had been brought under control by de Gaulle and was working toward an 
independent Algeria). The OAS embarked on a terrorist campaign that “formed the 
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background against which the final negotiations for Algerian independence were 
conducted” (Barei, 2003, p. 130).  
In October of 1961, the war in Algeria was brought to mainland France in the 
form of what has become known as the ‘Battle of Paris.’ This event provides insight into 
the position of Algerian immigrants within French society towards the end of the war, 
revealing their “degree of isolation and the depth of racism” within France (MacMaster, 
1997, p. 199). On October 6th, 1961, all Algerian cafés in Paris were ordered closed by 
the chief of police, Maurice Papon (a former Nazi collaborator), and a curfew was 
established that banned Algerians from the streets of Paris between 8:30pm and 5:30am 
(Halla, 2014). The police enforced the curfew by arresting anyone who appeared to be 
Algerian—including Tunisian, Moroccan, Spanish, and Italian immigrants (Welch and 
McGongale, 2013). In protest of the curfew, the FLN organized a peaceful protest for the 
night of October 17, 1961 when roughly 40,000 Algerians (of ‘French Muslim of 
Algeria’ status) descended upon the famous boulevards of central Paris after curfew 
(MacMaster, 1997, p. 200). Algerian immigrants relegated to the margins of society were 
making their presence felt and, according to MacMaster (1997, p. 200),  
Parisian bystanders were astonished by the ‘invasion’, hundreds upon hundreds of 
Algerians marching through the dark and rain of the Grand Boulevards shouting 
slogans, ‘Algeria for the Algerians’, ‘Power to the FLN’, or in the case of the 
women, uttering the shrill ‘You You’ of North Africa. 
With news of the protest, the French government gave Papon the authority to arrest 
and/or assault every Arab-looking individual in the streets (Guerdijou, 1998). The 
protesters met with 7,000 riot police armed with heavy batons and guns. Unarmed 
Algerians were beaten, shot, strangled, and drowned all across the city of Paris (Napoli, 
1997). Thousands of Algerians were arrested and transported to holding centers in the 
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city where the beatings continued, and many Algerians died in transit or in the detention 
centers (Napoli, 1997). Bodies of drowned Algerians, with their hands tied behind their 
backs, washed up on the banks of the Seine river for weeks following the incident (Welch 
and McGongale, 2013). In all, over 200 Algerians were murdered by the police and 
another 11,500 were arrested and held in sports complexes (functioning as holding 
centers) (MacMaster, 1997). This event, a massacre, reveals French reactions to Algerian 
immigrants in the final phases of the Algerian War, particularly the “hideous beast of 
racism” (MacMaster, 1997, p. 200). This event and other violent, racially motivated 
events that took place in Paris on and around the 17th of October 1961 are now among the 
most notorious and controversial incidents in modern French history (Welch and 
McGongale, 2013).  
After the Battle of Paris, the momentum for Algerian independence was 
irreversible and unstoppable, and de Gaulle accepted the FLN as representing the wishes 
of the majority of the Algerian people (Barei, 2003). The violence in Paris not only 
changed national discourses on Algerians in France, but also served to create indelible 
memories of insecurity and the end of colonialism within the collective consciousness of 
the Franco-Algerian relationship (Woodhouse-Ledermann, 2018). In November of 1961, 
de Gaulle began talks with the FLN in Switzerland to end the brutal conflict. The Evian 
accords were signed on March 18, 1962 that outlined an immediate cease-fire, amnesty, 
and the release of all military and political prisoners within twenty days (Barei, 2003).  
 The Algerian War constituted a significant transformation of the organizational 
structure of both France and Algeria. During the course of the war, four-fifths of France’s 
territory was torn away and over 500,000 people were killed from both the French and 
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Algerian sides of the conflict (Silverstein, 1998; Stora, 2001, p. 111). The war was “not 
just about the national liberation of Algeria, but it was truly played out and understood as 
a civil war within France” and created a crisis of French nationalism (Silverstein, 1998, p. 
102). General de Gaulle encouraged France to see the end of the Algerian War as an 
opportunity for France to set a new path. However, France was at the time suffering from 
demographic uncertainty, industrial anxieties, and doubt about the nation’s founding 
values (Stora, 2001). The war had weakened the French Army, divided the Church, and 
divided the country. Only a decade had passed since the end of World War II and the 
“kinship and participation in that unique history called “the Resistance” and “the 
Liberation” had been shattered” (Stora, 2001, p. 111). The Algerian War caused a 
genuine crisis in French nationalism and identity.  
Postcolonial Franco-Algerian Relations 
 Todd Shepard (2006) has argued that French politicians ‘invented’ the concept of 
decolonization in 1961 and 1962 to explain Algerian independence as a logical apex in an 
emancipatory rendering of French imperial history, to conceal the embarrassment of 
losing Algeria to militant rebels, and to reposition France with a focus on Europe rather 
than its empire. From this perspective, Algerian independence was evidence that the 
French civilizing mission was a success and had run its course by the mid-twentieth 
century (Wadowiec, 2014). In addition to the guarantee of Algeria’s independence, a 
significant legacy of the Evian Accords was the continued configuration of citizenship 
and national belonging through categories of racial-religious difference (Shepard, 2006). 
This was equally embraced by Algerians, as shown by comments made by the Ministry 
of the Interior in 1962, describing that among metropolitan Muslims, “a sense of racial 
 
128 
pride has swelled in their hearts and similarly has illuminated in the faces of even the less 
nationalistic. This is because, for the [Algerian] worker, [the Evian Accords] signals an 
official, French-recognized victory for Islam; it is the end of a complex” of inferiority 
(CARAN, 1962). Thus, the racial, national, and religious delineations of geographic 
belonging were (re)configured by the Algerian War—essentially rewritten by French 
officials.  
 Further, decolonization clearly had many implications for Algerian migration. 
Under the terms of the Evian Accords, two clauses guaranteed that all Algerians with an 
identity card were “free to circulate between Algeria and France and while resident in 
France they were guaranteed, the same rights as French nationals with the exception of 
political rights” (MacMaster, 1997, p. 203). Unprecedented numbers of Algerian 
immigrants arrived in France during the 1960s seeking immediate work and stability as 
Algeria limped toward recovery after the war. Following the Evian accords, “70,000 
Algerians were arriving each week in France, and average net Algerian immigration 
increased by about 40,000 per year in the first three years of independence” (Samers, 
1997, p. 56). Between 1968 and 1975, the Algerian population in France swelled from 
471,020 to 710,690; by 1988, there were 820,900 Algerian immigrants in France (Stora, 
2001, p. 158). This number surpassed the 812,000 Portuguese immigrants, 573,000 
Italian immigrants, and 571,000 Spanish immigrants in France in the late 1980s 
(Silverman, 1992, p. 47). The Algerian population was more than three times larger than 
the Moroccan community, the second largest ex-colonial population in France 
(Silverman, 1992, p. 47). 
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 Algerian-born sociologist, Abdelmalek Sayad (1977) identified a periodization of 
Algerian migration to France over half a century, from the end of World War I to the 
mid-1970s. In his work, he identified three periods of migration, each characterized by 
dominant forms of circulation and by different types of migrant actors—the first stage 
occurred from 1945-1950, the second stage from 1950-1962, and the third stage from 
1962-1977 (Sayad, 1977). Sayad’s work distinguishes between the ‘origin variables’ 
(e.g., geographic, social, economic, and local migration culture) and ‘destination 
variables’ (e.g., working conditions, accommodation, and family situation) as they 
pertain to the migration trajectory of Algerian immigrants in France. Here, it is the 
interwoven nature of ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ variables that are in constant interplay in 
postcolonial Franco-Algerian relations. We have seen the ways that the first two stages 
played out during French colonization, but now, I move on to the third stage that 
occurred after the Algerian War.  
 While the end of the Algerian War did not immediately restrict the movement of 
Algerians to France, it did alter the context in which migrations occurred. Prior to 
Algerian independence from France in 1962, Algerian immigrants were not leaving one 
country to enter another. The end of the war meant that Algerians in France lost their 
automatic claim to citizenship status but, according to French law, they could apply to 
retain their French citizenship. However, as a result of the Evian Accords, Algerians in 
France were forced to choose between French and Algerian citizenship (Byrnes, 2013). 
This process was complicated by Algerians’ “sense of attachment to their new, hard-won, 
national independence, as well as by difficulties posed by bureaucratic paperwork to a 
population with generally low levels of education and literacy” (Byrnes, 2008, p. 9). This 
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hesitation to take on French citizenship weighed heavily on Algerians, because “adopting 
French nationality was considered treason against one’s roots, origins, homeland, etc. 
Algeria did not like its citizens to show up at the border with a French passport. This 
added insult to injury” (Ben Jelloun, 1999, p. 27). Still, Algerians did hold privileged 
access to residency, the labor market, and French nationality in the years following the 
end of the Algerian War (Byrnes, 2008).  
 On April 10, 1964, France and Algeria signed the Nekkache-Grandval accords 
which outlined that labor migrations of Algerians to France would be “a function of both 
Algeria’s requirements and the requirements of the French state” (Samers, 1997, p. 56). 
Algeria had a great need for exporting surplus labor, thus reducing unemployment and 
the attendant social ills this often triggered. France, however, had a great interest in 
stemming the tide of Algerian labor migrants, and this legislation imposed “humiliating 
terms which radically undermined the Evian agreement,” which enabled “France to set 
unilaterally a quota restriction (soon after set at 12,000 immigrants per year)” 
(MacMaster, 1997, p. 204). This policy tightened documentation requirements and 
introduced a quota system for Algerian immigrants 29. 
 
29 In 1962, also France had to deal with two new groups of immigrants to France: harkis 
and pied noirs. A harki was an Algerian sympathetic to the French cause in Algeria—
Algerians who fought for the French in the war. In 1962, up to 100,000 harkis who had 
served in the French security forces, arrived in France fleeing massacre in Algeria by 
nationalist sympathizers (House, 2006). Pied noir is the term applied to the European 
colons at the end of the war—850,000 pied noirs fled Algeria after the war and were 
‘repatriated’ to France (Choi, 2016, p. 2). French authorities struggled to attend to the 
needs of this influx of political refugees of sorts—the French colons and harkis became 
highly specific and very differently treated groups of immigrants in France. While the 
harkis had French nationality, they and their descendants were mostly left to exist in 
isolated camps in rural areas and have been exposed to similar forms of racist 
discrimination as other Algerian immigrants (House, 2006). The pied noir community 
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Though French and Algerian delegations were at odds on labor migrations, both 
sides agreed on the importance of limiting family resettlement (Franklin, 2017). French 
authorities were concerned with housing and providing social services for Algerian 
families, who were predominately residing in overcrowded and unsanitary bidonvilles 
(shantytowns), which posed public health problems. The possible permanence of 
Algerian family migration troubled Algerian officials because they feared that family 
migration would cripple Algeria’s economic and demographic recovery from the war 
(Franklin, 2017). Algerians in France received disproportionate public and governmental 
attention and the presence of Algerians (and their families) in France had “already led the 
French to create a template for managing migration, integration, and public fears” 
(Franklin, 2017, p. 122). However, the number of families arriving in France quickly 
overwhelmed the capabilities of the French social assistance system. This led to rising 
rents in low-income housing as well as “racialized application procedures” that 
compounded the difficulties for Algerian families to find suitable housing, resulting in 
the growth of the bidonvilles (Franklin, 2017, p. 129).  
The situation in the bidonvilles, in turn, reinforced the hostile French public’s 
negative view of Algerian families and promoted the notion that Algerians were 
incapable of assimilation into French society (Byrnes, 2013). In the late 1960s, social 
workers in France identified the multi-layered effects of living in the bidonvilles for 
Algerians, finding that “it is certain that reactions of hostility, contempt, and distrust, are 
 
has also been subjected to forms of discrimination as their role in the Algerian situation 
was interpreted by mainland France—most pied noirs ended up in the South of France 




more frequent and more contagious now that the concentration of Algerians is greater” 
(Gall, 1966, p. 127). For these social workers, the problems of Algerian family migration 
were not caused by its permanence, but by the systematic marginalization of Algerian 
families by the French administration. Their solution was to implement specialized 
programs to foster integration and to avoid delinquency, public health crises, and 
discrimination (Gall, 1966). By the 1970s, most bidonvilles were demolished and 
replaced by social housing high-rise apartment buildings that have become today’s cités 
(large concrete housing projects) in the banlieues30 of France (Togman, 2002).  
In the 1970s, France entered an economic downturn that put the industrial jobs 
typically held by Algerian immigrants at risk and led immigration officials to further 
restrict the number of immigrants admitted to France. The priorities of immigration 
policy were not only to prevent the entrance of foreign workers but also to attempt to 
reduce the number of existing foreign workers in France (Viprey, 2010). The 
combination of an economic downturn, a lack of housing, and an increase in racially 
motivated attacks on Algerians in France led to the decisive decisions by France and 
Algeria in the early 1970s to halt immigration between the two countries. In 1973, the 
Algerian government suspended all emigration to France in response to a series of racial 
attacks on Algerians in France (Stora, 2001). In part due to the oil shock of 1973, France 
halted labor migrations and family reunifications to France in 1974 (Samers, 2003a). In 
1974, the French government suspended all labor migration from outside of Europe 
(Stora, 2001). A November 1975 decree introduced a system of labor opportunities that 
 
30 As described earlier, the French term “banlieue” literally translates to “suburb” but the 
term banlieue has become pejorative, meaning slums dominated by immigrants (Packer, 
2015). I further discuss these areas in Chapter Seven. 
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required open job positions to be offered (and preferably filled) by French nationals first, 
and then the job could be offered up for foreign fulfillment (Viprey, 2010). In 1978, the 
French council of state overturned the ban on family reunification but maintained a firm 
stance on restricting labor migrations (Viprey, 2010). Additional policies sought to 
eliminate illegal entry, to regularize the status of those already arrived, to encourage 
unemployed immigrants to return home, and to handle tensions between indigenous and 
foreign workers and the demands of immigrants for broader protection and rights (Ogden 
and White, 1989). According to Silverman (1992, pp. 46-47), this period of immigration 
was 
crucial in terms of the different ways in which immigration came to be perceived 
in official circles. From having been considered a peripheral and temporary 
phenomenon, immigration was recognized to be of structural significance; from 
having been discussed largely in terms of manpower needs and economic 
necessity, immigration was conceived also as a ‘social problem’ and a problem of 
assimilation and ethnic balance; from having been largely marginalized in France, 
immigrants became increasingly politicized and involved in conflict and struggle. 
By the 1980s, there was a growing realization in France that “culturally diverse 
immigrants were in France to stay,” and anxiety about cultural assimilation began to 
grow in French society (Thomas, 2011, p. 78). In response to this anxiety, and faced with 
rising unemployment, the French government attempted to “force the return of substantial 
numbers of unwanted foreigners who had been legally resident in France, above all 
Algerians, to their countries of origin” (Thomas, 2011, p. 78). In 1983, the secretary of 
the state added stricter limitations on the 1975 labor requirements and re-established a 
system of ‘return assistance’ on the basis of bilateral agreements with the countries of 
origin (a provision aimed at Algerian and Moroccan immigrants) (Viprey, 2010). In 1986 
French immigration policy took an even harder turn toward ultra-conservativism with the 
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introduction of the Pasqua Law that restricted the conditions of entry and residence of 
foreigners in France and instigated the deportation of illegal aliens in the name of ‘zero 
immigration’ (Viprey, 2010). The 1987 Nationality Code required “mastery of the French 
language, civil or military service, ‘Frenchifying’ of last names, absence of a criminal 
record, and sponsorship by French nationals;” under this law, second-generation 
immigrants would have to opt either for this naturalization or for return to their parents’ 
country of origin (Thomas, 2011, p. 83). 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, Algerian immigration became synonymous with 
crime, poverty, and racial tension, terms like ‘North African,’ ‘Muslim,’ ‘Maghrebin,’ 
‘Arab,’ even ‘immigrant,’ were used “interchangeably when describing the ‘problem’ of 
Algerian immigration” (Benbassa, 2005; Byrnes, 2013, p. 3). Attention shifted to the 
second and third-generation descendants of Algerian immigrants, and discussions of 
integration became increasingly heated. The time period of the late 1970s through the 
1980s can be described as a transition that hinged on the republican narrative that 
promised Algerian families an eventual social integration through a measured adaptation 
to French lifestyle—in reality this was “beset by the confluence of popular and state-
endorsed racism which, through citizenship applications and housing policy, generated a 
number of structural hindrances that precluded integration on the ground” (Wadowiec, 
2014, p. 175). According to Hargreaves (1995), a public survey in 1985 showed that 66 
percent of those questioned (French citizens) felt that France was in danger of losing its 
national identity if nothing was done to limit the foreign population—this figure rose to 
75 percent in a similar 1989 poll (p. 151). North Africans, namely Algerians, were 
considered by the French public to be the least assimilated of all immigrant groups in 
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France (Hargreaves, 1995). Algerian immigrants and their descendants were perceived as 
a recalcitrant community, resistant to proper cultural identifications of French belonging 
(Silverstein, 2004). So, while immigration through normative channels (defined by the 
historical immigration patterns from Algeria to France during colonization) slowed in the 
1970s, the 1980s saw a shift in attention from immigration to integration. 
As integration became the main subject of obsession for the French majority, the 
second generation of Maghrebi immigrants “experienced their own political and cultural 
awakening” and developed a culture of their own—an overlapping of their parents’ 
heritage with French culture as they experienced it (Byrnes, 2008, p. 13). Calling 
themselves ‘beurs’ (inverted slang for ‘Arab’), Algerian-origin youth invoked their 
French citizenship and rejected the daily discrimination they suffered in French society 
(Begag, 2007). Beur became both a counterculture and a political identity rooted in their 
parents’ history and their shared geographic space of the banlieues. The beurs used 
music, literature, and filmmaking to express their experiences as poor, marginalized 
urban youth (Dotson-Renta, 2015). Postcolonial immigrants and their descendants 
challenged the idea of a cohesive society where republican values make everyone the 
same—the idea being that politics should not be formed around cultural, ethnic, and 
racial categories that would separate citizens. According to Azouz Begag (2007), “it was 
during this period that [Algerians and their descendants] began to feel like the disowned, 
illegitimate children of French society…the grand mythical principles of the equality of 
all citizens before the law were trampled underfoot” (p. 12).  
It was also during this time that the banlieue, which had replaced the bidonvilles, 
became both a place and an idea by taking on a special meaning attached to the beur 
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generation and their parents. Owing to the high level of social disadvantage, chronic rates 
of unemployment, and poverty, the banlieue is often regarded as a dead-end space 
(Hargreaves, 2011). Yet, for the beur generation (and subsequent generations of 
immigrant families), the “ethnically diverse nature of the populations concentrated in 
these spaces makes them richly multicultural” (Hargreaves, 2011, p. 28). Mustafa Dikeç 
(2007) characterized the banlieue as the ‘badlands’ of France. Dikeç remarks that from 
the establishment of the banlieues, they have been associated with insecurity and a lack 
of social order (2007). The banlieues function as visual representations of failed 
assimilation policies, and they appear in public discourse almost exclusively as spaces of 
crime, poverty, and foreign bodies. In short, the banlieues have become the antithesis of 
what it means to the French majority to be French (Dotson-Renta, 2015). Re-connecting 
this to my selection of neighborhoods for this research, because of these (and other) 
assumptions about banlieues, it was important for me to understand the difference (if 
any) between central-city Paris, and the surrounding areas.  
Franco-Algerian Relations: 1990s-2000s 
 As the decade of the 1990s approached, events in Algeria were set to become 
more influential in the immigration context between Algeria and France. In 1988, Algeria 
experienced the collapse of the single-party system dominated by the FLN, which had 
ruled Algeria since independence from France (Chelali, 2017). In October of 1988, 
demonstrations erupted across Algeria, to protest the widespread inflation and consumer 
scarcity (Stora, 2001). Islamic activists mobilized thousands of protestors, and the 
government responded with several reforms to appease the Algerian populace, including 
the separation of the Party (the FLN) and the state (Chelali, 2017). During the years 1989 
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and 1990, multiple shakeups of the government and the electoral process led to the 
inclusion of the Front Islamique de Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS) party in the 1991 
presidential elections (Stora, 2001). The Algerian government, seeing that it was losing 
the election to the FIS, cancelled elections and closed the polls. The cancellation of the 
Algerian election was supported by the French government, who “found itself caught in 
the web of the conflict” (Stora, 2001, p. 213). The FIS was banned and thousands of its 
members arrested (Stora, 2001). Islamist guerrillas emerged and began an armed 
campaign against the government and its supporters, plunging the country into a civil war 
that lasted until 2002.  
This period is often referred to as the ‘Black Decade’ as the level of violence and 
bloodshed increased, and the war claimed hundreds of thousands of lives—both military 
and civilian (Chelali, 2017). During the Black Decade, tens of thousands of Algerians 
fled to France to escape the horrors of the civil war (Zerdoumi, 2015). The French state 
responded by further tightening immigration rules. From 1990 through 1993, French 
legislators debated and implemented amendments that increased the penalties for 
irregular migration and established a legal holding time of 20 days for questionable 
migrants (Lochak, 1997; Viprey, 2010). During this time, critics accused immigration 
officials of proceeding with the assumption that the Algerian immigrants’ requests for 
entrance were “manifestly unfounded” (Viprey, 2010, p. 156).  
In 1993, the French government implemented a revised set of migration and 
naturalization measures (the second ‘Pasqua law’) that involved random searches and 
detainment for those without the proper papers (Samers, 2003b). In 1997, the Debré law 
“called for further limiting of foreigners’ rights and a heightened surveillance of 
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undocumented immigration” (Samers, 2003b, p. 567). This law was directly aimed at the 
“ambiguous status of some sans papiers,31 particularly the parents of French-born 
children, the foreign spouses of French citizens, children who entered France before the 
age of 10 and foreigners who had resided irregularly in France for more than fifteen 
years” (Samers, 2003b, p. 567). Subsequently, and reflecting new neoliberal imperatives 
that were stricter on immigration, a new set of immigration laws passed in 1998 focused 
on retaining highly skilled and highly educated foreign students and professionals 
(Lochak, 1997; Viprey, 2010). 
During this time, integration, naturalization policies, the meaning of French 
citizenship, and the relation between cultural diversity and national unity became the 
most important issues in French politics (Celik, 2010). Debates about integration and 
citizenship soon revolved around a series of ‘headscarf affairs’ which first emerged in 
1989 and had become hotly politicized by 2004. The headscarf issue, which concerned 
the right of Muslim girls to wear the headscarf in state-run schools—brought questions 
about the proper function of public education, gender equality, individual autonomy, 
public order, religious freedom, and the rights of immigrants to the forefront of French 
public and political discussions (Celik, 2010). In early 2004, the French government 
passed a law that prohibited the wearing of any clothing that clearly indicated religious 
affiliation in the public schools (Bowen, 2007). While the law promoted secularism32, 
 
31 Sans papiers refers to illegal immigrants, or immigrants without legal residency papers, 
in literal translation, it means “without papers.” In the 1990s there was a Sans Papiers 
movement that fought for the regularization of illegal immigrants in France. 
32 French secularism, known as laïcité was codified in French law in 1905 after a long 
struggle between liberal-Enlightenment movements and conservative forces allied with 
the Catholic Church. As originally construed, it sought to bring the power of the Church 
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and was worded “in a religion-neutral way,” in practice, the law targeted the headscarf 
worn by Muslim girls. According to the French government, young women wearing the 
headscarf presented  
grave dangers to French society and its tradition of secularism (laïcité) presented 
by Islamic radicalism, a trend toward “communalism,” and the oppression of 
women in the poor suburbs…French public figures seemed to blame the 
headscarves for a surprising range of France’s problems, including anti-Semitism, 
Islamic fundamentalism, growing ghettoization in the poor suburbs, and the 
breakdown of order in the classroom (Bowen, 2007, p. 1) 33. 
 Compounding the sense of alienation that many immigrants felt in the wake of 
the headscarf debate was a law passed in 2005 by the National Assembly regarding the 
historical presentation of French colonization. The law called for the building of new 
monuments and museums that would valorize French colonial work and require schools 
to include within their curriculum the positive role of colonialism in the lives of colonial 
subjects (Bancel, 2013). The law was ultimately repealed by Constitutional Council. 
However, this debate illustrates how the state has sought to invoke colonialism and 
imperialism in defining Frenchness, regardless of the deeply alienating effect the memory 
of colonialism has on hundreds of thousands of French citizens from postcolonial 
backgrounds (Woodhouse-Ledermann, 2018). 
In 2005, riots broke out in the banlieues of Paris (and later across France). The 
riots began after two young boys fled from police and hid in a power substation where 
they were electrocuted and died from their injuries (Begag, 2007). Then interior minister, 
 
under the control of the French state.  Its meaning has changed considerably in recent 
decades in the context of Muslim immigration. I discuss laïcité further in Chapter Six. 
33 In 2011, the niqab (Muslim dress where all of the face except the eyes are covered) was 
outlawed in public spaces. In 2016, efforts were made to outlaw the burkini (Muslim 




Nicholas Sarkozy, made public comments about his intentions to clean out the racaille, 
or ‘scum’ of the banlieues (Pulham, 2005). Racaille, a term with implicit racial and 
ethnic resonances, is “about as close as one can get to hollering “ethnic cleansing” 
without actually saying so” (Pulham, 2005, p. 1). The expression racaille again laid bare 
the vestiges of colonialism in France, the word is associated with ratonnades, or “rat 
hunts” that occurred not only in colonial Algeria but in Imperial France to seek and kill 
assumed Algerian dissidents (Stora, 2001). The riots revealed a crisis of representation 
and recognition that called the viability of the French political system into question 
(Celik, 2010). While France had promised formal legal recognition of equality to all of its 
citizens, in practice, the identities of North African—namely Algerian—French citizens 
have historically been unequally recognized, and their demands not equally represented 
in French society.  
In 2006, Nicholas Sarkozy again made aggressive public comments regarding 
immigrants. Then president, Sarkozy declared that French immigration policies should be 
focused on ‘Immigration choisie v. Immigration subie,’ meaning that France should 
‘choose’ desirable immigrants, rather than ‘suffer’ undesirable immigrants (De Carvalho, 
2016). In this way, Sarkozy signaled his desire for legislation that allowed France to 
choose its immigrants and to foster educated and ‘of good stock’ immigrants while 
discouraging undesirable immigrants. This same sentiment has continued to guide French 
immigration policy to the present day. Today, a majority of French politicians see 
immigration as a problem. Former Prime Minister of France, Manual Valls called France 
“to take urgent action to control [France’s] external borders...otherwise our societies will 
be totally destabilized” (Marliere, 2016, p. 2). According to a September 2016 poll, 62 
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percent of French citizens oppose welcoming migrants and refugees seeking asylum in 
France (Marliere, 2016, p. 2). Further, a majority of French voters feel a “loss of 
‘sovereignty,’ which has to be ‘regained’” (Marliere, 2016, p. 2). In France, racism and 
xenophobia are on the rise, especially toward those from former colonies in North Africa 
(Marliere, 2016). Anxieties about immigration have been significantly heightened by the 
series of terrorist attacks in the mid-2010s. As described earlier, since the beginning of 
2015, there have been 36 incidents of terrorism on French soil, totaling 252 killed and 
943 wounded (Gatehouse, 2018; Breeden, 2019; Onishi and Méheut, 2020; Erlanger, 
2020). Among these incidents were the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, in which terrorists 
killed 11 and injured 11 others, and a Bastille Day attack in 2016, in which a driver 
ploughed into a crowd killing 84 people and injuring hundreds of others, and 2 gruesome 
incidences in 2020 involving beheadings (Chatignoux et al, 2018; Onishi and Méheut, 
2020). These acts of terrorism have seen a return of the colonial language that 
distinguished the ‘civilized’ from the ‘barbaric.’ Within these discourses, immigrants 
have been conflated with Muslims, and Muslims conflated with terrorists, and all of these 
are viewed as unassimilable in the French polity.     
In short, integration in France has never been about providing immigrants with 
opportunities to advance in French society. Political discourses and policies tend to 
enforce cultural assimilation, so that Algerians who fail to conform with “French dress, 
French habits, French marital practices [can] only be “other” to the French community;” 
integration’s tenets have created “the logic through which Algerians [are] excluded” 
(Franklin, 2017, p. 28). By elaborating the terms of Algerian-origin individuals’ supposed 
‘failed’ assimilation into French society, contemporary French Republicanism obscures 
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the structural impediments, unrealistic expectations, and subjective judgements that have 
been imposed on postcolonial immigrant communities.  
These structural impediments are evidenced by the acutely high unemployment 
rates among immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and sub-Saharan Africa 
(Lhommeau et al., 2010a). French researchers have found that, “all else being equal and 
after many structural effects have been taken into account, some of these groups [of 
immigrants] have higher unemployment rates than the mainstream population” 
(Lhommeau et al., 2010a, p. 53). In 2010, descendants from Algerian immigrants held 
one of the lowest employment rates of sixty-nine percent, compared to the mainstream 
employment rate of eighty-one percent (Lhommeau et al., 2010a, p. 54). For Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants, “the risk of unemployment is more than twice that of 
the mainstream population” (Lhommeau et al., 2010a, p. 56). Speaking to 
intergenerational social mobility, sixty-six percent of Algerian descendants’ fathers are 
manual laborers (and far more frequently unskilled), compared to only thirty-nine percent 
of the mainstream population; forty-six percent of descendants of Algerians also work in 
manual labor jobs compared to thirty-four percent of the mainstream population (Okba, 
2010, p. 62-63). Additionally, the sons of immigrants from Algeria are typically paid less 
than their peers in the mainstream population, yet the wage gap is only half of what it was 
for their fathers (Lhommeau et al., 2010b, p. 73). Educationally speaking, in 2010, 
eighteen percent of Algerian descendants left the French education system without any 
qualifications, compared to only eight percent of the mainstream population (Brinbaum et 
al., 2010, p. 46). Forty-one percent of Algerian immigrants’ descendants went on to 
higher education, compared to the mainstream figure of fifty-three percent—students 
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often attribute this lack of higher educational attainment to “unfavorable treatment” 
pertaining to their ‘origin’ or ‘skin color’ (Brinbaum et al., 2010, p. 49-50). A final 
observation of the schooling experiences and outcomes of immigrants versus the 
mainstream is that because of the residential segregation in France, typically, immigrants’ 
descendants do not go to the same schools as the children of the mainstream population 
(Felouzis, 2005).  
Conclusions 
This dissertation argues that the socio-cultural norms that define French identity 
and that form the basis of membership in the French polity took shape through the 
colonial encounter. After the 1789 Revolution, the term ‘empire’ “came to denote the 
personality of the entire French nation” and the “unification of disparate local groups into 
a single whole” (Pagden, 2001, p. 132). However, to enter the national community of 
France, it has been necessary to master the attributes, habits, dispositions, and mores of 
French society and culture, as defined by the French political elite (Fogerty and Osborne, 
2003). When the French empire undertook their mission civilisatrice to civilize the native 
people of its colonies, concepts of ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ were created with 
reference to an idealized, universal French culture. Historically in France, there have 
been clear lines to distinguish those “who did and did not have the right to be seen, and 
see themselves, as French” (Welch and McGonagle, 2013, p. 3). 
French racism has continued to deepen the divide between people of Algerian 
descent and other post-colonial immigrants, on the one hand, and European-origin French 
citizens on the other. This racism has been self-sustaining: “once anti-Algerian racism 
had been established and consolidated it, like anti-Semitism, was able to take on a ‘life of 
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its own’, a kind of autonomy, and to reproduce itself through time regardless of changes 
within the economy and regardless of the degree of Algerian incorporation/integration 
into French society” (MacMaster, 1997, p. 222). Throughout the Franco-Algerian 
relationship, notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ show up again and again, and like their 
predecessors, contemporary French governments continue to draw lines between “those 
they deem unworthy of, or unable to access, “Frenchness,” and those who are seen as 
properly “French” and “Republican” (Tchumkan, 2015, p. 1). The polarization of official 
rhetoric in France between ‘us’ and ‘them’ reveals that the notion of Frenchness 
continues to be highly selective and is developed to keep Algerian immigrants and their 
descendants out of socially accepted concepts of Frenchness. Citizenship and belonging 
for those of Algerian origins has been, and continues to be, tenuous and partial.  
This historical overview underscores that France is a “country faced with its 
inability to confront its colonial enterprise” in Algeria (Tchumkan, 2015, p. 2). France’s 
relationship with Algerian immigrants and their descendants is structured around “the 
long hatreds” produced by the original French invasion in 1830, sustained over the 132 
years of colonization, and increased through their defeat in the Algerian War of 
decolonization (Evans, 2012, p. xi). The “bedrock of Muslim anger” that developed 
through the material and cultural dispossession of Algeria was never reconciled by 
France (Evans, 2012, p. xi).  
While this imprint of colonialism exists in France today, it exists in different, less 
directly salient ways for younger generations34. The experiences of colonialism and 
postcolonialism between France and Algeria have profoundly shaped the lives of 
 
34 I discuss the aspects of a postcolonial identity in Chapter Five. 
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Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France; however, these influences are not 
monolithic, all-encompassing, or deterministic. In addition to class differences and 
continued differentiations based on ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion/religiosity,’ the amount of 
time involved in the history of Algerian immigration to France, and the generations of 
Algerians (born in both Algeria and France), make for divergent experiences for the 
Algerian-origin population in France. The result nearly two centuries later is a society 
that continues to deny Algerian-origin individuals an economic and political space in 
France, not least through restrictions on the expression of religious identity in public 
space. This troubled history raises several questions pertaining to the nature of belonging 
for Algerians in France: how are cultural practices of Algerian immigrants and their 
descendants marked by the legacy of the colonial period? What specific features of 
current cultural practices of Algerian-descent peoples are derived from pre-migratory 
traditions, and how have these been modified through settlement in France? How do 
gender, class, and education impact those practices? Do Algerian-origin individuals 
function essentially as part of or apart from the national culture of France? These are the 




ALGERIAN IDENTITY IN FRANCE
“When I look in the mirror, all I see is my parents’ Algerian son.”  
-Ferhat, 45-year-old, son of immigrants 
“I can’t tell you what it is to be French, but I can tell you what it is to not be Algerian.”  
                                                                  -Nadia, 26-year-old, part time resident in France 
“My name is Lakhdar, not François.” 
- Lakhdar, 48-year-old immigrant 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have provided conceptual and historical frameworks for 
understanding identity, belonging, and integration in the immigrant-receiving context of 
France. Immigrant identities are configurations of both ‘self’ and ‘other’ that are 
expressed and materialized through categories of ethnicity, heritage, race, religion, and 
citizenship. While they occupy a politically and socially subordinate position in France, 
Algerian immigrants and their descendants position themselves in relation to these 
identity categories and assign values and meanings to them; as well, they act upon these 
values and meanings within the realms and spaces of everyday life. Algerian-descent 
individuals negotiate these identity categories by embracing or rejecting the traits, values, 
and meanings associated with each; in doing so, they often engage with ideas of what is 
‘appropriate’ or ‘socially acceptable’ in different socio-spatial contexts. 
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This chapter places identities within a post-colonial context marked both by 
persistence and flux—shaped by, but also departing from, the situation of Français 
musulmans prior to Algerian independence. Algerian immigrants’ ties to Algeria remain 
important and meaningful, but there is no static ‘Algerian culture,’ just as there is no 
static ‘French culture.’ For the purposes of this dissertation, I follow geographer Don 
Mitchell’s (1995) approach that rejects ‘culture’ as a static, coherent, and visible set of 
traits to be inventoried so as to demarcate one culture or another. Instead, I engage with 
culture as a collection or production of norms, values, attitudes, social practices, and 
ways of understanding oneself in relation to Others. As such, cultural identities are 
always in the process of becoming through power-laden relationships. 
The discussion in this chapter challenges traditional sociological approaches to 
integration and assimilation, which posit that immigrant groups’ identification with 
‘ethnic’ origins diminish over time and generations and that immigrants take on the 
identity of the host society, blending into the mainstream, or the national ‘host-society.’ 
This teleological understanding of integration, with its binary conception of immigrant 
and host-society identities, informs many political discussions of integration. In France, it 
is central to discussions about the supposed ‘failure’ of North African immigrants (and 
their descendants) to become truly ‘French.’ This perception effectively places Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants as ‘internal outsiders’ who, while perhaps holding 
French citizenship, are permanently foreign (Costelloe, 2015; Driggers, 2018). State 
officials and media figures interpret ‘failed’ integration as an unwillingness of people of 
Algerian origin to shed identities (particularly Muslim identities) or to reject those 
cultural values and practices that are viewed as antithetical to Frenchness (Sánchez, 
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2019). Journalists and politicians, as Silverstein and Tetreault (2006) note, continuously 
perpetrate a symbolic violence against young French citizens of North African descent by 
repeatedly and mistakenly describing them as ‘foreigners’ and pathologizing and 
demonizing them for their supposed unwillingness to ‘integrate’ into French society. In 
blaming French children of immigrants for their perceived failure to integrate, these 
political actors deflect responsibility for social inequalities (Silverstein and Tetreault, 
2006). In these oppositions, this happens in both general terms as to how Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants are represented in French media and political discourse, 
but also in the everyday experiences of life in France—in public spaces such as the 
metro, in cafés, and on streets and sidewalks. The articulation of Algerian identity is 
produced as something ‘against Frenchness’ as something ‘other.’ 
I challenge this approach to integration discourse by illustrating how those of 
Algerian origin interviewed for this research identify and place themselves within a 
complex assemblage of identity categories that constitute French society. In the following 
sections, I show how Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France draw on 
multiple, intersecting, and sometimes contradictory identities simultaneously, and how 
identities emerge from interactions with others in particular settings and contexts. Acts of 
negotiation and arrangement of identities vary within the study population; the constructs 
of French and Algerian identities work together for some individuals and collapse for 
others. The ways that different components of identity work together for individuals are 
indicative of the intersectional quality of Algerian identity in France. The meanings 
attached to certain identities reflect stereotypes and prejudices, impressions and 
experiences; thus, contradictions are woven throughout the identities presented here.   
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This chapter begins with a discussion of official discourse relating to French 
identity, and then turns to my research subjects’ identity narratives. My analysis gives 
special attention to the importance of historical memory among my respondents and the 
antagonism toward France that it generates. This identity plays into French claims about 
non-assimilation. But I then explore how interview respondents construct different 
identities that can also complicate or undermine the French/Algerian binary. This 
discussion evaluates how individuals reconcile and combine the identities and 
components of their own lives and personalities that they conceive of as ‘French,’ 
‘Algerian,’ or as something different. To best understand the relational formulation of 
identities, I have grouped interview participants with similar ways of expressing identity, 
and I describe the kinds of encounters, situations, and experiences that have led them to 
think about and perform identities in particular ways. Following chapters examine in 
more detail the spatial element of identities among the Algerian community in Paris, 
France. 
Defining French Identity 
 Assimilation discourses and policies assume a coherent, bounded French national 
identity and carry an expectation that immigrants should conform to it. Political actors 
(bureaucrats, legislators, and other agents of the state, including schoolteachers and social 
workers) articulate French national identity on a daily basis, and they enshrine particular 
understandings of this identity in the French nationality code, immigration, and 
citizenship laws (Oscherwitz, 2001; Hargreaves, 1995). While political actors treat 
national identity as self-evident and unchanging, these same actors frequently revise 
nationality and citizenship codes and debate the meaning of integration. Indeed, there has 
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been much debate about the nature of so-called Frenchness—about whether it is under 
threat, how to maintain it, and the role of government in promoting it. These discourses 
influence the ways people of Algerian descent understand Frenchness and their position 
in a French polity. 
The term français de souche35  has been used by key French political actors to 
define Frenchness, specifically in reference to postcolonial immigration. In the 1960s, de 
Gaulle used the term to demarcate those “who are real French and those who do not fully 
belong” (Woodhouse-Lederman, 2018, p. 80). Though Algeria was technically a part of 
France at the time, de Gaulle was pointing out that not everyone was legitimately French. 
Français de souche suggests an ethnic quality that is rooted in a longstanding 
genealogical connection to French territory where multiple generations were born under 
French law (excluding colonial subjects) (Décimo, 2013). Thus, the concept of français 
de souche is less connected to formal citizenship (though it informs citizenship law) than 
to culture, religion, ethnicity, and race: the français de souche are white and either 
Catholic or not religious (Fredette, 2010).  
The dominant group of French people has thus arrived at some relatively stable 
understandings of what it means to be French, allowing them to take their Frenchness for 
granted. According to historian Robert Darton (1984), “Frenchness exists” in such a way 
that a “specific and national manner, a body of learnings concerning the social world and 
precautions to be taken or rules to be followed to make one’s way” in the French world 
(Darton, 1984, quoted in Chartier, 1985, p. 684). Immigrants, in contrast, must constantly 
 
35 The term français de souche translates to ‘native-born French’ or ‘ethnic French.’ The 
term is used to delineate those with a dominant group (French) ancestry and those 
without (immigrant).   
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learn and experience what it means to be (or not to be) French. Lacking this 
‘commonsense’ quality of French identity, immigrants are always only partially included 
within the bounds of Frenchness, causing them to be hyper-aware of what those 
boundaries are. Though somewhat stable, this commonsense Frenchness must be 
constantly articulated and rearticulated. An especially influential voice in recent 
articulations of Frenchness has been historian and public intellectual Patrick Weil (2014), 
who has proposed four pillars to define what it means to be French: (1) the principle of 
equality (codified in law), (2) the French language36 (a unifying cultural instrument since 
1539), (3) the positive memory of the French revolution, and (4) French secularism, 
laïcité (inclusive of freedom of thought, separation between church and state, and the 
freedom to practice religion). The focus on laïcité37 speaks directly to the characterization 
of Muslims (i.e., North Africans) as not only different from the français de souche, but as 
unlikely to assimilate so long as they adhere to their religion. Adherence to Islam 
becomes a rejection of one of France’s most revered values. Indeed, critics argue that 
advocates of laïcité “merely employ [secularism] as a by-word for discussing Muslims” 
(Peace, 2017, p. 1). The discourse of laïcité, of course, obscures the rootedness of French 
secularist discourse in Western-Christian theological concepts (Ocak, 2015).  
Assimilation discourses and policies assume not only a coherent, bounded French 
national identity, but also a coherent, bounded immigrant identity, in this case, Algerian 
 
36 Within this identification of the French language as a pillar of Frenchness, there is an 
implicit class implication. Only those from a certain socioeconomic class (i.e., middle- 
and upper-classes) have access to learn ‘proper’ French, a topic I return to later in this 
chapter.  




(or, more broadly, Maghrebian or North African). Understandings of Algerianness and 
Algerian identity in France are often associated with notions of violence, delinquency, 
fundamentalism, illegal immigration, and unemployment (Clare and Abdelhady, 2016; 
Zammoum, 2011). Additionally, owing to Algerians’ history of revolution and victory 
over France, Algerians are perceived by the French as opponents or antagonists, rather 
than potential members. It is important to note, however, that Algerian immigrants and 
their descendants produce and reproduce this antagonistic binary, as well, though with 
different values and attitudes attached to each element. To understand the delineation 
between French and Algerian, we must first understand how people of Algerian descent 
themselves participate in the construction of the French/Algerian binary. The following 
section examines the identity anchors that research participants ascribe to Algerian 
identity. 
Defining Algerian Identity 
My research participants draw on multiple identities and place themselves in 
multiple social groups simultaneously. Their narratives reveal complexity and fluidity, 
though, paradoxically, this complexity and fluidity draws upon and reinforces binaries. 
Algerian immigrants and their descendants continuously reproduce ideas about 
Algerianness, albeit in ways that attribute much more positive meanings to this category 
than one finds in French national discourse. Of the 73 people I interviewed for this study, 
53 referred to themselves primarily as ‘Algerian,’ seemingly confirming perceptions 
among dominant groups that Algerians are not ‘assimilating’ into French society. My 
respondents’ articulations of Algerian identity most often revolve around notions of 
family and obligation, kindness and hospitality, and of morality and religion. They argue 
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that strong attachment and dedication to family is what sets Algerians apart from the 
French, and they define the French as more individualistic, self-centered, and isolated. 
Their Algerian identification was sometimes combined with religious identity (e.g., 
Muslim), and a more specific ethnic identity (e.g., Berber or Arab). Here in this chapter, I 
am focusing just on ‘Algerianness’ as this is the primary way that individuals identified 
themselves. In the following chapter, I explore religion and religiosity in more depth.  
One way that people of Algerian descent practice dedication to family is by 
participating in the transnational behavior of regular visits to Algeria to visit family. As 
Salih (2002) explains, “the summer return is a very important event” for North Africans 
living in Europe (p. 221). Salih’s work (which focuses on Moroccan migrants in Italy), 
found that the “whole way of life in Italy is functional and complementary to the summer 
return…The lifestyles migrants display when they are in Morocco for a short period are 
the result of a hard and difficult life for the rest of the year” (2002, p. 221). These 
findings are applicable to my study respondents. When a familial holiday in Algeria is 
not possible (as in the summer of 2020, due to travel restrictions related to COVID-19), 
“the pain is acute [because] it is sacred for us to leave” (Méheut, 2020, p. 1). In 2020, an 
estimated “82% of French people of Algerian origin had spent at least one holiday in 
Algeria during childhood, while 34% return every year,” and family holidays are seen as 
a cultural bridge for the second-generation that “allows people to rediscover an identity 
through their parents, through their belonging to a people, through their belonging to a 
culture” (Méheut, 2020, p. 1).  
 For example, Imed, a 26-year-old immigrant living in the Meudon banlieue, in the 
92nd district outside of Paris, goes home to Algeria twice a year to visit his family. He 
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works a “French job” and does not have as much time off as he would like to spend in 
Algeria. Imed claims that the difference between French people and Algerian people is 
that “they do not mean the same thing when they say ‘family’” because the French do not 
have as much respect for the older generations. Imed’s two grandmothers lived with his 
family in their apartment in Algeria, something he thinks would never happen in France. 
Imed came to France to work as a software engineer and was miserable in this job, 
describing his days spent “staring at the walls” and feeling unable to connect with his 
French coworkers. Imed sought out other Algerians and North Africans, eventually 
convincing his brother to move to Paris to live with him—the re-constitution of his 
family unit in France. Imed does not feel “part of the world in France” but feels obligated 
to stay. He has had problems with French people both in his work, and especially while 
finding an apartment; he feels an inability to connect with French people on a personal 
level. In these ways, Imed has and continues to struggle to find his place in France, 
asking himself, “What am I doing here?” He speaks fluent French yet prefers to speak 
Arabic with his brother and other Arab Algerians because he feels accepted by and 
comfortable with this group and with the Arabic language (in fact, Imed spends his free 
time exclusively with other Algerians). Imed’s explanation of his feelings of exclusion 
indicate a heightened sense of inhospitality, on the part of the French toward immigrant 
Others. This attention to his exclusion leads to a second common theme in Algerian 
identity, that of hospitality.  
Interview participants identify hospitality as a key feature of Algerianness. 
Hospitality is often identified as a hallmark of Arab and Muslim cultural traditions, and 
the scholarly literature on North Africa recognizes hospitality rituals as a way of 
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maintaining the family’s status (Ben Jelloun, 1999). Engaging with this cultural 
performance of hospitality, Algerian immigrants and their descendants weave common 
hospitality activities into their everyday lives in France. Algerian hospitality involves 
providing accommodation, food, and drink to visitors and extends to helping others, both 
friends and strangers. Hospitality, in my study respondents’ narratives, is also associated 
with kindness and forgiveness—a willingness to grant outsiders some measure of 
welcome and inclusion within the ‘community,’ even if only temporarily. The opposite of 
hospitality is total, permanent exclusion—an unwillingness to accept outsiders even as 
guests. Hospitality incorporates a number of social experiences ranging from acts of 
service, the providing of food and shelter, and protection from exclusion; my participants 
contrast these ‘Algerian’ traits with the racism and rejection they experience in France. 
Expressions and performances of hospitality are central to the formulation of community 
and individual identity—and in the specific case of Algerians in France, hospitality is 
practiced intentionally, that is, it is practiced because it is not French. The conscious and 
intentional acts of hospitality practiced by Algerians in the context of France is an 
identity practice with heightened importance, both in its seeming ordinariness and its 
clear difference from what is perceived of as French. I explain this further in the 
following narratives.  
For instance, Said, a 53-year-old immigrant, living in the 13th arrondissement, 
works to keep Algerian cultural traditions alive in his life and work through his practices 
of hospitality. As a café owner, Said takes hospitality seriously; he is well known in his 
neighborhood for helping newly arrived immigrants to find work and housing. Said 
regularly gives free meals to weary travelers (on many occasions, this practice included 
 
156 
me) and immigrants; his hospitality is something that nearly everyone in his 
neighborhood has experienced. During the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015-2016, a ‘pop-up’ 
refugee camp existed a few blocks east of Said’s café. The camp held hundreds of 
refugees living in tents in an open area under a bridge along the Seine river. Said 
regularly took leftover couscous to the migrants living there. While French society 
relegated these refugees to homelessness, Said sought to relieve their burdens, if only 
with a warm meal. Said’s practices of hospitality also include acts of forgiveness. For 
instance, one of his regular customers at the café is a Frenchman who is a veteran of the 
Algerian war (he was a French paratrooper) who participated in the Battle of Algiers 
against Algerian revolutionaries. The two men laugh about this now. Said explains, “It is 
in the past. If it was my father standing here, yes, there would be a problem. But for me 
[makes a sweeping motion over his shoulder with his hand] it is in the past,” despite the 
importance of this war to Algerian identity, as I explain below.  
My host-mother, Kahina, practices hospitality in many of the same ways that Said 
does. Kahina’s apartment is often the first stop for many newly arrived immigrants; in her 
home, she can offer a cup of coffee and an Algerian meal or dessert, and she provides a 
place to speak Arabic or Berber freely with her. Her home is a meeting place of sorts, 
commonly filled with relatives that live nearby, neighbors from North Africa, and other 
Algerian friends from the city. Kahina even goes so far as to offer the use of her address 
to newly arrived Algerians. Her postal code shows a residence in the 20th arrondissement, 
within the city limits of Paris. This is important because job applications are often 
rejected by postal code alone. Bonnet et al. (2016) note, for instance, that “job applicants 
have lower interview rates when their curriculum vita provides an address indicating a 
 
157 
poor suburb” outside the city limits of Paris (p.5). During the time that I lived with her, 
there were three Algerian immigrants that came over regularly to collect their mail and 
visit with Kahina. The assistance that Kahina provides follows the notion of social 
capital—the range of thinking around norms and networks, the values and resources that 
are the result (and product of) socially negotiated ties and relationships (Edwards, 2004). 
In her own way, Kahina practices hospitality to honor her Algerian heritage, and in other 
ways, to distinguish herself from the French; this is illustrated in her efforts to help others 
of Algerian origin bypass French prejudicial practices involving residential location, in 
this small act, she maintains a sense of opposition to Frenchness. The practices of 
hospitality shown by Said and Kahina are thus central to the performance of Algerian 
identity, they are intentional, rather than random, isolated actions.  
In addition to the concepts of hospitality and familial dedication, the notion of 
revolution is central to the Algerian identity. Just as French public intellectuals connect 
French identity to the French Revolution, many of my respondents connect Algerian 
identity to the Algerian Revolution. Algeria’s struggle against French colonial rule serves 
as an important reservoir of memories and discourses that my respondents draw upon in 
articulating their identities and subjectivity. Algerians have a tradition of cultural and 
political resistance that dates back to the colonial encounter. From the moment of the 
French conquest of Algeria in 1830, “the indigenous society, in spite of enormous land 
expropriations and violent repression, sought to defend its core identity through a 
complex range of cultural resistances” (MacMaster, 1997, pp. 218-219). During the 
colonial period, many Algerians refused assimilation, resisting their domination by and 
absorption into ‘French civilization.’ Though excluded from the realm of formal politics, 
 
158 
Algerian colonial subjects were dynamic political actors who continually contested 
colonial policies and the authority of the colonial state. The legacy of this resistance plays 
out in Algerian immigrants’ engagements with the dominant narrative of liberal 
republicanism in modern France. Just as the French hold on to an illusion of neutral, 
republican citizenship38 while dealing with the fallout of their racist imperialism, 
Algerian immigrants and their descendants maintain and assert a revolutionary identity 
even while, in many cases, holding French citizenship.  
The paradox of living in a former imperial power’s land is not lost on people of 
Algerian origin. My research subjects speak of honoring their forbearers’ refusal to 
surrender to the French by resisting cultural assimilation in contemporary French 
metropolitan society. Interviewees frequently recounted cultural memories of the 1962 
Algerian victory in the war against the French. According to Hakim, a 28-year-old 
immigrant, living in the 15th arrondissement, “there is a huge proudness” among 
Algerians that comes from winning the Algerian war of decolonization. From Hakim’s 
perspective, people of Algerian descent do not experience a sense of Frenchness but 
rather they substitute that feeling with a sense of pride from beating the French, being a 
part of a great revolution, the victors of a great struggle. He says, “In Algeria when they 
would talk about the French, they were our invaders, we had a war with them and a lot of 
people were killed by the French…It’s a lot about culture and mistrust.” 
This pride often translates into practices of recounting memories of family 
members who participated in the liberation of Algeria. For example, Hassan, a 33-year-
 
38 The model of republican, universal, or liberal citizenship is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Six.  
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old son of immigrants, living in the 18th arrondissement, is working on a documentary 
about his father’s life as a revolutionary in Algeria and France. Hassan becomes animated 
when he speaks of his father’s accomplishments, and he has devoted his spare time and 
money to this project over the years. The stories of fathers smuggling weapons for the 
freedom fighters or of grandfathers being tortured but unwilling to betray Algeria are 
plentiful in the narratives of my research participants, and they use these nostalgic 
explorations of family history to situate themselves in French society. Embracing the 
colonial/revolutionary past with pride gives Algerians in France a degree of personal 
dignity and social prestige in an otherwise exclusionary social context. 
Postcolonial discourses and historical memories circulate through their everyday 
lives and spaces and contribute to their conceptions of belonging and identity. Another 
example, Youcef, a 35-year-old immigrant, living in the 94th district outside of Paris, 
describes his pride in his revolutionary roots, as both sides of his family were heavily 
involved with the FLN during the Algerian revolution. He explains that there were two 
kinds of revolutionaries: the first kind was actively participating in the resistance—
keeping gun caches and plotting actions, typically from the mountains; the second type, 
often labeled as ‘administrative,’ found desk jobs within the French system and acted 
against the French from within. Youcef’s grandfathers represent both types of 
revolutionaries. His maternal grandfather oversaw weapons stashes in the eastern part of 
Algeria while his paternal grandfather worked with the French colons in the western part 
of Algeria. His paternal grandfather was so heavily enmeshed with the French that he 
feared for his life and his family’s safety after the war; he was considered to be a Harki (a 
French sympathizer) by many locals. Youcef’s mother remembers her father being taken 
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nightly and tortured, only to be returned to her childhood home in Constantine, Algeria. 
One story that Youcef remembers clearly is of the night when his grandfather was taken 
by French soldiers to a graveyard, handed a shovel, and instructed to dig his own grave. 
This story gave Youcef nightmares as a child. Both families relocated to Algiers after the 
war ended in 1962. 
For Youcef’s family, the revolutionary spirit did not fade after Algerians achieved 
independence. His father was politically active before the Algerian civil war in the 1990s 
and was part of a group that started the Social Democratic Party of Algeria. When the 
violence of the civil war escalated, Youcef’s father became frightened for his family’s 
safety (because of his political activism) and sent Youcef’s sister to France to live with 
relatives; he sent Youcef to a private French school in Algiers. Youcef follows in his 
ancestor’s footsteps and is politically active in France, regularly participating in protests 
against the mistreatment of immigrants and social injustices in France. He frequently 
organizes groups through Facebook to bring together like-minded people (mostly 
Algerian) to talk about their common struggles in French society. He claims that he has 
revolutionary blood in his veins, and he honors his family tradition of fighting against 
political oppression, corruption, and social unrest—continuing the work in France, 
though in a much smaller capacity than his ancestors. 
Numerous participants wove their revolutionary roots into their interviews in 
similar ways to Youcef and Hassan and work to honor and remember their Algerian 
heroes and heroines in modern France. Djamila, a 34-year-old immigrant, living in the 
Bobigny banlieue in the 93rd district outside of Paris, was named for Djamila Bouhired, a 
famous female Algerian revolutionary. Omar, a 28-year-old immigrant, living in the 20th 
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arrondissement, speaks with pride about his mother, who was born and raised in the 
Casbah of Algiers, where Omar’s grandfather worked with the so-called ‘terrorist cells’ 
of Algerian revolutionaries during the Battle of Algiers. Abdel, a 25-year-old son of 
immigrants, living in the 16th arrondissement, describes his father’s participation in the 
revolution. His father joined the FLN after moving to France and collected money from 
the Algerian workers as a ‘revolutionary tax’ for the war. Three of Abdel’s uncles died in 
the Algerian War.  
These stories appeared constantly in my interviews, even though there was not a 
specific question that directed my respondents to identify a part of their familial history 
related to the revolution. This ‘revolutionary energy’ that Algerians so clearly identified 
with has been described as something like inventiveness, creativity, or self-management 
(Lyotard, 1988). The participants that speak of their revolutionary identity clearly link it 
to a sense of autonomy and resistance, pride, and struggle. From a French perspective, the 
notion of a revolutionary identity instead signifies a social problem with direct links to 
“Islamist separatism” that is placed squarely on Algerians: “the bloody Algerian war and 
the colonial past [is] still imprinted” in the “collective psyche” of France, according to 
French President Emmanuel Macron (quoted in McAuley, 2020b, p. 1). This accusatory 
approach of holding Algerians responsible for Islamism in France has recently been taken 
to a grossly excessive level—in a January 2021 report, the so-called ‘Algeria Report,’ the 
recent brutal attacks carried out in France by Islamist terrorists (one a Russian passport-
holder in a Paris suburb, and three attacks by a Tunisian immigrant in the southern city of 
Nice) ties these acts of terror to Algeria, the Algerian war, and the ‘collective psyche’ of 
the Algerian revolution, even though these “heinous crimes [are] wholly unrelated to 
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Algeria” (Ramdani, 2021, p. 1). Macron addressed the specific matter of identity among 
the postcolonial population living in France, saying, “we see children of the Republic, 
sometimes from elsewhere, children or grandchildren of citizens from immigrant 
backgrounds and from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa revisiting their identity 
through a post-colonial discourse,” calling this identity practice “a form of self-hatred” 
(quoted in McAuley, 2020b, p. 1). Here, we can see how identity and memory within the 
Algerian community becomes, from a French perspective, an indicator of community 
pathology—the Algerian War is not in the past, it continues on in both French and 
Algerian identity practices.  
Some of my research respondents asserted the superiority of Algerian-origin 
peoples over the français de souche. For instance, Lakhdar, a 48-year-old café owner, 
living in the 10th arrondissement, holds strong opinions about the differing work ethics he 
perceived between French and Algerian (particularly Berber Algerian) workers. Lakhdar 
hesitates to elaborate but admits that he does not typically hire French people to work in 
his café because “they are lazy” and unreliable. In Lakhdar’s experience, his Berber 
employees work harder, stay longer, do not call in sick, and are reliable and easygoing. 
This positioning of himself (and his fellow Algerians/ Berbers) within French society is 
part of the relational process of identity formation. Lakhdar identifies strongly as 
Algerian and feels disdain for the French. Lakhdar moved to France as an adult, after his 
parents and other siblings had immigrated to France. When asked about his identity, he 
says, “My name is Lakhdar, not François” and explains that he is always working to 
defend and take pride in his Algerian heritage. When Lakhdar was in his 20s, his father 
offered to help him file paperwork to change his name to something more French (a 
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practice that Lakhdar says was common), but Lakhdar had no interest in becoming 
“François or Pierre” he says. Yet Lakhdar also shows a willingness to forgive, explaining 
that even though there was a war between his countries of France and Algeria, “the 
enemy is our friend.” In fact, Lakhdar sees Algerians as holding a privileged place in 
French society because of their victory in the war: “We have a special history with 
France, Algeria has made France what it is [today]” he says. Lakhdar offers examples of 
how he perceives Algerian immigrants to be more accepted in French society than 
Tunisians or Moroccans: “In Paris, more of the hotels and bars are Berber, the Moroccans 
are only butchers. Algerian people, we can do anything, but Moroccan and Tunisian 
people cannot.” In these ways, Lakhdar understands his position as an Algerian in French 
society as subordinate, but he contextualizes his social position within an immigrant 
hierarchy where Algerians are placed above other immigrants. From Lakhdar’s example, 
the tension between being at once privileged and disadvantaged is very real; his practices 
of exclusion of other immigrants (and in some cases, the French) in a way that replicates 
the practices of exclusion by French society show the nuanced ways that Algerians 
occupy social positions of power and disadvantage simultaneously.  
These examples demonstrate how Algerian immigrants and their descendants 
continuously reproduce stark binaries between Algerian and French identities, indicating 
a pronounced sense of alienation from French society. The constructs of Algerianness 
(e.g., hospitality, dedication to family, revolution) become meaningful to individuals in 
their everyday lives. Identity formation is taking place relationally, with Algerian-origin 
individuals formulating a sense of who they are through interactions with fellow 
Algerian-origin people and with non-immigrant French people. This involves a degree of 
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self-stereotyping, as well as a stereotyping (both positive and negative) of other groups. 
These practices follow anthropologist Michael Herzfeld’s (2005) understanding of 
“cultural intimacy,” which he describes as “the recognition of those aspects of a cultural 
identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless 
provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality” (p. 3). Herzfeld further 
understands stereotypes, woven into the social fabric of a society, as generalizations that 
are “by definition reductive, and, as such, always mark the absence of some presumably 
desirable property in its object.” For Herzfeld (2005), stereotypes are “a discursive 
weapon of power” that inform how individuals articulate who they are in a wider social 
milieu (p. 202). A key point is that the Algerian identity expressed by my respondents, 
while drawing on historical memories of Algeria and performed through visits to Algeria 
or the replication of ‘typical’ Algerian behaviors, is not a simple ‘carry-over’ from the 
‘old country.’ It involves an active production of community and belonging and the 
attribution of meanings to one’s own behavior and experience. This becomes especially 
evident in cases where respondents have ‘failed’ in their efforts to be French and have 
made a conscious choice to identify more closely with their Algerianness.   
To elaborate, some of my respondents shared with me their efforts to be French 
and to conform with the expectations of membership in French society, only to be 
rejected and rebuffed. For some, then, the adherence to an Algerian identity and an 
explicit rejection of French identity comes from tangible reminders that they are not 
French, rather than an incapacity to assimilate, or a choice not to assimilate. Some of 
these respondents viewed education or social status as their tickets into the majority 
French identity, but they found themselves reconnecting with their Algerian identity in 
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the face of discrimination and exclusion. For example, Sakina, a 31-year-old daughter of 
immigrants, living in the 20th arrondissement, has developed a strong association with her 
parents’ homeland over the course of her child and adulthood. Growing up, Sakina 
excelled in school, often despite discriminatory treatment from her teachers for being 
Algerian. Sakina explains that she was expected to work harder in school to prove herself 
next to her French peers, and she finished high school second in her class. She earned her 
bachelor’s degree in Lille before moving to Paris to find work. Though she is from a 
working-class background (her father was a manual laborer, her mother stayed at home), 
Sakina has achieved a tenuous status within the middle-class with her job at an 
advertising firm in Paris. 
Sakina describes that while she presents herself as (and feels) French (e.g., 
‘French’ clothing, French language without accent, etc.) she is still frequently singled out 
as ‘Algerian’ by her name and skin color. Sakina describes the inhospitable environment 
in France for people of Algerian descent and her personal experiences of racism, stating 
that she has “experienced racism all my life.” She describes times during her childhood, 
growing up in Lille where she felt more racism than in metropolitan places (e.g., Paris). 
People would regularly yell at her, "You’re not in your country!" When she was growing 
up, if her father was late coming home at the end of the day, she assumed it was because 
the police stopped him, as this was just a normal part of her life.  
Sakina told me of an experience when a French coworker was surprised that she 
spoke so many languages (she speaks six languages); Sakina took offense to this 
perception, feeling that people assume she is uneducated because she is of Algerian 
descent. In another example from work, she says that she is not included in what she 
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perceives as the ‘French’ social groups—she describes her cohort (women around the 
same age, also single, etc.) who regularly go out for drinks after work—an event that 
Sakina is never invited to: “Maybe it’s because I don’t drink [alcohol] that they don’t ask 
me [to join them]” she says. Though the consumption of alcohol was not included in the 
four pillars of Frenchness that I described earlier, many interview participants identified 
drinking alcohol39 as a marker of difference between Frenchness and Algerianness. 
Sakina’s exclusion from socializing with her coworkers, and the social networking 
benefits within that everyday activity speak to the settings in which these experiences of 
exclusion occur.  
Sakina, in some ways, is an ‘ideal’ second-generation immigrant who tries to 
‘earn her Frenchness’ through hard work in school and her career. Yet though she 
possesses the degree and the career, she has still experienced rejection in these areas, 
causing her to turn toward her Algerian roots and get involved with the local Berber 
Cultural Association in Paris, where she spends most of her free time. Sakina had always 
felt alienated from French society, yet it was not until adulthood that she developed, and 
began to act upon, a stronger attachment to her Algerian roots. Having once identified as 
French, she now distinctly claims an Algerian and Berber identity. 
The feelings that Sakina describe of being excluded from French society are 
echoed by Ferhat, a 45-year-old son of immigrants, living in the 19th arrondissement. 
Initially in our interview, he proudly declared “I am French!” Yet, he followed this by 
discussing his struggle with identity. Like Sakina, Ferhat spent his younger years in 
 
39 Participants also identified drinking alcohol as a marker of integration, such that, if a 
person drinks alcohol, they are ‘integrated.’ I examine this matter further in Chapter Six 
as it applies in the context of Muslim religious abstinence from alcohol.  
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pursuit of Frenchness, yet, over time and after experiences of exclusion, he admits, 
“When I look in the mirror, all I see is my parents’ Algerian son.” Consequently, his 
feelings of Frenchness are countered by his feelings of rejection from French society. 
Ferhat speaks of childhood experiences at school when he found himself only around 
other children of immigrants. He grew up in the banlieue and does not have memories of 
‘French’ classmates. When he went to university in Paris, he, like Sakina, was not 
included within the social activities of his French classmates. Ferhat talks indirectly about 
desperately wanting to acquire more ‘Frenchness’ because he is French. For example, 
from the time he arrived as his university, he was drawn to French philosophers’ work, 
“especially if they do not believe in God,” because it provided a perspective that he did 
not get from his Muslim upbringing. Ferhat’s attempt at gaining Frenchness through 
embracing French philosophy and gaining expertise in French subject matter did not 
achieve the desired result of acceptance within French society. As much as Ferhat tries to 
fit in as ‘French,’ he always falls short of his goal and describes painful experiences of 
exclusion from French society. 
Though he grew up around other immigrant families, Ferhat’s childhood 
experiences were different from others in his generational position in that he has only 
been to Algeria twice—once at age 16 and again at age 24. His family does not make the 
typical yearly trip to see his extended family and he does not feel a connection to Algeria 
in the same way that other participants describe. Most notably, he does not have Algerian 
citizenship, only French.40 Further, Ferhat does not speak Arabic, though he understands 
 
40 Ferhat is the only second-generation Algerian that did not hold dual citizenship in 
France and Algeria from the group of research participants interviewed for this research.  
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a little bit of the language. His parents spoke Algerian Arabic sometimes when he was a 
child but wanted him and his five siblings to speak only French. Here, Ferhat represents a 
sort of ‘double-exclusion’ where he is not accepted within ‘French’ society, and yet has 
not fully developed a connection to ‘Algerian’ identity, thus, he experiences feelings of 
isolation between his French and Algerian identities. This sense of isolation within the 
French/Algerian binary is repeated by other participants in their quest for Frenchness.  
Another example of the failure to fully access Frenchness through education is 
Idir, a 32-year-old immigrant living in the 92nd district outside of Paris who came to 
France to continue his studies, and who completed a master’s degree and a PhD. Like 
Sakina and Ferhat, Idir perceived higher education as a path to mobility in French 
society. However, he places himself squarely within an Algerian identity. After he 
graduated, Idir worked in in the finance industry in Paris for a few years but found that 
this career left him feeling like he was earning ‘bad money,’ and so he quit his job to 
pursue his passion for learning and teaching. Idir explains a sense of right and wrong 
through an Algerian adage: “You always know when you are making bad money,” that is, 
money made in ways that go against the moral values of a person, specifically a religious 
Algerian-origin person. For Idir, being Algerian involves his Muslim faith, hospitality 
and kindness, and a modest way of life. He lives these principles and feels that “God will 
see me if I have a good heart.” Idir admits that when he studied philosophy in school (and 
returned to this study after leaving the finance industry), he only read(s) philosophers 
whose beliefs on religion corresponded with his own. He makes it very clear that if a 
philosopher (or any academic) does not believe in God, he will not read their work. 
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Like many others, Idir describes aspects of Algerianness and Frenchness with 
reference to hospitality and kindness. He explains, “being nice is something normal for 
Algerians, but for the French, it is seen as a sign of weakness.” He returns to examples of 
when he was working with mostly French coworkers in the finance industry, remarking, 
“They just want to make money, [and] they don’t care about anything else…it wasn’t for 
me.” After he left his job and returned to teaching, he also left many of his acquaintances 
with French individuals, now mostly surrounding himself with other people of Algerian 
origins—going so far as to seek a teaching position in an immigrant suburb. So, while he 
had pursued a French way of life, and surrounded himself with French people, he found 
that he could not sustain it, and he now connects himself fully to Algerianness, to people 
of Algerian origin, and to the larger immigrant community in Paris and the surrounding 
area.   
A somewhat different case from Idir, who actively rejected the French middle-
class preoccupation with money and prestige, is Youcef, who argued that Frenchness is 
not accessible even to those who enjoy a high social status. Youcef, a 36-year-old 
immigrant living in the 94th district outside of Paris, describes his upbringing in Algeria: 
“I am what they call ‘Golden Algerian’ which means, like, the Daddy’s kids, people who 
had money and privilege.” Because of his family’s social status in Algerian society, 
Youcef grew up speaking only French. He had what he describes as “a French 
upbringing” that involved speaking French without an accent and knowing mainstream 
French music and television (i.e., produced and consumed primarily by those of non-
immigrant backgrounds). Youcef assumed that his French upbringing would make it 
easier for him to find things in common with French people and feel more at ease in 
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French society because he felt that he held a sense of comfort with French social norms 
and expectations. Yet, after he immigrated to France, he fell into the status of an 
‘immigrant’ and an ‘Algerian.’ He found that even though, in his mind, he could think, 
act, and speak as a Frenchman, he could not change the color of his skin, or the instant 
perception that accompanied his apparent Algerianness. In addition to this new 
experience of racial exclusion, Youcef struggled to maintain legal residency, furthering 
his isolation in his new country. Youcef spent nine years working to get his papers in 
order to live and work in France legally. During that time, he was unable to travel home 
to Algeria to see his family and friends. When Youcef could not travel home to see his 
family, he sought out other people of Algerian descent in Paris online and met up with 
them in person, finding comfort in his fellow countrymen. Youcef now lives in a 
neighborhood that is “totally Algerian” and he likes living among Algerians. In these 
ways, like others described here in this section, Youcef perceived his upbringing to offer 
access to Frenchness, yet, when he arrived in France as an adult, he found that neither 
social status nor education could solidify access to Frenchness—that his Algerianness 
would ultimately define him.  
Youcef, like Sakina, Ferhat, and Idir found that he ‘reverted’ to his Algerian 
identity and to the Algerian community in the face of rejection from Frenchness. Whether 
they were rejected by French dominant groups or found that they rejected French 
dominant norms themselves, each of them worked to find a place of inclusion and 
acceptance in more Algerian-friendly realms—a phenomenon that has recently been 
observed by French scholars: “[T]here is an important minority who have this problem of 
identity, who don’t feel French—either because they’ve been rejected or because they 
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don’t have the desire” for inclusion within French society (El Karoui, 2018, quoted in 
McAuley, 2020a, p. 1).  
Given the way North African immigrants have been continuously racialized by 
French society, it is not surprising that my study respondents define themselves against 
Frenchness and that they describe their Algerian identities in both culturalist and 
oppositional terms. They also maintain strong transnational connections with Algeria—a 
fact that plays into French nationalist discourses about the non-assimilation of 
immigrants. The participants’ narratives presented here show the work that Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants conduct to destabilize the boundaries between 
Frenchness and Algerianness, only to retreat into the ‘unassimilable’ identity of the 
Algerian-binary following continued exclusion from Frenchness. 
Yet, despite the salience of the French/Algerian binary, it would be overly 
simplistic to take it as a given. Clearly, the binary is very meaningful for my respondents, 
and it has a ‘real,’ material set of implications in terms of behaviors and social networks. 
But a closer look at participants’ responses reveals a significant degree of ambivalence 
toward both categories, whereby neither the French nor Algerian identity categories 
satisfy the sense of belonging and community among some participants. In the following 
section, I show other ways that interviewees trouble the French/Algerian binary. Some of 
my respondents attempt to shift identity boundaries or to dis-identify with the categories 
that others assigned them; for some, this involves embracing a pan-ethnic identity. With 
this said, even these participants reverted to the Algerian-binary identity in certain 





As shown in earlier examples, my respondents offer hospitality to a broader group 
of immigrants. While maintaining a strong identification as Algerian, their sense of 
relative sameness with other immigrants hints at the possibility of broader identity 
practices. One such practice involves the notion of pan-ethnicity. In this case, research 
participants not only reject (or are rejected from) a French identity, but they also reject an 
Algerian identity and substitute a pan-ethnic identity. Scholars of pan-ethnicity observe 
that pan-ethnicities can be a strategic response to conditions of inequality; they involve a 
unique tension inherent in maintaining subgroup distinctions while generating a broader 
sense of solidarity (Padilla, 1985; Okamoto and Mora, 2014). Here, I describe three 
cases— Nouara, Yanis, and Ali—who ascribe to themselves a pan-ethnic identity and 
who, in varying ways, reject the French/Algerian binary as the foundation of identity 
construction, offering instead a pan-ethnic identity such as ‘African’ or ‘world citizen.’ 
Yet, each of the participants also claim an Algerian or Berber identity in certain contexts. 
In other words, narrower identities, and the binaries on which they are based, do not 
entirely disappear among these respondents. The individuals in this group describe 
experiences of extreme rejection, often surrounding their legal status (or lack of) residing 
in France, and their pan-ethnicities involve the production of alternative social networks 
that serve as important resources for coping with precariousness.  
One example of pan-ethnic identity construction is Nouara, a 33-year-old 
immigrant residing in the 20th arrondissement of Paris who experiences a particularly 
thorny engagement with her identities. Nouara has French ancestry, and her maternal 
grandfather received the highest French order of merit for military actions, the Legion of 
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Honor. Her mother grew up in France but returned to Algeria to marry Nouara’s father. 
Owing to the circumstances surrounding her birth, her parents’ lack of education and 
knowledge of citizenship status and processes, Nouara did not, and has not yet attained 
French citizenship. Indeed, she has lived in France illegally all her life, though her 
parents and sister all have French citizenship41. Nouara’s family moved back to France 
during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, and her sister was born in France (with direct 
access to French citizenship upon her birth). On the one hand, Nouara might be expected 
to identify as Algerian, though she only lived there for the first few years of her life; on 
the other hand, she could perhaps identify as French since she has spent her formative 
and adult years living in, speaking the language of, and going to school in France, despite 
her lack of legal status. In fact, she identifies as neither, choosing instead to call herself 
‘African’ or a ‘world citizen.’ Still, while she describes feeling a lack of connection or 
feelings of loyalty to either her French or Algerian identities, she admits that she has 
relied heavily on her network of Algerian-origin people, her ‘Algerian network.’ This is 
especially the case with respect to finding and keeping work and applying for legal 
entrance into universities. Nouara says that among Algerians, “everyone is equal, and no 
one would refuse another Algerian in need.” Nouara explains her understanding of 
Algerian hospitality as something indispensable in her life, “I can’t do it without them” 
when describing her reliance on her Algerian network to help her through her life.    
Another example is 25-year-old Yanis who arrived in France and lived with 
friends in the St. Denis banlieue, in the 93rd district outside of Paris before finding a place 
 
41 I discuss participants like Nouara in further detail in Chapter Six, within the discussion 
regarding citizenship status. 
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he could afford in the 18th arrondissement. Because he is in France on a work visa, Yanis 
must keep his job and get a continuation of his contract to maintain his legal residency in 
France. Yanis worked for years to come to France and received many rejections in the 
form of school and visa applications—rejections he blames directly on his status as 
‘Algerian.’ But at the time of his interview, he had just applied for a one-year visa, and he 
aims to stay in France and eventually to apply for citizenship. Like Nouara, he claims an 
African identity. Yanis explains that he does not want to discuss his feelings of 
‘Frenchness’ or ‘Algerianness.’ Rather, he wants to “depoliticize origins.” He declares, “I 
am AFRICAN! I want to make noise about it!”  
Yanis’s desire to ‘depoliticize’ his origins is, like Nouara, a reaction to the many 
levels of rejection and exclusion he has experienced based on his Algerian origins. When 
Yanis speaks of his background, he does (grudgingly) identify as Berber though he tries 
to complicate even his Berber identity. Yanis emphasizes the hybridity of all identities, 
explaining that Algerians themselves are a mix of cultural groups: before the French, 
there were Greeks, Turks, Italians, Arabs, and Spaniards in Algeria. By highlighting this 
hybridity, he further distances himself from a singularly Algerian or French identity. But 
Yanis’s position sometimes becomes contradictory, showing how identity works across 
multiple settings: he claims and rejects identity categories at different moments, changing 
the attributes that he assigns to each category and classifying certain identities as merely 
‘cultural,’ as when he states, “Well, culturally, I am Berber.” In explaining his sense of 
identity and belonging, he refers to an old Algerian adage: “If you do not know where 
you are going, look behind you.” For Yanis, this adage refers to how much his parents 
and grandparents went through to get him where he is today. His father was born in 
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Kabyle during the French-Algerian war and was raised in a ‘Kabyle house’ made famous 
by the French ethnographer Pierre Bourdieu. Like Nouara, he socializes mainly with 
others of Algerian origin, and he relies extensively on Algerian social networks. There 
are limits, then, to his broader African identity, and we might think of ‘Africanness’ more 
as an aspirational construct—or as an identity he can deploy in certain contexts to avoid 
the political meanings attached to Algerian or French identities.    
For many similar reasons, Ali, a 29-year-old immigrant living in the 13th 
arrondissement, embraces his African roots in ways akin to Nouara and Yanis. When 
asked, he says, “I’m African!” and laughs when he explains that he does not like to claim 
his Algerianness in France because he feels there is too much discrimination from the 
French. In fact, Ali admits to telling people that he is from Portugal rather than Algeria 
when trying to find work. Ali finished the 11th grade in Algeria before he immigrated 
illegally to France. He wanted to find work in France to send money home to his large 
family (he is the third of eight children) back in Algiers. Ali works multiple jobs in 
precarious employment—the work he is able to find is often insecure, low-paid, without 
benefits, and often labor-intensive (e.g., working in the early morning markets, unloading 
produce for farmers to sell). Ali feels that France is a world of inhospitality toward 
immigrants, and to Algerians in particular—a problem he blames entirely on the French 
colonization of Algeria. In Ali’s mind, the French remain angry that they lost the 
Algerian War, but they still ‘owe’ Algerians for the century plus of colonization.  
Ali finds it difficult to locate help or hospitality from the French, but like Nouara 
and Yanis, he draws upon a large network of Algerians in Paris. Because Ali did not 
finish high school and is living illegally in France, he relies heavily on this network to 
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help him accomplish things that legal residents do with ease, such as finding work or 
housing. While Ali’s legal status in France is precarious, he is often contacted by friends 
and relatives to help other newly arriving immigrants from Algeria. When I interviewed 
him, he had recently been to the airport to greet a family of four as they arrived in Paris. 
He took them to the government office where they could fill out the necessary paperwork 
to begin their life in France (though Ali did not have access to this privilege). Ali 
continued to help this family find a place to live and connected the father with others of 
Algerian descent that would assist him in finding work. Ali is never paid for his 
assistance; he does it out of an obligation to his fellow Algerians. Ali helps Algerians 
regardless of the circumstances precipitating their arrival in France and has helped many 
unauthorized immigrants find housing and work, just as was done for him by others of 
Algerian descent when he arrived in France years prior.   
Still, Ali’s African identity is meaningful to him, and its purpose is twofold: first, 
he, like Yanis, does not want to offer up his identity, or his ‘origins,’ for possible 
rejection on the part of French society. Ali has been rejected by French society in every 
way possible, and he claims African (or even other European) identities as a practice to 
diffuse, or using Yanis’s term, to depoliticize his origins; second, Ali uses an African 
identity to shift attention from his identity as ‘Algerian,’ which, as I have discussed 
previously, is often conflated with ‘illegal immigrant.’ He feels that an African identity is 
less likely to lead to a questioning of his legal status, though, as shown by his attempt to 
claim Portuguese (i.e., European) roots, an African identity is still problematic. Here, Ali 
is claiming, or performing an identity with the intention of avoiding suspicion and 
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ultimately, avoiding rejection. Ali’s use of African identity, in short, is a strategy to cope 
with his vulnerable existence living illegally in France.  
These three participants highlight the ways that my respondents make use of pan-
ethnic identities to avoid the particular stigma attached to Algerianness and to protect 
themselves from the marginalization and rejection that they encounter (Okamoto and 
Mora, 2014). The following sections move the conversation past the binary or singular 
identity understanding and shift toward a hybrid notion of multiple identities that function 
together. In the next section, I further interrogate the premise of binary-identity creation 
to incorporate the missing links in the discourse of identity formation by challenging the 
generalizations and one-sided conceptualizations of Algerian immigrants and their 
descendants in France to include more fluid, complex, and hybrid expressions of identity. 
Hybrid Identities: Challenging and Reworking the French/Algerian Binary 
 I have tried to demonstrate thus far that my respondents’ identities revolve around 
a strong French/Algerian binary, and that respondents continuously negotiate this 
binary—at times destabilizing it, but also reinforcing it. Binaries remain intact, yet 
boundaries become blurry and complicated as respondents position themselves 
differently at different periods in their lives, and/or as they aspire to pan-ethnic identities 
that offer some relief from the French/Algerian binary. At times, respondents describe 
identity categories in terms of cultural purity, at other times, they seem to suggest that 
categories may be somewhat flexible—or, at least, individuals have some ability (albeit 
limited) to choose an identity. Here, I continue to explore the ambiguities that surround 
these identity categories, highlighting the ways some of my respondents continuously 
move in and out of identity categories/performances and attempt to position themselves 
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in the liminal spaces between categories. Practices of shifting between categories vary by 
generation, though all involve a limited appreciation of and conformity to Frenchness 
(despite some feelings of exclusion), along with some effort to re-work ‘Frenchness’ to 
accommodate racial/ethnic difference; there are also a limited number of cases in which 
individuals more fully embrace ‘Frenchness’ at the expense of an Algerian identity. 
These hybrid identities emerge from respondents’ experiences and suggest the ways 
people knit together various elements associated with different identity categories in 
everyday life; hybrid identities continue to rely on binary conceptions of Frenchness and 
Algerianness, while also undermining essentialized categories.   
As I noted earlier, many of the first-generation Algerian immigrants I 
interviewed, and some of their children, work to ‘re-create’ an essentialized Algerian 
culture in France. But others make no such attempt and, indeed, regard transnational 
practices as adverse to their inclusion within French society. At the same time, while 
some members of the second-generation tend to feel connected to Algeria, their 
relationship with Algeria differs from that of their parents, and they approach 
membership in a transnational Algerian community with hesitancy or separateness. By 
the same token, while most second-generation participants identified at least partly with 
Frenchness, their sense of membership in a French national polity varies. They all 
maintain a distinction between France and Algeria, but the values, attitudes, and ways of 
being that they attach to Frenchness differ, and they understand themselves in varying 
ways to be partly French. Again, these dynamics do not necessarily dismantle binaries, 
but they suggest a degree of agency in the different ways in which immigrants construct 
and negotiate categories. 
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One example of these complex negotiations is Wily, a 36-year-old immigrant, 
living in the 20th arrondissement, who returns home to Algeria to see his family twice a 
year. Though Wily is from a very poor family, he has worked hard to escape poverty in 
Algeria and to join the middle class in France. He migrated to France in 2008 and went to 
college, he now holds an administrative position in a hospital. Wily recounts his 
experiences of exclusion in France, explaining that he decided to unofficially change his 
name from Karim to Wily after he was rejected from job applications: “[S]ometimes you 
hear people, they are racists. They hear Karim, and they think Arabic.” He continues, 
“When people ask me where I am from, I do not say Algeria. Algerian is bad because of 
the history; if I say I’m Algerian, that changes a lot of things;” and, “They hate us more 
now. Before, Algerians work[ed] only in service [manual labor] but now [we] have 
degrees and higher jobs and the French say, ‘They take our jobs.’” Yet while Wily 
embraces his Berber-Algerian heritage, he says, “I am French, of course” when asked to 
articulate his own feelings of identity. Wily links his identification as ‘French’ to his 
desire not to practice religion, his pursuit of knowledge through formal education, and his 
status as a single, divorced person. Wily says, “If I have to choose between Algerian and 
French, I would choose French for sure [because] I feel better here.” In Wily’s example, 
in identifying with Frenchness, he creates new opportunities for himself and validates 
parts of his life experience that are not socially acceptable in Algerian society (e.g., being 
divorced, being non-religious, etc.), which he deems to be “closeminded.” 
Wily’s association of Algeria with closemindedness is echoed by other 
respondents. For instance, Nadia, a 26-year-old part-time resident in France living in the 
14th arrondissement, feels that she belongs less with Algerians and more with the French 
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because they are “really open-minded,” and she is “way too open-minded for Algerian 
people.” Unlike Wily, Nadia is from an upper-class family in Algeria and has the ability 
to live in France for part of the year; she is trying to immigrate to France full-time but so 
far, has not been able to secure the required visa for a legal, permanent stay. Nadia 
references specific examples of open-mindedness in France when it comes to feminism: 
“When they start talking about women’s rights, I feel like I’m the only one [in Algeria] 
who thinks like that. Then I come [to France] and talk to French people and I feel, yeah, 
I’m like you.” She also feels akin to the French when it comes to issues of sexuality and 
religion. Nadia understands Frenchness almost wholly in opposition to Algerianness. She 
explains, “I can’t tell you what it is to be French, but I can tell you what it is to not be 
Algerian.” Even though she grew up in Algeria and only lives half-time in France, she 
does not identify as Algerian. Nadia’s case is especially interesting because her 
connections to France are tenuous at best, yet she still identifies with France more 
strongly than she does with Algeria.  
Nadia’s critical differentiation of Algerian and French identities, perceived 
through the lenses of freedoms and open-mindedness are echoed by other participants, 
like Omar, a 28-year-old immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement, who came to 
France to get his master’s degree and who completed his PhD in 2014. Omar holds 
feelings of ambivalence—of both attraction and repulsion, of love and hate for Algeria 
and for France (Smelser, 1998). When Omar discusses his understanding of Algerianness, 
he draws upon the same binary used by many respondents. He feels that Algerians “want 
to have a relationship with [their] parents,” and he plans to take care of his parents when 
they are older. For Omar, those who do not take care of their family (i.e., the French) are 
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selfish, and he feels that Algerians possess a stronger sense of obligation to family. He 
believes, in some ways, that Algerian culture has been imprinted on him, and that he 
cannot escape it: “I think your culture is from where you grow up. From zero to 20 years, 
it’s the time when you really got your culture.” In this regard, Omar feels separate from 
French culture: “I share some things with French people, of course, but some things I 
don’t share with them because I didn’t grow up here—I don’t have the same references as 
the French.” Yet Omar enjoys the freedoms that come with living in France, and he 
cannot imagine moving back to Algeria. Though he feels that he does not share 
everything with the French, he thinks of France as an open country, open to people like 
him. He states, “It’s why I like the French, [they] are open to other cultures. It’s not like 
Algeria, they’re closed [minded]. You will become Algerian [only] if you have the 
Algerian culture.” Omar sees French and Algerian societies as offering different costs 
and benefits. He states, “to be in a conservative society [like Algeria], you have the cost 
of freedoms but in France, you lose the value of family. Here [in France], people see their 
mom one time per month…For me it’s not like that, I want to have a relation with my 
parents,” who still live in Algeria. But Omar likes living in France, and he plans to stay. 
He explains, “there are a lot of advantages [in France] …and many of my Algerian 
friends are my schoolmates—they came to finish school but then found jobs, like me, and 
stayed.” Interestingly, Omar’s friend-circle consists mainly of Algerians who meet up to 
play soccer or celebrate Algerian/Muslim holidays. An avid fan of the Algerian soccer 
team, Omar even went to Brazil to see Algeria play in the 2014 World Cup42. In these 
 
42 Football allegiance has been a casual marker of identity, for example, “If there is a 
football game between Algeria and France, I will totally support Algeria” (Alsaafin, 
2019). There was also an incident involving a game between the French and Algerian 
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ways, Omar experiences strong feelings of both his Algerianness and his Frenchness; and 
he presents these feelings in a way that shows less sense of rejection by French society, 
and more a sense of rejecting French specific attitudes and norms, especially relating to 
family. At the same time, he embraces parts of his Algerianness in terms of his close 
association with other individuals of Algerian origin—especially those whose lives have 
followed a similar course as Omar’s and who embrace similar aspects of Frenchness. 
Omar, then, places his Algerian identity within the bounds of Frenchness, without the 
fear of rejection experienced by other respondents.  
Omar is just one of several participants who feel accepted in France through 
education and career success. Another is Brahim, a 36-year-old immigrant living in the 
4th arrondissement. He moved to France when he was 22 years old and explains, “At 22, 
you have your identity, not like when you immigrate when you are young, or you are 
born in France.” He described himself as Algerian, but after thinking about his answer, he 
went on to say, “I do feel French though. This is where I live, this is where I work, this is 
where I vote, this is the language that I speak” (Brahim also speaks Algerian Arabic, 
Standard Arabic, English, and Russian). When asked about Frenchness, Brahim explains 
that an appreciation for fine art and museums is something that makes a person ‘French’ 
or that is indicative of Frenchness. Brahim also loves French philosophy and identifies it 
as something innately ‘French,’ but he has a preference for French-Algerian works that 
offer some context for his specific sense of French identity. Because of his professional 
work abroad and his many languages, Brahim is often interviewed for news segments 
 
soccer teams in France in 2008, when Algerian immigrants and their descendants 
infamously booed the French national anthem, inciting political commentators to 
proclaim their lack of assimilation. 
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about political issues in France regarding immigrants. He admits that while he can 
comment on his perception of life as an immigrant, he has no experience living in the 
banlieues or of being raised as an immigrant in France: he has not struggled to find work 
or housing, and he holds a sense of confidence or even choice in his identity when he 
discusses being Algerian and/or French.  
Brahim achieved middle-class status in France through his education and career 
opportunities. However, as we saw in the narrative of Youcef, the elements of class, 
education, and career do not always guarantee access to Frenchness. It is instructive here 
to return to the case of Youcef, the 35-year-old ‘Golden Algerian’ who was raised with a 
‘French upbringing’ within the upper-class of Algeria. As I described earlier, Youcef’s 
grandfathers were revolutionaries on opposite ends of Algeria, and though he came from 
an upper-class family in Algeria, he still struggled for nearly a decade to obtain legal 
residency in France, suffering feelings of exclusion from a French identity. Youcef 
admits that he sometimes also feels separate from other Algerian-origin people in France. 
When he is around people of Algerian descent speaking Algerian Arabic, Youcef cannot 
participate in the conversation, and he feels that “there is some kind of gap where it’s like 
we’re a bit different, like I’m almost like a French-Algerian guy and they’re all real 
Algerian people. So yeah, it’s kind of hard.” Youcef’s ambivalence and insecurity in 
some circumstances illustrates the many confounding variables that affect identity 
construction. Youcef has confidence in both his French and Algerian identities in certain 
situations but lacks confidence in other situations. In some situations, his perfect French 
offers access to Frenchness, but his struggle to obtain legal residency created a barrier to 
inclusion within French society. His family’s history and his association with Algerian 
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clubs offers access to Algerianness, but his lack of Algerian Arabic skills makes it 
difficult for him to engage fully with an Algerian ‘community.’ In these ways, Youcef’s 
narrative illustrates the significance but also the complexity of the French/Algerian 
binary and the ways that negotiations of these categories can reinforce and destabilize 
them at the same time.  
Another example of a hybrid identity from a first-generation participant is Hakim, 
who was born in Algeria and his family moved to France when he was a child. Hakim 
sees a sharp difference between ‘Algerian’ and ‘French’ identities—two very different 
‘cultures,’ distinctive in terms of values and traditions, despite historical connections—
and he recognizes the subordination of one to the other. He states, “Algeria is really 
different from here…just the mentality in another country is totally different. I would 
love to bring a good friend of mine [from France] to Algiers to show him and he would 
see with his eyes what is really different and why…another country, another culture…” 
Hakim identifies as French saying, “I was raised here [in France] so of course, I speak 
French, my friends are French, my culture is French, my way of thinking is French…I’m 
more French than Algerian…I have a French point of view.” Hakim describes a “French 
way of thinking” to involve a sense of secularism, he explains that he does not believe in 
a God (despite his Muslim upbringing and cultural traditions); he also references a 
dedication to higher education, philosophy, and socialization with other French people. 
From Hakim’s perspective, a notion of being raised in an environment of Frenchness, 
regardless of being physically located in France or not, is enough to confer French 
identity (although this was not the case for Youcef, as previously noted).  
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Yet he also separates himself from the français de souche in recognizing the 
supremacy of subordination of Algerian identity within the French context. He suggests 
that the French do not envision France as a country whose modern history, culture, and 
identity are founded on the recruitment and absorption of foreigners, but as a nation 
formed and preserved by ethnic majority French (Elayyadi, 2004). Hakim, a teacher, calls 
this “a kind of postcolonial tension” that exists among his students in the suburbs, 
because “they know what they are not: French.” Here, Hakim reflects on the negative 
relationality of identity: knowing what one is ‘not’ to know what one ‘is.’ Still, he 
regards these categories as navigable—his is a liminal membership, suggesting 
something in-between both a French and an Algerian identity. Having defined himself as 
culturally French, he then detaches himself from Frenchness, describing the French as not 
open-minded, evidenced by the segregation of racialized minorities in France: “[W]here I 
work in the 93rd [district], you just have Black and Arab people. It’s like a ghetto and it is 
really poor and has a lot of social issues. So, when I see that, I cannot say that France is 
very openminded.” 
Following Hakim’s depiction of social issues in France, as they have now and 
historically affected Algerians in France, Louati also engages with social issues to 
understand French and Algerian identity. Louati, a 72-year-old immigrant, lives in 
Gentilly, a southern suburb of Paris in the 94th district. He migrated to France in 1965 at 
the age of 20, just three years after the end of the Algerian War. He attended college, 
earned a master’s degree in economics, and taught in secondary schools for many years. 
He then turned his attention to cinema and became a documentary filmmaker, focusing 
on topics that he saw as important to the Algerian community in France (e.g., the social 
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situation of the banlieues). For Louati, French identity is always secondary to Algerian 
identity; though he has lived and worked in France for over fifty years, he identifies as an 
“Algerian filmmaker” and not a “French filmmaker.” He says, “You are what others say 
you are. If you are born in Algeria, you are Algerian. You are where you are born.” But 
Louati’s everyday life is quite different from other study participants who also prioritize 
their Algerian identity. Louati fills his day with artists, academics, and other 
acquaintances (both French and Algerian); he drinks red wine in the afternoon while 
smoking his cigarettes (it was during this time that I interviewed him at his home) and 
invites a wide variety of people into his home regularly. He values hospitality, but the 
hospitality he practices does not seem to be shaped by Algerian cultural mores. Louati 
thus destabilizes the French/Algerian binary, even as he relies upon it to explain his 
feelings of identity.  
 These narratives of first-generation participants demonstrate the complexity that 
emerges among first-generation Algerian immigrants as they internalize and make claim 
to some level of Frenchness. These individuals, at a personal level, feel lower (or no) 
levels of rejection from mainstream French society, but they recognize that French 
society excludes Algerians. Their relationship with both Frenchness and Algerianness is 
fluid, situational, and partial. Interviews with second-generation participants show similar 
ambivalence toward both Algerian and French identities and the desire (and ability) to 
borrow from different identities or to move back and forth between two ‘cultural worlds.’ 
For instance, Mhenna, a 27-year-old son of immigrants who lives in the 20th 
arrondissement, feels that there are two different kinds of French people: there are 
“French-French” (his version of français de souche) and “half-French.” He defines the 
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‘French-French’ as having two parents of French origin: “They are selfish, won’t speak to 
other people, won’t help other people, and teach their children not to talk to other people. 
If you can just ask for information in the street, even if they know what the answer is, 
they say, “I don’t have time”” Mhenna says. Language was another factor Mhenna 
describes when separating his categories of French people; the ‘French-French’ speak 
only French43, and demand others to speak French with them, whereas ‘half-French’ 
people have an immigrant parent and a French parent and speak multiple languages 
(including French). Mhenna, who considers himself ‘half-French’ (though both of his 
parents were born in Algeria), explaining that ‘half-French’ people are identifiable by 
their hospitality (or helpfulness), their willingness to speak to others, and their dedication 
to family. From this perspective, Mhenna is creating a hybrid identity that embodies 
aspects of both a French and Algerian identity that he named ‘half-French.’  
 Mhenna feels comfortable in French realms because “I am French,” he says. 
When describing his everyday life, he explains situations where he draws from both his 
French and his Algerian (or in his case, ‘half-French’) identity: “At work, I am with 
French people; I do not think about ‘who’ I am,” he says, “but for things like, you know, 
holidays, they mean something to me”—referencing Muslim holidays, which he 
celebrates with his parents, family, and other Algerians (though he does not actively 
practice Islam). Mhenna speaks about a desire to study Algerian history, because it is 
interesting to him, something that he sees as different from his own life experience in 
 
43 Speaking French ‘properly’ does not just imply a command of the French language—it 
also implies a certain ‘kind’ of French, so-called ‘Parisian French’ (e.g., the French 
spoken by French intellectuals, businessmen, and politicians) (de Gruyter, 1989). 
Multiple participants referred to speaking a certain ‘kind’ of French that even many 
Frenchmen (in the rural areas) do not have access to. 
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France, and that he feels an obligation to know more about. In these ways, Mhenna 
practices his French and Algerian identities in different circumstances, switching 
different identities on and off in certain circumstances.  
 Partial detachment from French and/or Algerian categories, and differing 
engagements with each, is also shown in Hassan’s narrative. Hassan, a 33-year-old son of 
immigrants who lives in the 18th arrondissement, believes that to ‘be French,’ a person 
must be born and raised in France, speak the French language44 perfectly, and “feel at 
ease on French earth”—this notion of ‘feeling at ease’ is in reference to a sense of 
belonging to France (i.e., a sense of comfort with French social norms and values). 
Though he has a Berber name and a revolutionary father (as mentioned previously, 
Hassan is making a documentary about his father’s life as a revolutionary during the 
Algerian War), Hassan identifies as French, saying, “The fact is, I am not Algerian.” For 
Hassan, an Algerian person is someone born and raised in Algeria who speaks Berber or 
Arabic perfectly. Hassan speaks Berber and Arabic, but not perfectly. For him, “I am 
French, but a part of my culture is Algerian, and a part of my culture is French, but I 
cannot say that I am Algerian.” Yet while Hassan claims that he has always felt at ease in 
France, he has felt pressure to “prove his Frenchness” to the français de souche and 
 
44 According to the 1992 study, “Geographical Mobility and Social Inclusion,” conducted 
by the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) and the National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), around half of the first-generation Algerian 
immigrants claim Arabic as their maternal language and another twenty-four percent 
claim using a mix of Arabic, Berber and French (Tribalat, 1996, p. 190). Tellingly, only 
ten percent of the second-generation of Algerians in France claim Arabic as their mother 
tongue and an additional twenty-eight percent claim speaking a mixture of French and 




claims that with this type of person, you can physically feel their discomfort (i.e., 
prejudice or racism) when they are in the presence of an immigrant. Hassan considers 
racism as the antithesis of French political values and considers racist people (e.g., 
français de souche) as “less French than me because they are in total opposition with a lot 
of historic French values” (e.g., equality). In this way, Hassan, the son of immigrant 
parents, considers Frenchness to be the ability to embrace and live the French values of 
equality, liberty, and fraternity—and he admonishes those that do not embrace French 
values. Hassan, a teacher, feels that there is a significant problem of racism in French 
society: “Racism is caused by other factors and people don’t speak enough about it…it’s 
a big problem of social ethnicity, especially in schools. I have two classes [in an 
immigrant banlieue] with no whites. But in schools on the other side of the Seine, all 
white people.” Hassan thus shows ambivalence between identifying with other French 
people, though the problem for him is the willingness (or lack) of the French to adhere to 
their own ideals.  
Notably, in his condemnation of racist français de souche, Hassan exhibits a 
passion for French values of equality, liberty, and fraternity. His identity is thus 
determinedly French, and he feels a sense of superiority in his Frenchness. This feeling of 
superiority was also shown by Abdel, who like Hassan, perceives what it means to be 
French through language, place of birth, and residence. Abdel, a 25-year-old son of 
immigrants who lives in the 14th arrondissement of Paris, identifies ‘Frenchness’ in terms 
of language, philosophy, and ‘high culture.’ Abdel feels French in some ways, 
particularly his mastery of the French language. He explains, “Since my life is dedicated 
to the French language, and since this is what makes my life meaningful, I define myself 
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as French.” However, he also understands Frenchness, “as an aesthetic demand, never 
reachable…in that sense, I consider that only a few people, I would say only cultured 
people, are ‘really’ French.” He continues, “[France has] a civilization I admire; I feel 
that France is better than Algeria, greater by its civilization. I used to associate Algeria 
with violence and superstition.” His vision of France, he explains, is represented by 
“1960s France, where culture and republicanism were very important,” but he admits that 
he believes this conception of France “is mythical and does not exist anymore.” In a way 
akin to Hassan’s understanding of his position within his French identity, Abdel feels 
confident enough to offer commentary on an idealized notion of Frenchness, and to 
associate himself with idealized French values.  
A final example of the hybrid identities expressed by some second-generation 
respondents comes from Amara, a 23-year-old daughter of immigrants who lives in the 
Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue, who makes claims of Frenchness and Algerianness. She 
explains, “I don’t consider myself as only an Algerian girl. I don’t know how to say it, 
like, mixed, you know? So, I can talk with the Algerian people in totally Algerian and [I 
am] comfortable with talking with these people, and at the same time, [I am] totally 
comfortable with French people.” Amara, like others described in this section, identifies 
French culture with ‘high culture.’ She points specifically to architecture, indicating that 
she sees ‘Frenchness’ in the buildings that she sees in central Paris, but not in the 
banlieue where she lives: “It’s also about the history, you know? You just have to walk 
on the streets and see the architecture.” She notes that this same French culture is 
imprinted within Algeria itself—she sees it in the architecture when she visits Algeria 
every year. Amara describes a sense of open-mindedness (like Wily and Nadia) in French 
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culture, though unlike many other respondents, she sees open-mindedness in “their 
acceptance of immigrants…I think that French society is open-minded, especially in Paris 
and other big cities where you have a lot of immigrants.” Though Amara expresses a 
sense of ‘fitting in’ within French society, she admits that she does not recognize herself 
in French politics, and she does not participate in civic duties like voting. Throughout her 
interview, Amara refers to herself as Algerian and French in different situations, places, 
and experiences—for example, when she speaks about immigrants (e.g., social relations 
in French society or the banlieues), she identifies as Algerian; when she speaks about her 
everyday life (e.g., going to the cinema, or out with friends), she identifies as French. 
Though their depictions of Frenchness and Algerianness differ, the respondents 
described in this section have one thing in common: feelings of at least partial acceptance 
in the realm of a French identity, a sense of comfort in ‘French spaces,’ and enough 
confidence (possibly because of their higher levels of education, though not all highly 
educated respondents feel as they do) to assign nuanced meaning to Frenchness. All of 
the participants that show a hybrid identity play back-and-forth with their descriptions of 
themselves as ‘Algerian’ in some cases, ‘French’ in other cases, and they vacillate in their 
use of the pronouns we/us/they/them in ways that imply relative social proximity or 
distance—for instance, “we won the war” (referring to the Algerian War), or “they are 
racist” (referring to the French), or “family is important to us” (referring to Algerians), 
and so on.  
The expressions of identity described in this section reinforce, complicate, and 
sometimes undermine the binary construction of Algerian and French identities. It is 
important to not only acknowledge how individuals construct identity through 
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dichotomies (e.g., French OR Algerian, or French VERUS Algerian), but how these 
dichotomies break down at times, and how they are continuously re-defined in relation to 
each other. The distinctions between Frenchness and Algerianness are based on both real 
and imagined differences that Algerian immigrants and their descendants experience and 
observe in their daily lives in France. In some cases, these dichotomies give way to more 
hybrid identities, whereby respondents locate themselves in the interstices of identity 
categories or contest the exclusivity of categories. Rather than relying on an either/or 
construction of belonging, these individuals work with a both/and construction that 
speaks to overlaps, intersections, negotiations, and engagements with social categories. 
These findings follow Bhabha’s (1994) claim that hybrid identity emerges when there is 
negotiation, interface, and exchange of cultural identities across boundaries. These 
examples of first- and second-generation hybrid identities further complicate the identity 
construction and expression among my research participants. These cultural productions 
cast a critical light on standard narratives of integration, which treat immigrant and host-
society ‘cultures’ as static and self-evident, and prompt us to consider how people are 
constantly bringing social categories into being. 
Conclusions 
This chapter highlights the complexity of cultural identity and social categories by 
unpacking the most prominent identity categories described in the interviews—French 
and Algerian. My interviews with people of Algerian origin reveal a wide variety of 
values and meanings attached to each of these categories, as well as many contradictions 
and ambiguities in their understandings of self and other. Being an immigrant in a 
nationally defined polity requires the comprehension of categories and hierarchies and 
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the navigation of membership within these categories. The ability and willingness to 
claim membership in categories is not uniform but varies significantly even among 
people with similar educational and class backgrounds. Participants evaluated their 
difference and sameness vis-à-vis various categories, often drawing on their own, 
personal experiences, and then indicated their desire to resist, accommodate, and rework 
these categories.  
Despite adopting a somewhat combative stance toward France and French 
identity—treating Frenchness as the opposite of Algerianness—many of the research 
respondents do incorporate French identity into their own identities and reconcile what 
might otherwise seem like mutually exclusive constructs. My study participants may see 
themselves as Algerian, but they also understand that being Algerian does not mean that 
they are completely isolated from Frenchness. In this way, being ‘Algerian’ or ‘French’ is 
a matter of degree, content, and situation rather than a static or zero-sum state of being. 
As might be expected, my second-generation respondents consistently displayed an 
increased capacity to explore different identities and to challenge or reject certain 
elements of identities. Engaging with multiple identities destabilizes the assumed 
boundaries between ‘Frenchness’ and ‘Algerianness’ and, paradoxically, also works to 
reinforce them. The recognition by participants that they are the product of different 
‘cultures’ in a sense makes these ‘cultures’ real, as people act upon norms and adopt 
‘typical’ dispositions that they associate with those cultures. Hybridity and negotiation, in 
this sense, do not totally undermine or dissolve those categories, but can instead involve 
the internalization and reproduction of the meanings attached to each.  
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This chapter has tried to show the range of ways that my study respondents form, 
reform, and contextualize identities. I have given particular attention to generations and 
generational shifts. First-generation Algerians tended to hold a more confident feeling of 
Algerianness from their upbringing in Algeria, though this was not always the case. 
Second-generation Algerians tended to rely on family and learned history, rather than 
personal experience, to find their Algerian identity, and were also more likely to embrace 
certain aspects of Frenchness such as language and political ideals such as equality. 
These examples indicate a process generational change that is central to mainstream 
integration theory. But I have also tried to show that there is nothing determinant about 
generational change—there is no standard pathway or trajectory from difference to 
sameness, but constant negotiations of categories and the meanings attached to them. In 
other words, ‘paths of integration’ are neither clear-cut along generational lines nor 
unambiguous in their endpoints. First and generation respondents alike embraced and 
rejected French-coded and Algerian-coded norms and values. What is clear from the 
narratives in this chapter is that that French national identity, despite the pretentions of 
French national discourse, is not universal, but particularistic. While my respondents vary 
in their attitudes and stances toward Frenchness, the very fact of their need to consider 
how or whether they can be French tells the lie of French cultural neutrality. 
Those seeking to join French society—to integrate themselves into ‘mainstream’ 
French life—believe they have access to some elements of ‘Frenchness,’ including 
French language, French philosophers, French art, and other elements of high culture. But 
not all agree that these elements are readily available, or that they are enough to truly 
belong. Those who feel more actively excluded or alienated from French society can turn 
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to other methods of existing within French society, often by making a determined effort 
to be around other (in some cases only) Algerian-origin people. Again, rather than 
following a linear progression, identities are bound up with present-day social 
interactions and historical relationships, changing in indeterminant ways. Youcef can 
describe himself as “a French-Algerian guy,” though he is not a French citizen; Ferhat 
can be a French citizen while realizing that he is “my parents’ Algerian son” and not 
French; Louati, Sakina, Idir, Omar, and Brahim can work very hard to earn degrees they 
thought would open the doors of ‘Frenchness,’ but only some of them will feel  that they 
have succeeded in gaining access to ‘Frenchness.’ These complex, non-linear identity 
constructions indicate the different experiences that second-generation Algerians have 
and the different ways they interpret and respond to these experiences. Their responses, 
above all, speak to a combination of ambivalence and possibility, of respect and 
disappointment, alienation and belonging vis-à-vis French and Algerian identities. In the 
following chapter, I give particular attention to religion and citizenship as key fields (and 




ALGERIAN RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP IN FRANCE
“My religion ends where yours begins.” 
- Kahina, 45-year-old Algerian immigrant 
“I practice [Islam], but…not totally. I don’t go to the mosque, I don’t pray every day, I 
drink, but I do Ramadan.” 
- Omar, 28-year-old Algerian immigrant 
“They promised us citizenship!” 
-Ali, 29-year-old Algerian immigrant 
Introduction 
The previous chapter illustrated that study participants negotiate a range of 
identities in defining their position in French society. While at some level they adhere to 
and reinforce broad identity categories like ‘French’ and ‘Algerian,’ their own identities 
are complicated, reflecting attachments to particular values, roles, and responsibilities 
associated with particular categories. This chapter continues the examination of 
immigrant identities as conceptualizations of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ focusing on the social 
fields of religion and citizenship as key physical and metaphorical sites of identity 
formation and contestation.  
The work that immigrants undertake in delineating, rejecting, and accommodating 
Frenchness and Algerianness illuminates the insecurities that they face and the fact that 
their position as (partial) outsiders requires them to articulate who and what they are 
(long-established, white French citizens, in contrast, are better able to take their French 
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identity as a given). In France, immigration has become closely associated with crime, 
poverty, racial tension, and even terrorism (Benbassa, 2005; Deltombe, 2007). 
Commentators and politicians have voiced concerns about the loss of French national 
identity and sovereignty due to immigration (Noiriel, 1996; Simon, 2012). While not all 
immigrants are perceived as a threat to the majority culture, those that are differentiated 
through racialized labels do become the focus of narratives about the threat to 
Frenchness. Muslim immigrants, particularly from North Africa (and especially 
Algerians), have been portrayed as the most threatening to the core of Frenchness (Blanc-
Chaléard, 2001; Hargreaves, 1995). 
Owing to the extraordinarily large labor migration from Algeria to France, Islam 
and immigration have become almost synonymous in the minds of many French citizens. 
As Roy (2006) notes, this “correlation between Muslims and immigrants in [France] 
means that Muslims are overrepresented in the most excluded parts of society: in tough 
neighborhoods, among the ranks of the unemployed, and in prisons” (Roy, 2006, p. x). 
Further, Islam has been pitted against secularism45, which many French have come to 
view as an essential component of French national identity and citizenship. In a society 
hesitant to openly acknowledge ethnicity or race as social categories, “religion 
distinguishes inclusion versus exclusion,” with French and Muslim identities placed on 
opposing ends of an ethnonational identity continuum (Beaman, 2016, p. 42; Kastoryano, 
 
45 Most recently, in October of 2020, when French leaders rallied support for the 
“outmoded national ideology of secularism” in the wake of an Islamic terrorist attack in a 
northern suburb of Paris (Mishra, 2020, p. 1). For some, this retreat toward secularism in 
the face of social unrest highlights the fact that the social system of France “is 
disastrously unsuited to an increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-racial society” (Mishra, 
2020, p. 1).   
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2002; Scott, 2007). On this continuum, Frenchness signifies rational, Enlightened 
civilization, while Islam signifies fanaticism and fundamentalism (Roy, 2006).  
The claim that Islam is incompatible with laïcité and democracy requires two 
assumptions: first, that all Muslims will think and act as Muslims unless they explicitly 
and visibly distance themselves from the religion of Islam; second, that laïcité is a 
‘culture’ or a system of values that must be shared and adhered to in a very strict fashion 
(Roy, 2006). The irony here is that laïcité, in its intention to keep religion out of the 
public sphere, often produces the opposite effect: it makes religious the focus of public 
debate and politics. Laïcité requires individuals to explain their ‘religion’ and their 
practices, to distinguish between belief and culture, and to think about whether certain 
kinds of behavior and actions are religiously Muslim, culturally Muslim, or culturally 
French. This chapter addresses these tensions around identity, religion, citizenship, and 
belonging in France, giving particular attention to the ways people from Algerian 
backgrounds interpret laïcité and how they conceive the relationship between their 
religious faith and their membership in French society. 
Muslims, of course, do not constitute a coherent community, and people from 
Muslim backgrounds are not uniformly inclined to describe themselves in religious terms. 
This chapter shows how people of Algerian origin think about Islam as an identity and 
how they negotiate membership in a polity that prioritizes a secularist ideal. First, I 
discuss the ways French politicians and commentators conceive of religion and religiosity 
as indicators of (non)integration. I then compare and contrast these dominant discourses 
with respondents’ articulations of the relationship between religion and integration. 
Following the discussion of religion, I look more closely at citizenship as a legal 
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status/relationship and as a set of values and political norms that regulate people’s 
participation in public and political life. Dominant configurations of citizenship in France 
valorize Republican values of universalism and equality while ignoring racism and 
Islamophobia. My respondents, I will show, purposefully and actively respond to the 
closures inherent in French laïcité and citizenship in various ways: by adhering to 
Western secularist understandings of religion; challenging the exclusions of laïcité; by 
asserting the compatibility of their religious identities with French republican values and 
principles; and/or by practicing citizenship in ways that challenge the boundaries of 
republican citizenship. Ultimately, the relationships between legal status, rights, and 
belonging are complex; ‘membership’ is therefore not a single, formal status (i.e., formal 
citizenship) but an array of feelings, positionalities, statuses, and practices.   
Secularism and Religion in French Society 
Historically, France has been one of the principal Catholic countries of Europe, 
but it has also been among the most hostile to the authority of the Church (Reisacher, 
2001). Following the French Revolution in 1789, religion was viewed as anti-
revolutionary and was brought under state control. Secularism emerged as the product of 
the power struggle between the French state and the Catholic Church (Bowen, 2007). 
This anticlericalism challenged the Church’s right to claim responsibility for the moral 
well-being of the French population, and it reflected both liberal and radical expectations 
regarding the right of individuals to choose their own moral compass and spiritual beliefs 
(Réville, 1905).  
Laïcité is France’s “idiosyncratic form of secularism…a complex concept that is 
dense with historical genealogy, practical contradictions, and—crucially—political 
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geographies” (Lizotte, 2020, p. 1). In 1905, France passed a law on the separation of the 
Church and State that guaranteed individual freedom of conscience, that established the 
non-interference of the State in religious matters, and that privatized religion. The overall 
aim was to ensure “freedom from oppressive religious authority” (El Sammaa, 2007; 
McAuley, 2020a, p. 1). The law recognized the rights of individuals to have beliefs of 
any kind and the ability to practice those beliefs as long as the individual did not disturb 
the public order.  
While the 1905 law guaranteed the free exercise of religion, including free 
exercise within public institutions (e.g., schools, colleges, hospitals, asylums, and 
prisons), laïcité is more restrictive in many ways than other forms of western secularism 
(Hurd, 2008). Theoretically, French secularism would make French society more 
welcoming to a religiously diverse population, but it associates religious identity with 
‘communalism’ or ‘separatism,’ which it views as harmful to the universal French body 
politic (Hurd, 2008; El Karoui, 2018). The integration of immigrants is expected to align 
with the privatization of religious belief (Jennings, 2000). French national and cultural 
identity, in other words, implies acceptance of a more privatized form of religious belief 
and practice, as well as a less intense level of religiosity46 (Tribalat, 1995).  
 The construction of Islam as inherently intense and fanatical, and as uniquely 
inseparable from ‘politics,’ is not new; historically, Imperial France viewed Islam as a 
rival cultural formation incompatible with French identity. Colonial authorities developed 
laws to exclude Muslims from nationality and citizenship and to withhold rights given to 
 
46 Notably, adherence to Christianity or Judaism “have not been understood to threaten 
the foundations of the French nation because they are not associated with immigration (or 
racial difference)” (Auslander, 2000, p. 291).  
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non-Muslim Europeans in colonial Algeria. Debates over whether and how to assimilate 
Algerian Muslims in colonial Algeria “acted as a proxy for a much deeper existential 
debate about the ultimate compatibility of French and Islamic civilizations” and the 
possibility of an Islam Français (Mann, 2017, p. 11). As explained by Naomi Davidson 
(2012) with reference to Morocco, Islam Français was a construct developed during 
World War I “that blended French secular republicanism with distinct embodied practices 
and aesthetics drawn from the French imaginary of orthodox [Maghrebian] Islam…[I]t 
was elaborated by French politicians, colonial officials, social scientists, architects, [and] 
urban planners” (p.1). Islam Français, in other words, was a hegemonic device to place 
Muslims within colonial, and later, French society:  
[T]he inscription of Islam on the very bodies of colonial (and later, postcolonial) 
immigrants emerged from the French belief that Islam was a rigid and totalizing 
system filled with corporeal rituals that needed to be performed in certain kinds of 
aesthetic spaces… “Muslim” was as essential and eternal a marker of difference 
as gender or skin color in France (Davidson, 2012, p. 2).  
 
In more recent iterations, since the 1980s, successive French governments have tried to 
create an ‘Islam of France’ that both ‘integrates’ the country’s Muslims and works to 
combat Islamist extremism, “transforming Islam in France to an Islam of France” (Piser, 
2018, p. 1, emphasis in original). In 2003, then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy created 
the French Council of the Muslim Faith, a national elected body that cooperates with the 
French state on matters concerning Islam (according to a 2016 survey, “barely a third of 
French Muslims even know what it is” (Piser, 2018, p. 1)). The goal of structuring Islam 
in France has been to create an Islam that both conforms to national values (secularism) 
and is “immune” to radicalization of its followers (Piser, 2018, p. 1). This twofold 
approach (secularism and anti-radicalization) has been expanded as recently as October 
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2020, when President Macron presented plans to regulate the practice of Islam in France 
and to prevent Islamic ‘separatism’ by allowing the state to monitor funding to mosques, 
to certify French imams, and to prevent the creation of Islamic schools—an approach that 
has been widely criticized for its conflation of Islam and Islamism (overtly politicized or 
militant versions of Islam) (McAuley, 2020b). Ultimately, the French state would like 
Muslims to be indistinguishable from the practitioners of other religions, with no 
identifiable clothing (e.g., headscarves) or dietary restrictions (i.e., halal). These 
intentions have most recently been voiced by the French Interior Minister Gérald 
Darmanin, who expressed shock at dedicated aisles in supermarkets for halal and kosher 
food, and implied that separate sale of these products can contribute to the isolation of 
minority communities (communalism) and can even lead to radicalization (Bryant, 
2020a; Guillot, 2020).  
Laïcité has thus developed into a means of controlling Muslims’ public 
expressions of religiosity—a phenomenon recognized and experienced by my research 
participants. Moufdi, a 28-year-old son of immigrants living in the 20th arrondissement, 
thus explains, “When you are French but also Muslim, they put these identities against 
each other. Like, they can’t exist together. Islam isn’t a ‘normal’ religion of France like 
Catholicism or even Judaism.” As Wattles (2018) notes, French secularism “allows the 
government to have differentiated policies toward North African descendants despite 
French citizenship’s implicit denial of race, religion, skin color, or other markers of 
difference” (Wattles, 2018, p. 14). Although the Muslim population in France is far from 
homogeneous, the dominant French narrative tends to treat Islam and Muslims in a 
“reductionist and essentialist fashion, failing to note the important variations and 
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cleavages” within the Muslim community47 (Freedman, 2004, p. 8). For an individual to 
become ‘fully integrated’ requires being ‘fully secularized,’ or non-observant. From this 
perspective, one cannot be both religious and adhere to French values because French 
values exclude religiosity (and especially Muslim religiosity). In the following section, I 
elaborate on the ways laïcité informs the identities and experiences of my research 
participants.  
Engaging with Laïcité among Algerian-Origin Communities in Paris 
Where French discourse tends to conflate ‘immigrant’ with ‘Muslim’ and to 
depict Muslims as a homogeneous group, my interviews reveal a heterogeneity of 
practices and identities. Many of my respondents, in the first instance, actually do adhere 
to Western secularist understandings of religion, describing their faith as ‘private’ and as 
not requiring any public accommodations or recognition. Others, in contrast, challenge 
the exclusions of laïcité, asserting the compatibility of their religious identities with 
French republican values and principles. Religious identity is also fluid at the individual 
level, as some of my respondents describe having shifted their religious beliefs and 
practices during their lives. In all these cases, though, Algerian immigrants and their 
children must engage, whether they wish to or not, with reification of religion, and they 
must position themselves as Muslims, regardless of personal religiosity, vis-à-vis a 
French laïque identity. Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France must 
constantly engage with a “world in which Islam is a chronic object of discussion and 
debate, a world that is thick with self-conscious and explicit discussions about Islam” 
 
47 In this dissertation, references to a ‘Muslim community’ refer to Muslims living in 
France. It does not refer to an official community, the global Muslim community, or a 
specific, named Muslim community.  
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(Brubaker 2013, p. 4). French preoccupations, in other words, oblige Algerian-origin 
people to explain how their religion makes them French or not French. It thus becomes 
part of the conceptual framework for understanding integration politics in France.  
Research on immigrant religiosity tends to accept the categories produced by 
laïcité and other modes of secularism—that is, the notion that people are either religious 
or non-religious. Some scholarship has focused on generational changes among 
immigrant religiosity, noting, per theorizations of progressive secularization, a ‘natural’ 
decline in religiosity or acceptance of more privatized conceptions of religiosity among 
second-generation French Muslims (Cesari, 2002; Ramadan, 2002). Here, again, there is 
a taken-for-granted, binary understanding of people as religious or secular. This view 
ignores the complicated ways that individuals engage with religion as a field of identity, 
belief, and practice; the way they conceive of religion as public/political or 
private/personal; and the way they connect religious identities to race, ethnicity, and 
gender. Writing in the U.S. context, for instance, Nadine Naber (2005; 2012) finds that 
the second-generation Muslim Arab Americans she interviewed view themselves as 
‘Muslim first, Arab second’ and view ‘Arab culture’ as a barrier to a more authentic 
practice of Islam. These young people immerse themselves and strive for a purer 
relationship with Islam that influences decisions about personal morals and marriage. 
While operating at a highly personal level, this understanding of Islam requires 
engagement with more ‘public’ issues of injustice, racial discrimination, oppression, and 
exclusion within U.S. society—issues that are relevant well beyond any Muslim 
‘community’ (Naber, 2012). I contribute to these discussions by showing that defining 
oneself as religious or non-religious is an act of negotiation—a process of positioning 
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oneself in relation to social hierarchies and stereotypes produced in French society. My 
interest here is not so much whether my respondents are more or less religious, but how 
they explain, construct, and narrate their religiosity in the French laïque context (Roy, 
1994; Bowen, 2004).  
First-Generation Religious Practices  
 Given the common assumption about generational change, I begin by exploring 
the varying ways my first-generation respondents interpret and ‘manage’ their religiosity 
and Muslim identities. A majority of respondents, 52 of 73 participants, identify as 
Muslims; of those, 41 of 52 Muslims are first-generation immigrants. Perhaps counter-
intuitively (given assumptions about more intense religiosity among recent immigrants), 
first-generation respondents tend to reflect a clear regard for the precepts of laïcité in 
France. They respond to expectations about the privatization of religion by practicing 
their religion very quietly. This seems to be a conscious decision, born of their awareness 
of the politics of laïcité in France. The following narratives show that my study 
participants are deliberate in choosing which aspects of Islam they observe or do not 
observe. This indicates that in a laïque context, there is no unconscious, unproblematic 
way that people practice Islam; rather, ‘religion’ becomes a collection of practices and 
meanings that people must consciously formulate on their own, or in smaller 
collectivities. These practices include a range of activities such as daily prayers, 
observing Ramadan, abstaining from alcohol (and in some cases cigarettes and other 
drugs), following a halal diet, attending mosque, observing Muslim holidays, and/or 
wearing a hijab. So, for instance, though all of my Muslim-identifying respondents 
observed Ramadan, they differed on their level of dedication and commitment to other 
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practices, explaining their varying levels of commitment partly in terms of dominant 
norms and expectations. Youcef offers an explanation of this, saying that the French 
will be trying to find French things in you. Like they will be trying to find 
connections in you. So, if you start talking about things they know, [if you] you 
share a bit of their culture, they will accept you more. The main thing will be if 
you drink, if you drink alcohol and if you smoke [cigarettes], they will say, ‘Oh 
he's integrated, he is in French ways!’ It’s stupid things but it is like this. 
Others took a somewhat different tack, pushing back against efforts by French politicians 
to circumscribe and exclude certain ‘Muslim’ practices as non-French. For example, 
Zizou, a 36-year-old immigrant living in the 92nd district outside of Paris, says, “I do not 
need to drink or eat pork to be French and totally integrated.” 
Said, a 53-year-old café-owner living in the 13th arrondissement, exemplifies the 
kinds of accommodations—including the privatization of religious practice—that my 
respondents make to ‘fit in’ while also being faithful to their personal beliefs and values. 
When it is time to pray, Said disappears upstairs to the private realm of the family 
apartment without explanation and returns after his prayers are finished. Said attends the 
mosque regularly, leaving his café in the care of his employees so that he can participate 
in prayers. During Ramadan, he quietly fasts. Through the years of my fieldwork, though 
Ramadan occurred in the hottest months of the summer, he abstained from consuming 
food and beverage from sun up to sun down. In privatizing his religious practice, Said 
produces a quasi-‘secular’ space in his café. That is, his café does not bear any markers of 
Islam, though it is an important social space for Algerian immigrants. Said serves alcohol 
to his customers, including Muslim customers, even though he does not drink alcohol 
himself. And he served food and drink in his café all day during Ramadan. As I explained 
in Chapter Three, I would often use his café as a venue for interviews. When one of my 
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interviewees showed up and ordered a glass of red wine, like he always did, this did not 
elicit any commentary from Said. There was no effort or intention to impose his 
‘personal’ religious beliefs in this space; he instead confined these to ‘private’ space, and 
in doing so, he made his café ‘public’ according to French standards—which is to say, 
unmarked by religious norms or identities (though Algerian cultural symbols and 
memories are very pronounced in this space).  
Said’s consciousness and active production of public and private distinctions is 
also evident in the practices of my host-mother, Kahina, a 53-year-old immigrant living 
in the 20th arrondissement. Kahina does her best to pray five times a day, yet even when I 
lived with her, I never saw her pray because she went into her bedroom, closed the door, 
and prayed in private. When she is at work, at a nearby childcare facility, she does not 
pray at all. Kahina is a strong advocate of peaceful coexistence between different 
religious communities, and this, in her view, requires clear boundaries between people’s 
faith and their public life. Thus, she says, “My religion ends where yours begins,” making 
circles with her arms as she describes this. While we were in Algeria, Kahina got into a 
heated argument with her sister-in-law, who thought that I should convert to Islam. 
Kahina stood up and shouted at her, “This is the problem! It is people like you, forcing 
your religion onto others that is the problem!” In this example, Kahina, like Said, 
illustrates the tendency among my first-generation respondents to adhere to a more 
‘private’ and ‘quiet’ approach to practicing religion, taking up as little space (public, 
private, mental) as possible. The key point here is that respondents actively produce 




For some of my respondents living in the banlieues, Muslim religious practice 
allows for the formation of social connections with Muslims from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Turkey, and other parts of the world. Lina, a 60-year-old immigrant, living in the 
Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue, raised her children with a strong affiliation with Islam. 
Lina, who is divorced, and her Muslim neighbors often celebrate iftar together during 
Ramadan, and twice she invited me for iftar meals. She has one son, the only male in the 
house, who was kept apart from me, the single female guest, during the meals. She tries 
to pray five times a day (a practice she cannot always keep up while at work in a nursing 
home), abstains from alcohol and pork products, but does not attend a mosque. Lina 
explains, “there are no good mosques for women here; there is one for men, it is just a 
room, with shoes outside. No place for women to pray.” For Lina traditional religious 
practices (e.g., the separation of men and women) are more easily woven into social 
engagements in the home, and so her home (a private realm) becomes the key site for her 
Muslim identity. Her devotion to Islam structures her life, but she makes 
accommodations for the times when she is in French, or secular, public spaces such as 
her work. Like those in the previous examples, Lina does not pray when in ‘public’ or 
‘laïque’ space. She does not wear a headscarf at home or in public. In these ways, Lina 
recognizes and accommodates the norms of laicism; in so doing, she produces the 
‘private’ space of her home, where social customs (such as prayer, or the separation of 
men and women) are practiced, and the ‘public’ space outside of her home, where she 
abstains from these practices; thereby making these categories real and substantive 
through her practices. 
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Said, Kahina, and Lina uphold a distinction between public and private realms 
even as they maintain a high level of observance and orthopraxy. For some of my 
younger first-generation interviewees, the distinction between public and private becomes 
less clear, or perhaps less salient, because their adherence to Islam is more selective and 
less intense. Paradoxically, it is in relaxing strict divisions that these respondents feel 
better able to engage with mainstream French society. For instance, Omar, a 28-year-old 
immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement, says that he is a practicing Muslim, “but not 
totally.” He explains, “I don’t go to the mosque, I don’t pray every day; I drink, but I do 
Ramadan.” Omar fasts during Ramadan (though he ‘cheats’ sometimes), he prays (but 
not five times a day), he consumes alcohol, but not pork products. He feels that because 
he does not follow Islam the way that he was raised—what he calls the “right Muslim 
Islam”— he is “adapting to my new land” in France. Omar compares the freedom of 
religious expression in France to the imposed expression in Algeria, and he prefers living 
in France where he can be Muslim, but in his own way. In contrast to Said, Kahina, and 
Lina, Omar does not actively work to produce ‘public’ or ‘private’ realms in which to 
practice his religion; instead, he takes a fairly relaxed approach to religious practice that 
does not require quietly hiding his faith. Without the mandate or expectation to pray daily 
or to follow a strict, prescriptive diet, such concerns simply disappear from his normal 
everyday life.   
Other first-generation respondents describe a similar sense of flexibility in 
practicing Islam that allows them to be ‘openly’ Muslim while accommodating French 
social practices and expectations. To illustrate, Aehour, a 28-year-old immigrant, living 
in the 94th district, explains that his religious practices changed when he arrived 
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(illegally) in France in 2013. He says, “[A]t first, I tried to pray five times a day, but 
couldn’t because of my job. No special time for prayers here.” As Aehour adjusted to the 
restrictions that laïcité places on public spaces (such as the café where he was working at 
the time), he also altered other behaviors as he adjusted to the freedoms of French 
society. “I remember the first time I drank [alcohol]” he says, “I hated it, but now, I drink 
sometimes, it is nothing.” He also admits to smoking hashish and getting high with his 
friends: “My friend, I was staying with him when I first got here. He was doing it and 
told me to try it.” While Aehour describes a devotion to his religion, he also manages to 
reconcile clashing behaviors and his belief—not only in relation to alcohol and drugs, but 
also in relation to dating. Aehour is dating a French girl and refuses to tell his mother 
(back in Algeria) about her, saying, “I cannot tell her. If she found out, you know, what 
we did, she [would] never forgive me.” Aehour, then, identifies as Muslim and at least 
claims to take religion seriously, but he is rather flexible with his adherence to the 
principles and practices, finding little difficulty in conforming with French social 
expectations and norms, though he still prefers to socialize primarily with other Algerian 
immigrants. Thus, the spaces of ‘public’ and ‘private’, and the identities associated with 
each, become intermingled and less rigid.  
The narratives of Said, Kahina, Lina, Omar, and Aehour are indicative of the 
ways that first-generation immigrants accommodate their religious practices to a French 
context. Though they all consider themselves to be devout, practicing Muslims, they do 
not all espouse the same collection of practices. In this sense, they each exercised some 
freedom of choice to ‘pick and choose’ which aspects of Islam they observe and those 
they do not. But this picking and choosing can only take place in a society that reifies 
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religion and conceives of (or even mandates) a separation between public and private 
realms. In Algeria, as my interviewees describe it, Islam is woven into everyday life and 
there is no need to make decisions about how and where one expresses one’s religious 
belief. In France, religion becomes a matter of choices, and people tailor religious 
practice and identity in ways that reveal an internalization of France’s secularist norms. 
Said, Kahina, and Lina’s interest in relegating religious expression to the ‘private’ sphere 
of their homes and not ‘imposing’ it on others, and Omar and Aehour’s flexible approach 
to choosing which rules they follow are indicative of the different ways that these first-
generation immigrants engage with Islam in laïque terms and, perhaps, avoid some of the 
stigma they might otherwise experience. These findings mirror existing studies showing 
that when migrants move to secular societies, they tend to adhere to secular norms and 
practices, rather than disrupt or undermine them (Stump, 1984; Smith, Sikkink, and 
Baily, 1998; Inglehart and Norris, 2009). But while migrants may alter their religious 
practices along secularist lines, this does not equate to becoming ‘less religious.’ Rather it 
implies adhering to an ideology that imagines religion to belong in a separate sphere; a 
‘sphere’ that must be actively created and demarcated. 
Second-Generation Religious Practices of Algerians 
As noted previously, some literature identifies a generational gap in religiosity 
and suggests a lessening of religious devotion over generations, much like the decline of 
ethnic attachment associated with ‘assimilation’ (Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts, 
2010; Parikh, 2020). Yet other studies indicate that there is an increase in religiosity 
among second-generation Muslims. In France, this phenomenon is attributed to feelings 
of social exclusion, and in some extreme cases, fundamentalism (El Karoui, 2016). Still 
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others, like Simon and Tiberj (2013) find no evidence of a “generational rupture that 
signals a more intense relation to religion among the youth born in France, but rather 
[evidence of] a more general affirmation of religion among immigrant populations since 
the 1980s, which is a part of a more global movement of the evolution of the function of 
religion in the Muslim countries” (p. 27).  
These conflicting viewpoints require us to consider how religious practices might 
allow second-generation Algerians to connect to their parents’ generation but may also 
serve to create distinctions from parents and to navigate a place in France. Returning to 
Naber’s (2005) work, she finds that second-generation adults in Arab-Muslim 
communities in the U.S. leverage Islam as a way to unsettle parental authority while 
maintaining a sense of respect and honor. Naber identifies a formation of a new Muslim 
identity among the second-generation, one that is considered a ‘purer’ version of Islam 
that purges their parents’ cultural practices and that is attuned to (and disruptive of) 
hierarchies of gender and race in both their parents’ societies of origin and in the U.S. 
This is not a simple case of becoming less religious as one becomes more ‘assimilated’ or 
more religious in reaction to exclusion. Rather, religious identity, belief, and practice 
become bound up with generational efforts to navigate relationships with families and the 
social hierarchies they encounter on a day-to-day basis. This approach suggests that 
broad generalizations are problematic, and that we need to look more closely to see the 
different ways that the children of immigrants conceive of religiosity in the context of 
laïcité. We can ask how laïcité shapes these individuals’ identities and practices; how it 
forces a consciousness of a religious identity even among those who are not very 
religious personally; and how it factors into their broader sense of difference or sameness.  
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Ideas of religiosity among my respondents involve an element of family and 
transnational relationships and tensions, and constant comparisons between their parents’ 
experiences and their own (which are situated more fully in the French context). Nielsen 
and Otterbeck (2016) discusses the use of Islam by first-generation parents to control the 
behavior (particularly marriage and partner choice) of their European-raised children. 
Islam in this way (and as suggested by Naber) can come to signify ‘back home’ and can 
appear to my French-born respondents as a set of foreign practices (much as it does for 
the French mainstream). Nadia, a 26-year-old part-time resident in France, living in the 
14th arrondissement, explains this as particularly applicable to Algerian mothers raising 
daughters in France:  
Because her daughter is French, it is nothing for her to go out with her friends, to 
have experience with boys…but her mother, even if she is evolved, even if she 
became French in her mind, when it comes to her daughter, it is not the same. She 
will be an Algerian [Muslim] mom and say, “Show me yourself! What are you?” 
because Algerian mothers wish to keep their daughters at home, and this is easy in 
Algeria. However, in France, it is not just a matter of culture; it is a matter of not 
living in a Muslim society. 
Returning to an incident I explained in Chapter Three, my host-mother, Kahina, asked me 
to read her daughter’s journal because Aida had been hanging out with people that her 
mother did not approve of, and had a much older boyfriend who was not Muslim. Aida 
complains about her “Muslim family” and says that she “hated spending holidays with 
them,” even going so far as to call her Algerian relatives “stupid” when describing their 
faithful way of life. Here, the ‘Algerian mother’ that Nadia describes is evident in 
Kahina’s desire to control her French-born daughter in a way that is similar to the way 
that she was raised in Algeria.  
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Though these anecdotes show a generational rift between conservative, religious 
parents and more ‘assimilated,’ French-born youth, such a rift is not always clearly 
evident. When looking at the second-generation, different patterns emerge as they 
negotiate identities and must situate religious belief and experience into public and 
private realms of life. The intensity of religious belief and feeling among second-
generation participants in this research varies considerably, falling into three broad 
groups: practicing Muslims, ‘cultural Muslims,’ and non-believers. Of the 29 research 
participants from the second generation, 11 ascribe to themselves a Muslim identity; nine 
identify as ‘culturally Muslim’ and nine have rejected Islam and do not believe in or 
practice religion. 
The eleven who identify as Muslim show very different engagements with Islam 
that range from strict to rather flexible. For instance, Amara, a 23-year-old daughter of 
immigrants, living in the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue, considers herself to be a 
devout Muslim. While she prefers not to wear a hijab, she does when she visits mosques 
(which is not a regular practice for her). Though she identifies strongly with her Algerian 
heritage, she considers herself ‘Westernized’ in her plans for romantic relationships 
(though she admits that her parents want her to marry another Algerian Muslim). In 
Amara’s workplace, even though there are many other Muslims that work with her (at a 
social housing office), they are not allowed to pray at work. She explains that she accepts 
this rule but would like to at least be allowed to pray if she wants to, saying, “There are 




Amara’s perceptions of and desire for increased freedom to practice her faith in 
public are not the norm among my research participants from the second-generation who 
consider themselves Muslim. Where Amara seeks increased recognition, Sakina 
downplays her religion, not unlike some of my first-generation respondents; Sakina, a 35-
year-old daughter of immigrants, living in the 20th arrondissement, considers herself a 
devout Muslim, but explains, “I do not say all the time that I am Muslim. You know, it is 
only for private knowledge, between me and God.” As previously described, Sakina is 
active with the local Berber Cultural Center, but she does not desire accommodations 
from French society for her religion. For example, she explains that she prays at home 
before work, never at work, but she will pray with other Muslims if she is around them 
throughout the day. Sakina embraces the secular expectations of French society and 
copes with them by choosing to spend most of her free time with other Algerian-origin 
Muslims. In this example, Sakina’s practices and perceptions of religiosity within a 
secular context resonate with participants from the first-generation, showing that there is 
not always, or necessarily, a sharp division between first- and second-generation religious 
practices and perceptions.  
While Amara and Sakina both incorporate aspects of Islam into their daily lives, 
this is not the case for many of the second-generation participants. The second group of 
nine second-generation participants identified as ‘culturally Muslim’—that is, they 
identify partly with being Muslim, but they describe their Muslim identity as ‘cultural’ 
rather than ‘religious’—a distinction that is in line with secularist thinking (Bowen, 
2004). References to individuals as ‘cultural Muslims’ is a controversial description; 
many scholars worry that referring to individuals who do not follow the religion of Islam 
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as ‘Muslim’ is imprecise and continues assumptions such as ‘all Arabs are Muslim’ 
(Brouard and Tiberj, 2005). Further, the idea of Muslims who are not religious might cast 
Islam as more than a religion and less of a choice: it becomes an “inherited marker, 
which limits an individual’s freedom of conscience” (Fredette, 2010, p. 59). Yet many 
individuals claim an affiliation with other Muslims, even if they do not consider 
themselves to be religious, resembling the idea of ‘cultural Muslims’ as put forth by 
Klausen (2005) or of ‘sociological Muslims’ as described by Venel (2004). This notion 
highlights that religion is a multifaceted social construction that involves more than either 
theological beliefs or ritualized practices. This group of respondents talk about 
participating in a few rituals, such as observing Ramadan, that are common to Muslims 
but that do not, in their view, require deep spiritual commitment.  
For instance, Annia, a 22-year-old daughter of immigrants, living in the 10th 
arrondissement, claims to be an atheist, explaining that while she was raised as a Muslim 
and feels a connection to her parents’ religion, she is not a believer. While she does not 
identify as a Muslim, she does not outright reject the identity either. She describes, “I 
grew up with Ramadan and prayers, but I do not believe in it. I do not believe in a God. I 
drink [alcohol]. I smoke. I live with my boyfriend. But it is my culture, you know?” In a 
similar way to Annia, Zohra, a 23-year-old daughter of immigrants, living in the 20th 
arrondissement, explains that she was raised Muslim. “Yes, I am Muslim. Well, no, I was 
Muslim” she says. As she got older, her friends were all French and were not Muslims. “I 
wanted to be like them” she says. When Zohra went to university in Paris, she says, “I 
stopped doing the prayers. I don’t believe it anymore.” For Annia and Zohra, there was 
an aspect of their ‘culture’ that was Muslim that could be separated from theological 
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belief. While they do not ascribe to the precepts of the religion, they cannot entirely 
divorce themselves from the label of ‘Muslim.’   
A narrative of a childhood steeped in religion, as in the cases of Annia and Zohra, 
was common among second-generation Algerians who identified as ‘culturally Muslim.’ 
Where some rejected religion as they grew up, others experienced more of a back-and-
forth engagement with Islam. For instance, Abdel, a 25-year-old son of immigrants, 
living in the 16th arrondissement, explains his journey of faith: “I used to be Muslim until 
the age of 17, and I am still very interested in religion, though I do not believe in a 
revealed religion.” Yet, when I interviewed Abdel again, one year later, he had returned 
to his Muslim beliefs and was working as an Arabic teacher at a mosque near his home. 
Abdel’s experience involved a series of pathways—of an exit and return to Islam. He was 
raised in a very poor family and he admits that he associates this poverty with his parents’ 
dedication to Islam. In his attempt to exit this poverty, he rejected Islam. Abdel’s mother 
and sister are still very religious (his father passed away when Abdel was a teenager) and 
he has begun to share religious holidays with them again, after years of avoiding them. 
Like Abdel, Aida’s views on religion changed over time as well, and where she once 
renounced all religion and specifically Islam, she has more recently begun to embrace the 
faith of her family. 
The delicate balance of religiosity between childhood practices and adult 
engagement was also evident for Mhenna, a 27-year-old son of immigrants, living in the 
20th arrondissement. Mhenna does not identify as a religious Muslim, but he offers the 
clarification that “I was raised Muslim.” He explains that he does not fast during 
Ramadan unless he is at his parents’ house, and only then because “my Mother is 
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watching, I have to fast.” Mhenna does not pray, drinks alcohol, and admits that he does 
not really believe in God; however, he does not eat pork products. This amalgamation of 
religious practices and attributes is also evident in the children of Said and Lina (both 
discussed in the previous section). Said’s children exhibit quite different ways of 
expressing and practicing their faith. Of his three children, only the youngest, Aldjia, 
shares Said’s devotion to Islam—she prays five times a day (though not at school, which 
the French state designates as a ‘public’ space), and fasts during Ramadan, though she 
does not go to the mosque, and does not wear a hijab. She explains, “I don’t wear [the 
hijab] because I am French.” Aldjia started taking Berber lessons at the Berber Cultural 
Association (where study participant Sakina teaches) and developed a deep fascination 
with her parents’ history and culture. Aldjia continued taking Berber lessons and started 
participating in other activities at the center, like Berber dance and cooking classes. Like 
other participants described in this dissertation, Aldjia’s connection with her Algerian 
roots has grown over time and influences her religious practices. In contrast, her siblings, 
Said’s older two children, Sylia and Abdallah, do not pray or go to the mosque, or fast 
during Ramadan, or abstain from alcohol, though neither will eat pork products48. Lina 
describes the religiosity of her children, saying that her oldest daughter and middle son 
are devout, but she fears that her youngest daughter is “falling away from God.”  
 The third group of nine second-generation respondents includes those who have 
rejected Islam and do not believe or adhere to any cultural practices connected with the 
religion. This group of interviewees maintains virtually no connection with Islam. For 
 
48 The halal diet is an important marker of religiosity among Muslims in France, the TeO 
study (2008) found that eighty-six percent of second-generation Muslims (practicing or 
not) followed a halal diet. 
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instance, Dalila, a 50-year-old daughter of immigrants, living in the 6th arrondissement 
(an upper-class neighborhood in the center of Paris), explains that “religion should be 
practiced at home, with discretion. But I am not religious, I hate Muslims” (though we 
were sitting in the home of her sister, a practicing Muslim, at the time of her interview). 
Dalila blames the influence of the Arabs on the downfall of her (Berber) people, and she 
reiterates the non-religious aspects of Berber history49. She feels that Islam is a restrictive 
religion that does not conform with her ideals of being a “liberated woman.” 
Like Dalila, Yamina rejects Islam. She is a 39-year-old daughter of an Algerian 
immigrant, living in the 10th arrondissement, and she speaks of her experience in 
rejecting Islam: her father is Algerian, and her mother is French; her father left when she 
was young, and her mother did not continue to teach Yamina about her father’s Islamic 
religion. As she grew up, Yamina focused on school instead and found that she was 
drawn to fashion and design, not to religion or to her Algerian roots. Most of the 
respondents who are not religious either made a conscious choice to leave the religion or 
were raised in non-religious households and have never considered religion as part of 
their identity. 
From these narrative examples of the three different sets of second-generation 
Algerians, we can see how respondents are conscious of ‘religion’ as a specific set of 
practices, values, and beliefs that they must choose or reject. This need to take a stand on 
Islam—to accept it as a culture while rejecting it as a theology or accepting some 
practices while rejecting others—is indicative of the influence of French Republicanism 
 
49 Historically, the Berber peoples of the Kabyle region of Algeria were known to be non-
religious, or in some instances Christian (owing to the many invasions over centuries). 
Though the area now has a majority Muslim population.  
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and laïcité and the assumption that religion and culture are discernable realms of life. 
One not only has the capacity to choose, but must choose, how one relates to ‘religion’ 
and ‘culture’ and how religion and culture relate to each other. Such choices do not 
follow any clear generational trajectory, though we can identify some general patterns 
that may be characteristic of certain generational segments.   
French political discourse routinely conflates immigrant with Muslim and 
suggests that people of Algerian descent are, above all, Muslim. At the same time, it 
regards Islam as naturally hostile to laïcité, which implies that there is a separate realm of 
‘religion.’ Laïcité, then, renders Islam problematic and compels immigrants and their 
descendants to situate religious belief and culture within particular realms, often in ways 
that uphold dominant conceptions of public and private. My study respondents describe 
their practices as religious and cultural; they articulate which aspects of their lives are 
‘cultural’ and which aspects are ‘religious,’ just as they articulate which aspects of their 
lives are Algerian or French. They must determine which elements of both are 
appropriate for ‘public’ life in France and which are to be confined to private light behind 
doors. Some assert French identity partly by counterposing French identity to Islam; but 
others seem to select elements of Muslim practice (or ‘culture’) that fit in with their 
particular way of being French and/or Algerian. Ultimately, by showing the multiple 
ways that Algerians express or reject religiosity, I show that they are constantly locating 
their religious identities in different realms (public/private, cultural/religious), which 
becomes a necessity in a laïque society.    
The promise of ‘integration’ in France effectively depends on accepting the host-
society’s norms as one’s own, including laïcité (Hargreaves, 1995). In turn, the 
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“transformation and manipulation of laïcité into an illiberal legal tool to restrict religious 
freedom has allowed elite public discourse to constantly question Muslim loyalty to 
France and debate whether or not Muslims can be good French citizens” (François, 2020, 
p. 1). Thus, religion and citizenship are intricately intertwined. The following section 
looks more broadly at the production of citizenship in France—the articulation of civic 
values and rights, and the ways in which Algerians interviewed for this research engage 
with these concepts. 
Citizenship in French Society 
Integration as a political process works partly through the domain of citizenship. 
Citizenship has multiple dimensions relating to legal status, rights and responsibilities, 
political participation, and a sense of belonging within a national polity (Bloemraad et al., 
2008; Sandel, 1998; Reiter, 2012). As Thomas (2002) notes, citizenship permits an 
individual to lay claim to an identity and to access a set of rights guaranteed by the state. 
In France, republicanism serves as the key cultural idiom of citizenship (Brubaker 1992). 
Historically, republicanism’s universalistic, civic understanding of nationhood has 
encouraged a relatively permissive approach to naturalization and citizenship based on 
jus soli, which connects membership to birthplace50 rather than ancestry. French 
republican citizenship, in this sense, represents “the reassertion of an Enlightenment 
project that values the creation of an autonomous subject who learns how to transcend 
particular identifications by way of a universal rational subjectivity” (Hoffman, 2004, p. 
1).  
 
50 A factor that has complicated the citizenship trajectories for some participants of this 
research, discussed in later sections.  
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Yet, public concern over the integration of North Africans has also “continued to 
foster efforts to narrow access to French citizenship” and the rights associated with it 
(Laxer, 2016). According to Hollifield (1994), ‘Franco-Algerians’ and their children were 
the central targets of the debates surrounding the French Nationality Code, which 
culminated in the ultra-restrictive 1993 Pasqua laws. The Pasqua laws revoked the 
automatic attribution of citizenship to children born in France to foreign-born51 parents 
(Weil, 2002). Though this and other restrictive aspects of the Pasqua laws have been 
modified, new restrictions have since been introduced. In 2002, for instance, the French 
government created new limitations on foreigners’ access to French visas and nationality, 
particularly for foreign spouses (Bertossi, 2010).  
Perhaps not surprisingly, naturalization rates among North Africans remain 
remarkably low in France. According to the 2008 TeO survey, the proportion of those 
with French nationality among Algerian migrants is 45 percent and 47 percent among 
Moroccans and Tunisians (Simon, 2010, p. 116) (Simon (2012) puts the naturalization 
rate for all immigrants in France at 40 percent). These low rates of naturalization are 
partially due to the substantial practical and administrative barriers that applicants face in 
formally joining the French polity. For approval, an application must pass several 
thresholds and meet requirements set by governmental agencies. One of the main 
obstacles is the criterion of ‘acceptability,’ which requires applicants to justify their 
“assimilation into the French community, primarily by sufficient knowledge of the 
 
51 As we will see in the upcoming sections, for Algerians, whether or not a person was 
born in a ‘foreign’ country was dependent upon the timing and place of their birth as 
Algeria’s status as ‘foreign’ changed over the course of the late 20th century. 




French language” (Bertossi, 2010, p. 18). Currently, the cultural requirements for 
immigrants to prove that they are worthy of formal membership within France involve a 
language test and a culture test (with questions about French culture and history) 
(République Française, n.d.). That said, a relatively generous approach to the French-
born children of immigrants means that a majority of descendants of immigrants born in 
France are French citizens (Simon, 2012). 
These tensions within citizenship policy hint at the unequal distribution of rights 
and privileges across citizenry (Brubaker, 1989). Citizenship, Reiter (2012) states, 
“privileges those able to claim more citizenship [rights] than others, and through this 
process, secure tangible advantages for themselves” (p. 4). In this sense, some individuals 
have full legal citizenship but lack full substantive citizenship because of other factors 
(residency status, racial, ethnic, religiosity, etc.). The promise of ‘belonging’ that 
supposedly comes with French republican citizenship is not realized for those who 
manifestly bear another (ethnic, racial, religious) identity (Ungar and Conley, 1996). This 
situation can lead people of migrant origin to protest against exclusions and to claim 
rights and full (substantive and legal) membership, or to disengage from French society.    
Adding complexity to this situation is the fragmentation of citizenship and rights 
along multiple legal statuses. Scholars and politicians often assume full legal membership 
in the analysis of immigrant integration. However, this is not the case with many 
contemporary immigrants or their children. Legal status, and therefore rights, can vary 
quite dramatically, creating various forms of inclusion and exclusion, and even those 
without formal membership can claim, and exercise, limited or partial forms of 
membership. Other individuals, in contrast, can have multiple memberships. Dual 
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nationals account for 5 percent of the population of metropolitan France between the ages 
of 18-50; 90 percent of these dual nationals are immigrants or descendants of immigrants 
(Simon, 2012, p. 6). Simon’s (2012) research determined that 66 percent of the 
descendants of Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians keep their parents’ original 
nationality, and that “this has particular significance for children of Algerians” (p. 1). 
Citing two key surveys, Simon (2010) notes that the proportion of Algerian immigrants 
claiming dual nationality rose from 7 percent to 67 percent between 1992 and 2008. This 
change largely reflected changes to Algerian citizenship law in 200552— to allow 
“nationality by descent” to a child whose mother or father is an Algerian national (the 
code is also retroactive). Following this change, many Algerians in France pursued dual 
citizenship (Perrin, 2014, p. 5). The prevalence of dual citizenship, whereby individuals 
are members of two polities and imagined communities, complicates ideas about 
belonging and loyalty and contributes to debates about integration in France.  
The empirical evidence offered in this section explores the many intersections 
between citizenship, identity, rights, and the varying ways that Algerian immigrants and 
their children draw upon particular dimensions of citizenship in articulating membership 
 
52 The code of Algerian citizenship from 1963 (post-independence), defined ‘Algerian of 
origin’ as being a person who has at least two ascendants in paternal lineage born in 
Algeria with Muslim status. The provision was based on the discrimination established 
by French colonists (the Native Code, see description in Chapter Four), and effectively 
excluded non-Muslims from the new nation (Perrin, 2014). Those that did not satisfy this 
requirement could apply for Algerian citizenship “on the basis of their participation in the 
liberation struggle” (Perrin, 2014, p. 5). Additionally, in 2005, Algeria removed a 
requirement that new citizens reject other citizenships (a requirement that was introduced 




in the French polity.  I examine how legal citizenship(s), or the lack thereof, relates to an 
individual’s sense of belonging(s) or exclusion(s) from different polities. My findings 
suggest that the relationship between legal members and belonging is not straightforward 
or predictable. Some of my respondents conform with stereotypes of naturalized citizens 
in viewing legal membership in France in purely instrumental terms—as a passport rather 
than as a symbol of deeper attachment to a national polity. For these individuals, 
belonging is situated more firmly in Algeria. But this scenario certainly does not apply to 
all, and my respondents’ attitudes about citizenship vary considerably. Equally important 
are the assertions that my undocumented respondents make about their deservingness vis-
à-vis French citizenship. For these individuals, a desire for French citizenship is not just 
about a passport or legal access to employment, but about the legacies of French 
colonialism and the long, difficult relationship between Algeria and France. 
 The narratives that follow focus on the tension between citizenship and 
belonging: how formal inclusion can fail to ensure a sense of belonging; how legal 
exclusion requires an ability to live within profound precariousness; and how multiple 
membership requires the compartmentalization of seemingly conflicting emotions and 
ties to different places. This discussion reiterates the importance of citizenship as a legal 
construct that imparts “a certain objective status in a society” (Simonsen, 2017, p. 1). At 
the same time, this discussion highlights the different ways that individuals think about 
and experience legal status—how one’s legal status impinges on their sense of 





Algerian Citizenship Practices in France 
Many of my respondents with French citizenship view this citizenship as a bundle 
of rights and even more as a privileged legal status that affords social and geographical 
mobility. For some critics (especially on the political right), this denotes instrumentalism 
on the part of immigrants, rather than ‘genuine’ loyalty toward their adopted country. But 
I want to suggest that the value placed on legal status is not merely instrumental or 
superficial. My respondents put a great deal of weight on security and mobility, and their 
access to these privileges imparts its own form of loyalty and commitment.  
I begin with participants who were born in France (second-generation) and were 
French citizens at birth. For instance, Amara, a 23-year-old living in the Champigny-sur-
Marne banlieue, has an older brother who was born in Algeria, and two sisters who, like 
Amara herself, were born in France. Amara’s grandfather came from Algeria to work in 
Paris in the 1950s in construction before returning to Algeria a decade later. Amara’s 
father came from Algeria to work in Paris in the 1960s, working mostly in bars and 
nightclubs. Her father returned home to Algeria every summer, and in the early 1980s, he 
married Amara’s mother in Algeria. After having Amara’s brother, the family of three 
moved to France permanently and achieved French citizenship. Amara and her sisters 
were born in Ivry-sur-Seine, a suburb south of Paris. In Amara’s family story, we see 
multiple pathways toward citizenship, but Amara herself did not consciously choose her 
citizenship; rather, she benefited from her parent’s completion of the process before she 
was born. Amara, her parents, and her siblings all have dual citizenship in France and 
Algeria (a topic I return to below). In Amara’s experience, citizenship is a taken-for-
granted reality. As described in Chapter Five, Amara feels as though she is both an 
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‘Algerian girl’ and a ‘French girl’—in her words, “I don’t consider myself as only an 
Algerian girl. I don’t know how to say it, like, mixed, you know? So, I can talk with 
Algerian people in totally Algerian and [I’m] comfortable with talking with these people, 
and at the same time, [I am] comfortable with French people. I cannot choose between 
Algerian or French, I am both.” For Amara, her identity is reflective of her dual 
citizenship status; her feelings of belonging and connection to each nationality indicate 
the hybridity of her life experiences.  
Sakina’s path to French citizenship was similar to Amara’s. Sakina, a 35-year-old 
living in the 20th arrondissement, tells the story of how her parents were born in Algeria 
before decolonization, and how they took advantage of de Gaulle’s decision to make 
French citizenship available to Algerians (including Muslims) in a last-ditch effort to gain 
their loyalty during the Algerian War (as discussed in Chapter Four). Her parents moved 
to France in the 1970s when her father found work as a laborer in the northern town of 
Lille, France, where Sakina was born. Sakina had French citizenship at birth, but this was 
not the case for her entire family, as I explain shortly. Sakina does not take her 
citizenship for granted, nor does she lack gratitude for the citizenship she possesses. 
Sakina’s citizenship, as she talks about it, feels like a relief, as though she ‘barely made 
it’ through the difficult journey toward citizenship, even though it was, in reality, easy for 
her. She says, “I am lucky, I have both [citizenships].” To associate an element of ‘luck’ 
or ‘chance’ to the acquisition of citizenship status is an interesting way to illustrate the 
geographic, temporal, and other ‘life chances’ factors that ultimately influence who has 
access to different citizenship(s). Unlike Amara, Sakina finds it difficult to embrace 
hybridity, and while she was “born French,” she describes herself as feeling alienated 
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from French ‘culture.’ She says, “They [the French] don’t see me as French, only as 
Algerian.” While she does not worry about her legal status, she worries about her social 
status within French-dominated realms of life (as described in Chapter Five). 
Like Amara and Sakina, Farid, a 42-year-old immigrant living in the 20th 
arrondissement, had French citizenship at birth, though he was born in Algeria. Farid’s 
family naturalized during times when it was, he says, “easy for Algerians to get French 
citizenship.” His Algerian-born parents spent time in France and completed the process to 
gain French citizenship before any of their children were born, easing the path for their 
children. Farid and his siblings all have dual citizenship in France and Algeria (he and 
one other sibling were born in Algeria and the rest of his siblings were born in France). 
Where Amara seems to take her citizenship status for granted and connects it to a sense 
of cultural hybridity, and Sakina feels a sense of relief but also a sense of alienation vis-à-
vis her French citizenship, Farid expresses a sense of citizenship as part of an entitlement 
for Algerians in France (I return to this sense of entitlement for those that do not possess 
citizenship in France). In Farid’s eyes, he is just as worthy of French citizenship as any 
other ‘French’ person, even though he was born in Algeria. He does not feel the need to 
express ‘gratitude’ (as Sakina does) for what is rightfully his; his access to French 
citizenship is not a ‘gift’ from a generous, benevolent host (France); rather, it is 
something owed to him, and it does not require justification or gratitude. Farid’s French 
citizenship (in combination with his dual citizenship in Algeria) is natural and normal. 
Farid feels that his is just as French as anyone else (cf.  Beaman, 2016). From just these 
three cases of Amara, Sakina, and Farid, we can see the differing meanings that can be 
attached to French citizenship among study participants, ranging from a general lack of 
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consciousness about citizenship to feelings of gratitude, to a sense of entitlement. These 
complexities multiply when we consider those who have had to travel an arduous path to 
French citizenship. 
Several of my study participants sought naturalization in France while pursuing 
higher education in the country. In this sense, it is important to note that France, like 
many other wealthy societies, has left the door open (relatively speaking) to highly 
skilled workers, regardless of their origins. This path—which ties citizenship to 
attainment of an advanced degree—is difficult; but in the end, it appears to produce a 
sense of citizenship that centers on cultural freedom and mobility. For instance, Omar, a 
28-year-old immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement, moved to France when he was 
22 years old to continue his education in electrical engineering. After graduating, he 
moved to Paris to start a new job. Omar works with the same company he started with in 
Paris—a solar energy planning firm—and is grateful for the ease with which he found a 
job immediately after finishing his PhD in France. He admits that his friends have 
encountered more difficulty. Omar attributes his success in the job market to his 
attainment of higher education, the connections that he made during his time in grad 
school, and his naturalization, which gave him the legal right and the cultural capital to 
secure a good job. But his acquisition of citizenship, while ‘easy’ at one level, was also 
an anxiety-inducing process. He explains that he was “always conscious” of his legal 
status in France and was “obsessed” with completing the requirements for citizenship. 
Omar became a French citizen at the age of 27, five years after his arrival in France, and 
he quickly embraced a French identity, which he connects to ideas of freedom. He says 
that he prefers the freedom of life in France, as opposed to the restrictiveness (in his 
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view) of Algerian society. For Omar, the path to French citizenship was important 
because it offers completion—it has secured multiple dimensions of freedom 
(geographical, economic, cultural) for him.   
Omar’s sentiments are echoed by Idir, a 32-year-old immigrant, living in the 92nd 
district outside of Paris. Like Omar, Idir came to France to continue his studies, which in 
Idir’s case involved a master’s degree and PhD. Idir explains that during his studies, he 
came to appreciate the personal freedoms allowed him in France. He says, “I can’t 
imagine going back” to Algeria, as “it’s too tribal” and superstitious. He prefers living in 
a cosmopolitan society like France. He explains that he began the process toward 
achieving French citizenship, staying in school to keep legal residency until he reached 
the requisite five-year residency requirement. Like Omar, Idir sees his French citizenship 
as freedom—freedom from Algerian social norms and freedom to go wherever he wants. 
Since receiving French citizenship in 2014, he has since traveled extensively abroad.  
The work that Omar and Idir did toward completing a PhD degree in order to 
‘earn’ their ‘Frenchness’ is indicative of the lengths to which my respondents were 
willing to go to have the privilege of French citizenship—to belong within the French 
national polity. Omar and Idir worked diligently to overcome barriers to French 
citizenship, and the combination of citizenship and education confers a sense of 
satisfaction and self-esteem—a sense that they have earned the freedom and mobility that 
comes with being French. However, not all of my study participants were so successful in 





The Elusiveness of Legal Status 
 I have so far described paths toward or experiences of citizenship; first, those with 
French citizenship at birth (born in both France and Algeria), followed by examples of 
participants that sought naturalization after arriving in France to pursue higher education. 
I now turn the discussion to those that have not been successful in their pursuit of French 
citizenship—those who have little hope of achieving legal status to live and work legally 
in France. I first describe two instances where temporal shifts in policy have led to 
families with members of different legal status. I then offer examples of participants who 
immigrated to France illegally and continue to live without legal status in France. In this 
section, I delve into the complicated relationships between legal membership and 
belonging. As shown in previous examples (e.g., Sakina), individuals can have full 
citizenship and not feel belonging; conversely, individuals can lack citizenship and feel 
that they ‘ought’ to belong, though the state refuses them. These findings complicate 
assumptions and expectations about citizenship, belonging, and generational change.  
As described in previous chapters, regular and frequent travel between France and 
Algeria are commonplace within the Algerian community. Families have navigated the 
ebbs and flows citizenship and immigration regulations that have governed this travel for 
decades. Within the political back-and-forth of citizenship regulations in France, timing 
has a major impact on the ability for Algerians to access citizenship. In the early years of 
Algerian independence, birth in Algeria did not pose a major barrier to legal members in 
the French polity, but in recent decades, it has become much more of a problem, 
especially for those who do not have the wherewithal to pursue advanced degrees. 
Temporal shifts in policy can lead to families with members of different legal status. For 
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example, while Sakina was born with citizenship status, her sister, Soumia, lives illegally 
in the 20th arrondissement. Their family was living in Lille, France when their mother 
was pregnant with Soumia. They went on their yearly summer holiday to Algeria in 1989, 
and Soumia was born while the family was in Algeria. Soumia’s parents assumed that 
Soumia was French because they held French citizenship and because their other child 
was French. Yet in the 1990s there was additional paperwork that had to of been filled 
out for Soumia (who was born on independent Algerian soil) to have French citizenship. 
This was all very doable if Soumia’s parents had had a detailed understanding of the 
bureaucratic workings of the French citizenship system. As it happened, Soumia fell 
through the cracks of citizenship and did not claim French citizenship during the time that 
it was necessary (and simple) to do so. Sakina and Soumia have another sister and two 
younger brothers—all of whom were born in France and have dual citizenship. Sakina 
blames her parents for not knowing how to help her sister achieve citizenship in France; 
Soumia claims that she does not blame or resent her family for her illegal status—she 
blames France. Soumia feels that France owes her citizenship, that she is entitled to it in 
spite of the lapse in administrative paperwork required to achieve it.  
Because Soumia holds only an Algerian passport, life in France has been very 
difficult for her. She has had trouble finding and keeping employment because of her 
illegal status. Citizenship status in France is highly valued for the protection it offers 
against deportation; the right to permanent residence is a privilege of citizens, 
“distinguishing them from settled non-citizens…which ultimately are deportable” 
(Birkvad, 2019, p. 801). Soumia feels deserving of French citizenship and, indeed, she 
describes herself as French: “I am French. I was born in Algeria, but I am French,” she 
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says. Soumia goes on to explain, “My family is French, I live in France, I grew up here. 
Just because I was born in Algeria doesn’t mean I’m not French. It is very frustrating.” 
While she feels that she belongs in France, she also believes that the historical tension 
between France and Algeria have led to her being purposefully excluded by the French 
state. She states, “Maybe if I was born in another country, not in Algeria, it wouldn’t be 
so difficult, like, in Morocco or something.” Though she was born in Algeria and holds 
(only) Algerian citizenship, she has not returned to Algeria in her adult life because it 
would be difficult for her to return to France. For the same reasons, when Sakina and 
Soumia’s family goes on family vacations outside of France, Soumia never travels with 
them. Sakina feels a sense of guilt over her citizenship status because her sister, Soumia, 
has led “a smaller life” in comparison but also because she feels the relief of being able to 
live, work and travel freely with her French passport. Soumia was, at the time of her 
interview, resigned to live in France illegally all her life, however much she feels she is 
French.  
Where Soumia stopped trying to obtain French citizenship after a lifetime of 
exclusion, Nouara refuses to give up on her pursuit of French citizenship. Nouara is a 33-
year-old daughter of immigrants, residing (illegally) in the 20th arrondissement of Paris. 
Nouara’s mother, Nabila, was born in France to Algerian immigrants and holds French 
citizenship. Nabila’s parents were French-Algerian, from Tizi Ouzou. Her grandfather 
fought for France in World War II and was a prisoner of war in Germany. He received a 
Legion of Honor award from the French government after the war. Nouara’s 
grandparents moved to France, where her mother was born. Nouara’s mother moved to 
Tizi Ouzou as an adult and met Nouara’s father. They were married in Algeria and had 
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their first child, Nouara, in 1984. When Nouara was eight years old, the Algerian civil 
war was raging in Algeria, and her parents decided to move to France to escape the 
violence in 1992.  
Nabila and her husband were uneducated and poor, and like Soumia’s parents, 
they did not have access to the necessary information about obtaining French citizenship 
for their daughter Nouara (who, similarly to Soumia, would have easily qualified for 
citizenship if her parents had submitted the paperwork in the correct timeframe). While in 
France, Nouara’s sister was born—a French citizen like her parents. Within her family, 
only Nouara (as in the case of Soumia) does not have French citizenship, and her freedom 
is limited in the same ways that Soumia’s life is limited. Both Soumia and Nouara are 
living in France illegally—and have been all their lives. 
Nouara, like Soumia, has been denied French citizenship every time she has 
applied in the last 20 years. However, this has not yet deterred her from trying. She needs 
to find employment with a contract that lasts for multiple years to show her necessity in 
the French economy and her stability in employment. To achieve employment, Nouara is 
hired as a ‘foreign’ worker—that is, she is hired as an Algerian citizen to work for French 
companies in France. Because French law requires companies to fill positions with 
French citizens if possible, Nouara struggles to gain employment as a ‘foreigner.’ 
Because of her struggles, Nouara is very opinionated about the necessity and meaning of 
citizenship. She has never felt accepted in France and, unlike Soumia, does not feel 
French or claim a French identity. Rather, as described in the previous chapter, she 
claims a pan-ethnic ‘African’ identity that manifests itself in her friendships with other 
immigrants. Yet at the time of her interview, Nouara was in a serious relationship with a 
 
235 
white Frenchman. I asked about the prospect of citizenship through marriage, and she 
scoffed at this idea: “Yes, he asked me to marry him and then I could be legal, but no, I 
will do this myself” she said. Nouara’s obvious insistence on self-reliance (with the 
exception of the Algerian community, as described in Chapter Five), coupled with her 
rebellious attitude may seem contradictory and even self-defeating. There is in her 
attitude a measure of pride in her Algerian identity that keeps her from asking for the 
‘assistance’ of her French boyfriend. In a sense, she is insisting that she should be able to 
earn French citizenship on the basis of her merit and deservingness; in other words, she is 
wholly worthy of membership in the French polity, and the French state should recognize 
it. There is in her position a mix of resentment toward France and a desire for 
membership in France.   
Soumia and Nouara are just two examples of the 13 participants in my study who 
were living illegally in France at the time I conducted the research. In fact, many others 
among my participants had lived in France illegally while they worked on getting 
citizenship papers. For Lina, it took ten years to get citizenship; for Said, eleven years; 
for Lina, seven years. Owing to the difficulty in obtaining citizenship, it is understandable 
that citizenship becomes deeply emotional, eliciting very mixed feelings of entitlement, 
rejection, worthiness, precariousness, and, in some cases, belonging. For example, Ali, a 
29-year-old immigrant, lives illegally in France. He feels anger at the French for not 
providing him a path toward citizenship, “They promised us citizenship!” he says when 
explaining his frustration at living the difficult life of illegality. From Ali’s perspective, 
France owes him citizenship and access to the jobs and freedoms that France has to offer. 
Ali feels a sense of entitlement to citizenship owing to the fact that France colonized 
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Algeria; he feels owed on behalf of his ancestors who suffered under French imperialism. 
This emotional connection to a sense of ‘owed citizenship’ is interesting coming from 
Ali. He is a young man born more than 20 years after Algeria won its independence from 
France, yet he still holds on to this resentment toward the French, even while arguing that 
he deserves to be French.  His conflicting feelings, to be sure, can be connected to the 
reality of his need to support his family in Algeria. Ali wants access to the labor market 
in France, as his forefathers had in their seasonal migrations between France and Algeria. 
Because of his lack of legal status, he is relegated to working low-waged, insecure jobs in 
France and does not feel part of French society. Lacking formal belonging or even a 
general sense of membership that might come with long-term residency in a single place, 
Ali lives as an outsider in France. Like Nouara, Ali holds a mix of resentment toward 
France and a desire for French citizenship—they both feel deserving of French 
citizenship but let-down by France.  
Ali is relegated to small acts of retaliation against French society for its slights 
against him. For instance, he refuses to pay for the metro in Paris, which he takes daily. 
This act of retaliation (or perhaps resistance) is echoed in Silverstein’s (2004) accounts of 
Algerians living in Paris. Similar acts are reported among my study participants. Both 
Aehour and Rafik admitted to not paying for public transport, describing it as retribution 
for the injustice they have suffered as illegal immigrants in France. Even some of those 
who themselves enjoy legal status perform small acts of retribution on behalf of their 
fellow Algerians. For instance, Lakhdar refused to name his children with French names, 
instead proudly giving them Berber names (recall that Lakhdar’s father asked him if he 
wanted to change his name to a more ‘French’ name). Lina’s act of resistance involved a 
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commitment on her part to “re-teach” her children when they got home from their French 
state-run school (her children are now grown). Lina explains that she wanted her children 
“to know ‘the real story’ of French history” and especially the place of Algeria within 
that story. As I described in Chapter Four, French schools have been criticized over 
recent decades for teaching the ‘positive aspects’ of colonization and ignoring aspects 
that portray France in a negative light. Acts of resistance or retribution within the context 
of French citizenship show that though many Algerian immigrants and their descendants 
desire, seek, and in some cases, earn citizenship in France, there is a constancy of 
resistance in the face of marginalization.  
Another participant living illegally in France while seeking French citizenship is 
Djamel, a 34-year-old immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement. Here, again, we see a 
combination of resentment and entitlement—anger that France has denied membership to 
him, and a sense that he is deserving of that membership. Djamel enjoys some fame in 
Algeria as a musician, and he has been working toward French citizenship for years. He 
blames his music for his inability to gain French citizenship, explaining, “My music is 
political. [It is] about what France has put my country through. They don’t want it here.” 
For Djamel, like Ali, French citizenship is owed to Algerians, almost as a form of 
reparations for the colonization of Algeria and for the emotional weight carried by 
Algeria due to French imperialism. Their sense of entitlement and deservingness springs 
forth from a sense of loyalty to Algeria, and a desire for justice, rather than from a 
positive emotional attachment to France. Neither Ali nor Djamel identify as French, but 
they do feel that they have a right to equality, especially in terms of labor market 
participation. This interpretation of citizenship is divorced from notions of cultural 
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membership or ‘assimilation,’ but it is nonetheless charged with emotion and a strong 
sense of the historical relationship and shared past between France and Algeria.  
Both Djamel and Ali have been criminalized by the French state because of their 
legal status. Ali, for instance, has been taken to jail multiple times for not having proper 
identification (he purposefully does not carry identification of any kind). According to 
Terrasse (2019), in France there is a connection between frequent identity checks with 
“an increase in the likelihood of country of origin identification, a decrease in the 
likelihood of French identification, and a decrease in the likelihood of believing others 
see one as French” (p. 1). Yet it is important to note that while feeling excluded in 
France, Djamel and Ali share a great deal of ambivalence toward Algeria. Neither feels at 
home in Algeria. For Ali, he says, “I have been so long in France, I cannot go back now,” 
referring to the cosmopolitan life he has become accustomed to even without legal 
membership. Despite acknowledging his ambivalence toward Algeria, Ali does continue 
to see his dreams for the future unfolding in Algeria, where he intends to return to get 
married. Ambivalence toward his ties to both France and Algeria is also exhibited by 
Djamel. Djamel is well-known in a small circle of artists in Paris (I met and interviewed 
him at an event where he was the ‘star musician’), despite his illegal status and a history 
of confrontations with French police. He admits that he enjoys this sense of celebrity in 
France, and he does not want to “return to the simple life” in Algeria. For both Ali and 
Djamel, they have become cosmopolitans—they are part of the way of life that exists in 




These examples of participants that lack legal status in France show the 
complicated relationships between legal membership and belonging; they show that there 
is no one-to-one relationship whereby full citizenship equates to belonging (in France or 
Algeria). The participants here show a mix of emotional responses to their legal status 
ranging from frustration at being legally excluded, to rebellion, to entitlement, to a desire 
for autonomy. All of these emotions and desires are woven into the citizenship practices 
and experiences of my study participants who live illegally in France, and who are 
actively illegalized by French immigration policy.  
Dual Citizenship—Dual Belonging? 
Further complicating the experience of citizenship for Algerian immigrants and 
their descendants is dual citizenship. Dual citizens, or binationals, participate in 
transnational activities and social networks which can be ‘political’ in nature (Bloemraad, 
2000). Public debates53 tend to portray dual citizenship as necessarily being in 
competition with French national identity (Simon, 2012) and as undermining 
integration—though the French state is relatively relaxed about dual citizenship, and it 
does not require Algerian immigrants to renounce their citizenship upon naturalization. 
Dual citizenship critics in France worry that “having bi-nationals within the French 
government [is] a worrying feature and ultimately [puts] national interest at risk” (Paquet, 
2017, p. 1). This old idea of the impossibility of dual loyalty has become more articulated 
and cynical over the years and can be understood simply as “[Y]ou are either French, or 
 
53 Interestingly, criticism of dual citizenship has (in 2011) even involved loyalty issues of 
soccer when “high-level officials from the national soccer team criticized the choice of 
dual-national promising young players for electing to play with their second-nationality 
national team instead of the French one” (Simon, 2012, p. 2). 
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you are not” (Paquet, 2017, p. 1). Yet, according to the French Institut National d’Études 
Démographiques (2012), holding dual nationality has little impact on “feeling French” 
such that, binationals feel “just as French as those who gave up their original nationality” 
(p. 1). Thus, dual citizenship is not necessarily contradictory with ‘being’ French.   
In this final section, I challenge the idea of conflict as an inherent characteristic of 
dual citizenship. My study participants who are dual citizens parse out different elements 
of citizenship and assign meaning and significance to each. In other words, participants 
assign different meanings to their citizenships, rather than viewing citizenships as 
existing in tension or conflict with each other. Study respondents express ‘feeling 
French,’ ‘feeling at home in France,’ ‘feeling Algerian,’ and ‘feeling at home in Algeria’ 
in ways that are consistent with other forms of compartmentalization that Algerians 
practice when navigating identity. At the same time, it is important to recognize that dual 
citizenship does not carry a great deal of significance for everyone: some respondents put 
far more weight in one over the other; and some hardly pay any attention at all to their 
Algerian citizenship. 
Under Algerian law, the children of Algerian émigrés are Algerian nationals; 
therefore, it is very easy (and culturally expected) to acquire an Algerian passport for the 
children of immigrants living in France. The Algerian passport has particular potency as a 
symbol of one’s continued membership in Algerian society. According to Hakim, a 28-
year-old immigrant, living in the 15th arrondissement, “You don’t want to be caught at 
the [Algerian] border without your Algerian passport…no one will respect you.” Amara 
explains, “If you only have your French passport [at the Algerian border], it’s like we 
don’t recognize ourselves as Algerian.” In short, the use of the Algerian passport is a 
 
241 
performance of membership for French citizens of Algerian origin and a sign of honor 
and respect for Algeria (Ben Jelloun, 1999). 
Wily, a 36-year-old immigrant living in the 20th arrondissement, elaborates on the 
theme of formal citizenship in Algeria as a form of honor. Wily is working on getting his 
French-born son an Algerian passport because, “If he has a grandfather who is Algerian, 
he is Algerian too.” For Wily, the passport is meaningful as a symbol of familial pride 
and dedication to one’s place of origin. Wily’s father, though he has lived in France for 
years, refuses to apply for French citizenship on principle: Wily explains that his father 
“doesn’t hate France, but he knows they killed his father. He cannot be a French citizen 
for this reason.” In this case, the passport is part of a system of identity that links 
generations of people to different places. His son needs an Algerian passport to convey 
familial dedication and to honor Wily’s father, who has refused French citizenship. 
Clearly, in this case, passports are more than travel documents; they are wrapped up in 
historical dramas of colonial violence. Thus, citizenship and legal membership can 
simply mean a travel document, but it clearly can mean much more.  
Another example is Lina, whose children were all born in France and have French 
citizenship. Lina worked hard to ensure that they each had Algerian citizenship, too, even 
while Lina herself was struggling to get French citizenship. Said’s children all have 
French and Algerian citizenship. Amara and Hakim both mentioned that having an 
Algerian passport also makes travel to Algeria easier (for the yearly summer visits to 
family) because you do not have to apply for (and pay for) a visa to enter the country. 
Many interview participants named the necessity of a visa as a reason to not use their 
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French passports when travelling ‘home’54. Yet it is important to note that not all 
participants feel emotionally invested in Algerian or dual citizenship. For instance, 
Kahina’s daughter Aida used her Algerian passport for the first time when I traveled to 
Algeria with them. Aida did not even know that she had an Algerian passport (and in fact 
had little interest in traveling to Algeria), but Kahina would not take her daughter to 
Algeria without one. For Aida, the possession and use of an Algerian passport does not 
hold any emotional weight. Similarly, participant Yamina (described previously in this 
chapter) has let her Algerian passport expire—she has no interest in pursuing the 
nationality of her father (who divorced her mother and abandoned Yamina as a child). 
Interestingly, Yamina has not visited Algeria since her father left more than 30 years ago. 
In these ways, some participants from the second-generation are not emotionally invested 
in the Algerian passport, do not feel pride or honor in maintaining and performing 
Algerian citizenship.  
Of course, the meaning of the Algerian passport and formal Algerian citizenship 
differs for those who only have Algerian citizenship and who have been excluded from 
French citizenship. As noted earlier, many respondents with French citizenship associate 
membership in the French polity with freedom. This freedom takes many forms (e.g., 
social values and attitudes), but it is exemplified by the passport. Idir, for instance, 
describes the sense of freedom he experienced after naturalizing as a French citizen, as he 
was able to travel abroad to visit other parts of the world. Meanwhile, those lacking 
French citizenship and possessing only Algerian citizenship feel constrained by their 
situation. Yanis, claims that his “biggest wish [is to be] a citizen of the world, just having 
 
54 I discuss Algerian interpretations of ‘home’ in Chapter Seven.  
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a passport that allows me to go and live wherever I want. [Algerians] have such a poor, a 
weak passport. Most Algerians will say that. You can't go anywhere." Another example is 
Nassim, who also has only an Algerian passport and is in the process of applying for 
French citizenship so that he can get the French passport. He wants citizenship so that he 
can work abroad: “I really want to leave Paris. If tomorrow I find the job outside of Paris, 
I will go, definitely. But since I cannot leave France, I will not get hired for a job 
abroad…after I get my citizenship, I will leave France for a while.” Both Yanis and 
Nassim exemplify how citizens of rich democracies (e.g., France) are exempted from visa 
restrictions, enjoying a perceived ‘generalized trust’ by virtue of their citizenship status, 
whereas citizens of ‘suspect countries’ (e.g., Algeria), are highly constrained in their 
mobility (Shamir, 2005; Birkvad, 2019). There is an element of instrumentalism to efforts 
to gain French citizenship, but I want to emphasize the emotional aspect of seeking a 
French passport. This French passport renders one not just fully French, but fully human. 
As a full Frenchman, they garner the trust of other wealthy countries and are no longer 
global non-citizens with limited access to mobility. Therefore, obtaining a passport from 
a country in the ‘Global North’ constitutes an important motivation to naturalize 
(Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006). 
 A 2016 Algerian law that restricts holding “high office” to “those with ‘exclusive 
Algerian nationality’” (Zoja, 2016, p. 1) adds a wrinkle to the dynamics of dual 
citizenship in Algerian-origin communities in France and highlights the generally limited 
way in which my respondents regard their formal membership in the Algerian polity. 
This law targets the widespread practice of dual citizenship in Algeria, where (as in 
France) it is very common to hold a French passport in addition to an Algerian passport 
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(Perrin, 2014). As recently as 2020, the 2016 law was exercised when the Algerian 
appointee as minister delegate to the prime minister, Samir Chaabna, was rejected on the 
issue of his refusal to relinquish his French citizenship to take this office (Hekking, 
2020). Thus, in Algeria, the possession of a French passport is seen to be in conflict with 
loyalty to the Algerian nation.  
 None of my dual-citizen research participants, however, said they would 
relinquish their French citizenship if forced to choose between French and Algerian 
citizenship. Though the ties that bind them to their ancestral homeland function partly 
through dual citizenship, Algerian citizenship simply is not worth the loss of freedom 
(mobility and lifestyle) that would accompany the loss of French citizenship. Thus, the 
attachment that my respondents feel to the ‘homeland’ is somewhat limited and narrow—
more familial and cultural than political (though the relationship and emotions involved 
in dual citizenship are certainly politically charged). The narratives offered in this section 
reveal a range of experiences, attitudes, feelings, and desires that revolve around 
citizenship. Within state discourse and even in some academic discourse, citizenship 
appears as a clearly identifiable status with clear meanings. One is, or is not, a citizen, 
and being a citizen suggests access to rights and full membership in a national polity. I 
have tried to show here, though, that citizenship does not have a single set of meanings. 
This is the case whether or not one holds multiple citizenship, though dual citizenship 
certainly complicates notions of membership and loyalty. Legal status varies 
considerably among my respondents, and so too does the meaning of that legal status. For 
some, legal status has been easy, and this affords them some luxury in terms of 
participation in the labor market and ease of travel. But there is no single relationship 
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between full legal status and a sense of belonging. For those without legal status, there is 
definitely a profound precariousness, yet also different levels of commitment to achieving 
membership. Some of those with French citizenship feel entitled to that formal 
membership, or simply take for granted that they are French; others feel gratitude or feel 
that they have earned it. Those without French citizenship might also feel that the deserve 
it, or they may simply experience a sense of permanent exclusion and otherness, despite 
perhaps feeling more ‘at home’ in France than in Algeria.   
Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on two key, interconnected fields of contestation and 
negotiation within integration politics in France: religion and citizenship. I have tried to 
show, first, that for people of Algerian descent, religion becomes part of identity whether 
or not they are personally religious. My participants work to distinguish between belief 
and culture and to designate certain practices as religiously Muslim, culturally Muslim, or 
culturally French. Where some respondents adhere to French secularist understandings of 
religion and make an effort to keep their faith in the ‘private’ sphere, others work to 
challenge the exclusions of laïcité, asserting the compatibility of their religious identities 
with French republican values and principles.  
This need to position oneself in relation to Islam is in response to French 
secularist discourse and practice, which brands Islam as foreign and as hostile to French 
republican values and to the neutral public sphere. Laïcité is a form of exclusion, but I 
have tried to show that people are able to navigate the boundaries created by laïcité by 
adhering to the public/private distinction concerning when and where to observe one’s 
religious beliefs; they may also treat Islam as a cultural artifact rather than as a 
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community of belief and practice that stands against the French polity. These practices 
vary among and between first-generation immigrants and their children. Some first-
generation respondents, for instance, uphold a distinction between public and private 
realms, even as they maintain a high level of observance and orthopraxy; for others, the 
distinction between public and private becomes less prominent because their adherence to 
Islam is more selective and less intense, though the separation remains. Some of these 
respondents feel a deeper engagement with mainstream French society. 
Second-generation Algerians also show a variation in their practice or rejection of 
Islam as these participants work to establish an identity that is different from their parents 
as they navigate their place within (or outside of) French society. Respondents from this 
group describe themselves as practicing Muslims, ‘cultural Muslims,’ and as non-
believers, and in doing so, engage with secularism in different ways. Some incorporate a 
strict practice into their everyday lives in France, but typically in a way that adheres to 
secularist norms. Those that identify as ‘culturally Muslim’ rely on secularist thinking to 
describe their Muslim identity as ‘cultural’ rather than ‘religious;’ they do not believe in 
Islam as a set of theological assertions, but they cannot entirely divorce themselves from 
the label of ‘Muslim’ because of their ‘cultural’ background. A third group of second-
generation participants reject Islam entirely and do not believe or adhere to any cultural 
practices connected with the religion.  
Together, these first and second-generation respondents together reveal a 
spectrum of responses to laïcité and the varying ways people can parse ‘religion’ and 
‘culture,’ identifying with, or rejecting, particular elements of each. It is impossible to 
escape the logic of laïcité in France, but my study respondents do show some agency in 
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locating themselves within its constructs. This analysis overall problematizes religiosity 
as an ‘indicator’ of ‘integration’ in France. It shows instead how beliefs and practices 
associated with religion become folded into an indeterminate, ideological-political 
process of claiming sameness within a national polity. Whereas laïcité purports to 
privatize religion, in fact, it politicizes religion by making it the object of public 
discussion, deliberation, and negotiation—something that immigrants, in particular, must 
think about, deal with, explain, and justify.  
Citizenship is the second key field of negotiation. In France, some individuals 
have full legal citizenship but lack full substantive citizenship and/or feel alienated from 
Frenchness. The language of citizenship is one of universalism and egalitarianism, but 
citizenship is neither universal nor equally understand or experienced. In the first 
instance, “visible and audible traits such as ‘race,’ ethnicity, religion, and accent may 
supersede formal citizenship in daily negotiations over national membership” (Birkvad, 
2019, p. 802). National membership, in this sense, is not only governed solely by the 
state, but also by ordinary individuals, who deploy tacit understandings of belonging in 
everyday life (Brubaker, 2010). As Cesari (1994) and Balibar (2004) have noted, the 
paradox of equality envisioned by the French citizenship structure is that it has produced 
a generation of young people fed on a diet of ‘equality’ and ‘social opportunities’ who 
cannot find a space for their equality claims due to their status as “illegitimate children of 
the colonial affair” (Memmi, 2004, p. 97). 
In this chapter, I have shown the division of citizenship and rights along multiple 
legal statuses. In describing the range of legal membership(s) held, or withheld, from my 
research participants, we can see the many intersections between citizenship, identity, and 
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rights, and the varying ways that Algerian immigrants and their children draw upon 
dimensions of citizenship in articulating membership in the French polity. The narratives 
in this chapter indicate that formal inclusion does not guarantee a sense of belonging, 
though it can; some of my respondents feel a deep sense of connection to France and 
French ‘culture,’ while others connect their legal status to more hybrid or partial 
identities. Legal exclusion always amplifies precariousness and feelings of exclusion, 
though it also produces feelings of entitlement—of being owed membership in the French 
polity.  
Resentment is a common emotion tied to citizenship for my research participants, 
often coupled with a desire for membership and connected to experiences of rejection 
from the French polity. Like many other experiences for Algerian-origin individuals in 
France, these feelings of resentment or entitlement are tied to colonialism and the 
Algerian War. Clearly, these resentments are not uniform; some express gratitude or just 
relief at having made it through the process of naturalization. But some do continue to 
engage in acts of retaliation or resistance in their daily lives in France—acts ranging from 
not paying for public transportation, to naming their children with Berber names, to ‘re-
teaching’ their children the ‘true’ history between France and Algeria. These acts of 
resistance or retribution within the context of French citizenship show that though many 
Algerian immigrants and their descendants desire, seek, and in some cases, earn 
citizenship in France, there is a constancy of resistance in the face of marginalization.  
Finally, dual citizenship is a common practice among my research participants. 
Though worrying for the French state, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that 
dual citizenship is not necessarily contradictory with ‘being’ French. Again, participants 
 
249 
describe a range of emotions tied to dual citizenship. The Algerian passport is a badge of 
honor, pride, and cultural heritage, while the French passport becomes a means of access 
to the ‘Global North.’ But the Algerian passport can also be viewed as constraining or as 
a burden, while French citizenship can signify a real sense of belonging, beyond mere 
possession of a passport.   
  This chapter overall has tried to complicate both scholarly understandings of 
integration as a generational trajectory toward sameness, and political discourses that 
conceive of Algerian-origin people as existing outside of, or in opposition to, French 
republican citizenship. The narratives presented here show that while they are in a 
socially, economically, and/or legally subordinate position, my research participants are 
constantly engaging with the discourses and structures of French republican, laique 
citizenship and positioning themselves in these fields of meaning—their identities are 
formed in relation to ideas of citizenship and secularism. Importantly, these engagements 
do not follow any standard trajectory, and they have no definitive endpoint. In the 
following chapter, I consider in more detail how negotiations of identity, belonging, and 




SPACES AND PLACES OF ALGERIANS IN FRANCE
“I like living in the banlieue…there are no French people here, only Blacks and Arabs.”  
                                                                                             -Hacina, 28-year-old immigrant 
“If you look like them, they think you belong here and will be nice to you [flips shirt 
collar up].”           
                                                                                        -Ali, 28-year-old illegal immigrant 
“I lived in the 15th, but the rich people are racist; too many white people live there. So, I 
moved to the 19th.” 
- Ferhat, 45-year-old son of immigrants 
Introduction 
 The preceding chapters have elaborated how people from Algerian-immigrant 
backgrounds negotiate a range of identities—French, Algerian, Muslim, immigrant, and 
citizen—in defining membership and belonging. These negotiations bring in experiences 
and understandings of inclusion and exclusion, racism, hospitality, familial obligation, 
and personal freedom. Study respondents connect identities to particular values, roles, 
and responsibilities, and then place these in specific realms of interaction and social 
activity. In interpreting their experiences and identities, respondents describe a 
fundamental rift between Frenchness and Algerianness, but they also complicate this 
binary in describing their relationships to different ‘communities.’ Respondents construct 
their identity through dichotomies, but these dichotomies also break down at times, and 
respondents often view themselves in more hybrid terms or as existing in the interstices 
of broad categories. Belonging is thus muddled, hybridized, and complicated by the 
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realities of people’s lives and their experiences of inclusion and exclusion within 
economic, legal, and cultural structures.   
It is within these moments of messy hybridity that we can start to talk about 
‘integration’ as a back-and-forth exchange through which social actors produce and act 
upon ideas of sameness and difference. Rather than adaptation, this process is about 
conflict, negotiation, accommodation, conformity, resistance, and subversion. It involves 
the (unequal) coproduction of social membership and identity. Previous chapters have 
suggested that interviewees place identities in different realms of life and situate 
themselves selectively in these realms through social behaviors. Respondents sometimes 
articulate these realms as metaphorical spaces (such as public and private spheres). This 
chapter brings into focus the materiality of these spaces.   
 This chapter explores the geographies of Algerian-origin people in France and the 
spatial strategies they use to assert, submerge, or rework various identities in the course 
of everyday life. Empirical evidence highlights the ways in which Algerian-origin 
individuals structure their interactions with French society, and the geographic contexts 
that influence and inform those interactions. While French republican ideology posits a 
universal, neutral ‘public’ sphere, in practice, this ideology works to denigrate and 
marginalize communities of Algerian descent who do not share equal class, racial, or 
cultural status with the mainstream French population. It is their identities that are pushed 
out of the public sphere to ensure its supposed neutrality. This chapter focuses on the 
ways that individuals of Algerian origin negotiate these bounded spaces of inclusion and 
exclusion in the French public sphere, which is manifested not only in state spaces like 
schools, but also in parks, cafés, neighborhoods, and workplaces. My study respondents 
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use, avoid, and often modify their behavior in these spaces in order to position 
themselves as insiders, or to cope with, or to call attention to, their exclusion. This 
chapter focuses on highly localized contexts within Paris. Integration is often framed 
within the national context, yet social interaction takes place where people live closely 
together and encounter each other on a regular, daily basis.  
Valentine (2001) notes that the majority group(s) often take the ease with which 
they occupy public space for granted. The majority group has the prerogative to define 
space according to its shared majority identity. The majority (in this case, white, non-
immigrant, middle-class French) then reinforces its identity through repetitive practices, 
thereby creating spatial norms and defining ‘appropriate’ uses of space. Members of the 
majority are unconscious of their domination of space because they rarely (if ever) need 
to examine or question their own identity. The spatial experiences of many, though not 
all, immigrants involve feelings of unease relating to living and working in an 
environment where a French/white/secular identity is normative and pervasive. Some 
find a sense of comfort within the supposedly ‘unsafe’ environment of the banlieue—the 
geographical Other to ‘mainstream’ public space. As I will explain, however, the 
banlieue itself creates tensions for some of my respondents. Not all, in other words, see 
the banlieue in rosy terms as an escape from an oppressive French environment. 
While my analysis focuses on negotiations of French space and its opposite, the 
banlieue, it also hints at the ways immigrant cultural practices can transformation 
dominant space, challenging the majority’s ownership and dominance and creating a 
sense of anxiety or crisis for majority groups. Immigrants—especially those who do not 
adhere to dominant norms, behaviors, and appearance—thus can subvert the majority’s 
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control over space, perhaps temporarily. In other cases, the majority resists any shift in 
‘ownership’ for as long as possible, as seen in efforts in the U.S. throughout the 20th 
century to block any ‘incursion’ of Blacks and Jews (among others) into ‘white’ 
neighborhoods, as described by Sugrue (2005). In France, these dynamics of space and 
place are often influenced by the contemporary politicization of laïcité, as detailed in the 
previous chapter.  
This chapter examines Algerian-origin individuals’ engagement with spaces and 
places in France through a critical geographical lens that centers on the production of 
space, the inscription of power relationships in space, and the contestedness of space. The 
production of space is a matter of domination, exclusion, enforcement, and erasure, but it 
can also be a matter of creativity, negotiation, and performance. This chapter emphasizes 
that the city is not a single, unified space, but a collection of different kinds of spaces in 
which certain people may be wholly or partially included or excluded. Space is the means 
by which people create ‘community,’ be it a community of citizens, or a subaltern, 
‘minority’ community; in either case, space is regulated and inscribed with written or 
unwritten rules. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the ways that people of Algerian 
origins operate within, accommodate, and push back on the spatialized parameters for 
belonging in France. While the discussion highlights the systematic exclusion of 
Algerian-origin people and the requirements placed on them as they enter the spaces of 
the dominant, unmarked political community, it also highlights that Algerian-origin 
people are not entirely powerless, and that they have some capacity to move between 
spaces, to challenge dominant meanings of space, and to carve out their own spaces.  
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This chapter is organized as follows: I begin with a conceptual discussion about 
how space and place figure into discussions of immigrants and integration/assimilation. I 
follow this with a description of the urban environment of Paris and the norms, identities, 
and social rules embedded in the city’s spaces. I then offer narratives from the research 
participants relating to their different engagements within these spaces. Here, I illustrate 
how my respondents (re)frame the banlieue as ‘home’ by contesting dominant 
conceptions of the banlieue as a deviant space. But I also reveal the ambivalence some of 
my respondents feel toward the banlieue and their acceptance of some elements of 
dominant French narratives about Algerian space. Finally, I discuss the spatialities of 
Algerian immigrants and their children as they move in and out of racialized and 
dominant spaces, and as they make and claim space in the everyday experiences of their 
lives in France. The chapter overall offers a critical perspective on the intersections of the 
social and spatial in the everyday lives of Algerian immigrants and the on-going 
production of societal membership and belonging.  
Space and Place: Immigrants, Integration, and Assimilation 
Understanding the politics of integration requires, first, an examination of the 
“spatiosymbolic order” that works to legitimate the majority group and their interests 
while marginalizing and excluding others (Farrar, 2008, p. 11). This examination, in turn, 
begins with an understanding of immigrant’s residential patterns and the interplay 
between residential ‘clustering’ and the dominant group’s anxieties about non-
assimilation. Scholars and politicians alike have long been preoccupied with the degree to 
which immigrants form ‘colonies,’ or residential clusters, within host-society cities 
(Huttman, 1991; Peach, 1975; Phillips, 1998). The spatial assimilation perspective holds 
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that immigrant groups tend to concentrate in “poorer neighborhoods, live in the worst 
dwellings, and are either over-represented in the worst segments of the labor market or 
are unemployed” (Bolt, Özüekren, and Phillips, 2010, pp. 169-170), but that under 
normal circumstances, they will gradually disperse from their initial social and residential 
‘ghettoes’ (Bolt and van Kempen, 2002; Clark and Drever, 2000). The spatial 
assimilation perspective has been challenged in recent years from different directions. For 
instance, some scholars have noted a more complex set of residential patterns that suggest 
a looser relationship between degree of ‘assimilation’ and residential location. More 
interesting, though, are accounts that have considered the interplay between observable 
residential patterns and the competing meanings attached to those residential patterns—
that is, the different ways that immigrants and dominant groups interpret, and respond to, 
the possibility or desirability of residential mobility. Such research often employs 
qualitative methods to explore “the experiences and aspirations of minority ethnic groups 
in relation to their housing and neighborhood and the significance of clustering for their 
sense of well-being and identity” (Bolt et al., 2010, p. 170; Ehrkamp, 2005; Phillips et al., 
2007). These studies have highlighted the social and cultural capital associated with 
minority concentrations in specific neighborhoods. From this perspective, persistent 
ethnic or minority segregation can be read both as a sign of community strength, and as a 
mark of social exclusion (Bolt et al., 2010). In general, this literature challenges political 
discourses that read residential clustering solely in terms of ‘self-separation,’ non-
assimilation, and group isolationism. 
The work of Deborah Phillips (2006) and her associates (Philips et al., 2007) on 
northern British towns is indicative of this approach. This work debunks the notion that 
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Muslim communities are ‘self-segregating’ and willfully choosing to live ‘parallel lives’ 
that run alongside, but rarely intersect with other residents (Phillips 2006; Phillips et al., 
2007). Ethnic enclaves, they argue, are not solely the product of a one-way decision made 
by the minority; rather, they are the result of multiply layered influences including racial 
discrimination, the mistreatment of minority groups by the dominant group, housing 
affordability, and the spatial structure of employment (Phillips, 2006). This work finds 
that poverty, lack of mobility, racism, and a fear of feeling ‘out of place’ all contribute to 
clustering along ethnic/minority lines. Phillips (2007) also finds that while Muslim ethnic 
communities persist and grow, this is “largely because of natural increase and new 
household formation among a youthful population” and that “there are also signs of 
dispersal into higher status neighborhoods, particularly by professionals” (Phillips, 2007, 
p. 1142). At the same time, she finds that “both the public and private housing markets, 
and in other spheres of resource allocation, together with popular racist sentiments, 
expressed through racist harassment, continued to reinforce existing patterns of minority 
ethnic segregation” (Phillips, 2006, p. 27). In this respect, “contests over space manifest 
themselves in displays of resistance by some white households when minority ethnic 
households try to move into ‘their’ neighborhoods”—indicative of the power that 
dominant groups have to exclude minority groups (Phillips, 2007, p. 1149). While it is 
seldom commented upon in debates about immigration, the highest levels of segregation 
along ethnic lines within multicultural cities typically occur in white residential spaces 
(Stillwell and Phillips, 2006). This is certainly the case in Paris, where the upper class is 
the “most segregated, followed by the lower class and immigrants, and the socio-spatial 
gap between these two most isolated groups is deepening”—reflecting choices made by 
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the upper class to self-segregate, and to reject socialized housing in their neighborhoods, 
not choices made by the minority (Grzegorczyk, 2013, p. 22; Prétecaille, 2006). I 
describe this point in further detail below.  
By re-framing discussions of residential clustering in terms of racialization, 
power, and agency, critical geographical literature draws attention to the discursive 
production of race and immigrant difference within the broader landscape, and the 
embeddedness of racial ideology in space (Anderson, 1987; 1988; 1991). Anderson’s 
seminal work on Vancouver’s Chinatown, for instance, describes how Chinatown for 
European Canadians signified “all those features that seemed to set the Chinese 
irrevocably apart...It embodied the white Europeans’ sense of difference between 
immigrants from China and themselves, between the East and the West” (1987, p. 594). 
Following Anderson and others, the analysis presented here considers spatial patterns not 
simply in terms of assimilation-versus-non-assimilation, but in terms of the shifting 
boundaries of identity and race in the host society, and the inclusion (or exclusion) of 
immigrant Others within the imagined and material spaces of the mainstream (Jacobson, 
1998). This work explores how every-day decisions on the part of both the dominant 
group (e.g., to cluster or disperse public housing, to ban or permit ‘communal’ identifiers 
in certain spaces) and minority groups (e.g., to live within or outside of a banlieue, to 
cease speaking in one’s mother tongue in certain locations) can work to legitimate or 
undermine the majority/dominant group claims, and to position minority groups within or 
outside the ‘mainstream’ (Farrar, 2008). In these myriad ways, individuals’ lives “are 
given shape and meaning through the spaces” they inhabit and the spaces where they 
“work, sleep, study, congregate, meditate, worship, govern, or protest” (Farrar, 2008, p. 
 
258 
2). Ultimately, according to Farrar (2008), the built environment “lends permanence to 
our aspirations about how we should live together…thus the language of space is also the 
language of politics, as both try to get at the ways we should organize our collective 
existence” (p. 2). Toward understanding the built environment of Paris, the following 
section offers a contextual analysis of the city, as it pertains to the spatial locations of 
dominant and minority groups.  
The Spatial Context of the City of Paris 
The Paris known and loved by tourists and residents today conceals under its 
romantic, ordered façade an urban environment of division and hierarchy (Rideout, 
2016). Paris is elegant, grand, and inviting with its uniform, embellished buildings and 
wide sidewalks lined with well-manicured trees and shrubbery (Rideout, 2016). Yet, 
behind this dazzling façade is a story of tension, struggle, demolition, and violence. 
Modern Paris is largely the result of a series of interventions in the urban environment in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Land enclosures and the migration of rural 
inhabitants from the northern areas of France during the industrial revolution contributed 
to the growth of large areas of impoverishment in the center of the city (Silverstein, 
2004). The region of Paris grew from 1.35 million inhabitants in 1800 to over six million 
by 1880 (Silverstein, 2004, p. 86). The infrastructure of Paris suffered under the strain of 
such a large increase in population, resulting in congested roads, poor sanitation, the 
spread of disease, and a limited supply of potable water (Silverstein, 2004). In response 
to the social upheaval that accompanied this difficult living environment (including 
regular violent confrontations against the government) and disease, reformers at the École 
Polytechnique developed plans to reconstruct Paris by demolishing the congested inner-
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city impoverished areas, opening up wide avenues, and constructing a rail and canal 
system (Filler, 1991).  
 Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann, appointed by Louis Napoleon as director of 
public works for the Paris region between 1853 and 1870, put the plans from the École 
Polytechnique in motion. Over the course of his tenure, he directed the demolition of 
“12,000 structures, cutting 85 miles of new direct roadways through the city to replace 
333 miles of meandering old ones, erecting imposing landmarks like the Opera and the 
Halles Centrals, revamping the antiquated and unhealthy water and sewage systems, 
increasing the number of street lights and sidewalks” (Filler, 1991, p. 32). Haussmann 
was also responsible for the development of nearly 5000 acres of public parks 
(Silverstein, 2004, p. 87).  
Though widely celebrated at the time, Haussmann’s work was not without 
criticism; his republican opponents “saw his avenues as imperialist tools to neuter 
fermenting civil unrest in working-class areas, allowing troops to be rapidly deployed to 
quell revolt” (Willsher, 2016, p.1; Taunton, 2009). Haussmann was also accused of 
engineering social hierarchies by destroying the mixed neighborhoods where rich, 
middle-class, and working-class people lived on the same streets. Post-Haussmann, the 
“emergent notion of the economically segregated community prevailed” (Filler, 1991, p. 
32), with the poor expelled from the inner-city to the outskirts of town, outside the city 
wall. The remains of the city wall eventually were dismantled and replaced by the 
périphérique—the ring road that functions to “delineate a sharp boundary between the 
Haussmannian city and the sprawling wasteland beyond” (Taunton, 2009, p. 99). The 
process of industrialization in the nineteenth century saw nearly all of Paris’s heavy 
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industry located outside the wall (later the périphérique); along with the factories, came 
the laborers required to work in the factories.  
 It is within this landscape of segregation and control that hundreds of thousands 
of Algerian immigrants settled after World War II. In the first decade after World War II, 
Paris faced a serious housing crisis, “which disproportionately affected North African” 
immigrants (Prakash, 2010, p. 223). Many North Africans sought cheap housing in 
boarding houses, hotels, and hostels in the less expensive districts of the city, in the 13th, 
14th, 18th, and 19th arrondissements; others found similar accommodations suburban 
shantytowns (Prakash, 2010). These shantytowns—the bidonvilles I first discussed in 
Chapter Four—were ethnically segregated and populated with a majority of Algerian 
immigrants. The bidonvilles were seen by governing authorities and the press as a threat 
to ‘French character,’ according to Wadowiec (2014, p. 135): 
[A]s the population was bottlenecked in dilapidated tenements and makeshift 
bidonvilles, popular and political discourse deflected longstanding structural 
problems (not enough homes) as further proof of problems inherent to the 
migrants themselves—such as an innate preference for squalor indicating that 
Algerians had little capacity or desire to become French.  
In this way, the bidonville emerged ideologically during the era of decolonization “as the 
spatial and symbolic antithesis to the type of adaptation that marked [Algerians] as stable 
contributors to French society” (Wadowiec, 2014, p. 167). Further, the visibility of these 
shantytown communities triggered authorities to view “most migration issues through the 
bidonville prism” (Byrnes, 2008, p. 11).  
In these conditions, there was an urgent need for providing Habitation de Loyer 
Modéré (HLM)—i.e., affordable rental housing—for immigrant workers (Dalrymple, 
2002). By the 1970s, most bidonvilles were demolished and replaced by social housing, 
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mainly in the form of high-rise, brutalist apartment buildings on the outskirts of Paris 
(Togman, 2002). These government-subsidized housing estates, called banlieues, or 
‘suburbs’, were developed in the style of Le Corbusier, a Swiss architect who sought to 
institute radical social reform through utopian, high-modernist urban design (Kohlstedt, 
2018, p. 1). Corbusier’s plans for a ‘contemporary’ and ‘radiant’ city built outside the 
périphérique “rapidly developed into a ghetto” (Shreir, 2014, p. 1), a place of 
“overcrowded public housing, people of color, new immigrants, and crime…categorical 
inequality, exclusion from the labor market, and social boundaries resulting in residential 
segregation” (Hutchison, 2010, p. 52). Scholars, journalists, and politicians have 
construed this banlieues mainly as spaces of resentment and oppositional behavior. For 
instance, Dalrymple (2002, p. 1) states, 
A kind of anti-society has grown up in [the banlieue]—a population that derives 
meaning of its life from the hatred it bears for the other, “official,” society in 
France. This alienation, this gulf of mistrust…is written on the faces of the young 
men, most of them permanently unemployed, who hang out in the pocked and 
potholed open spaces between their [apartments]. 
For some commentators, the description of banlieues as quartiers en difficulté (deprived 
areas), or zones sensibles (trouble spots) is intended to call attention to the problem of 
inequality and to advocate for solutions to inequality and unemployment. The imagining 
of these neighborhoods as wastelands filled with crime and violence, however, has also 
allowed the state “to rally support for targeted crackdowns” (Angélil and Siress, 2012, p. 
63). Police brutality is common in the banlieue, and this only works to fuel banlieue 
violence against the state. Riots occur periodically, including 1981 (the ‘rodeo riots’), 
1991 (Sartrouville and Mantes-la-Jolie), and 2005 (the ‘French riots’) (Laachir, 2007). 
The banlieues since the early 2000s have also been declared ‘no go’ spaces by governing 
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authorities (especially the banlieue of La Courneuve, north of Paris), and French media 
representations consistently focus on selective images of crime and violence that confirm 
the “idea of the banlieues as the space of the threatening ‘other’” (Laachir, 2007, p. 102). 
These sensationalized, culturalist explanations of segregation mask the historic, 
economic, and political mechanisms that have created segregation in the first place, and 
that have functioned to maintain inner Paris as a space of racialized privilege (McAvay 
and Safi, 2018). The mixed, immigrant-origin population appears simply to be “internally 
exiled—foreigners in their own country living a wholly different social and physical 
construct” (Angélil and Siress, 2012, pp. 61-62).  Having expelled the Black, Arab, and 
immigrant poor from the white, French city center, France has “found itself replaying a 
former colonial refrain, only this time within its own national borders,” thus furthering 
the idea of the banlieue as a ghettoized community (Angélil and Siress, 2012, p. 60). 
This analysis of the banlieue echoes Anderson’s (1987) analysis of Chinatown as 
a convergence of “place, power, racial discourse, and institutional practice” (p. 581). 
More than just a physical space, the ‘immigrant’ banlieue is a social construct that gives 
definition to France’s white European society. French Republicanism is based upon a 
perceived total equality of all citizens; these universalist pretentions are embedded in the 
capital city’s ‘public’ spaces—its “civic squares, government buildings, monuments, 
thoroughfares, and cultural centers,” all of which convey a coherent identity and provide 
“citizens with common landmarks and places of collective memory” (Farrar, 2008, p. 14). 
But this idealized citizenship relies upon the peripheralized Other that, for many French 
citizens, exists only through media images. Of course, the spatialized self-and-other 
construction of inner Paris and its suburbs is complicated by the existence of a large 
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population of Algerians living within the city limits. That is, while there is clear evidence 
of residential segregation, not all people of Algerian or North African origin reside in 
peripheral enclaves. Of my research participants only 15 of 73 are currently living in 
banlieues (though many grew up in banlieues and moved to Paris as adults). The 
remaining 58 respondents live within the city of Paris. All but 8 of these participants live 
in districts known to have a significant immigrant or Algerian population (mainly the 
13th, 18th, or 20th arrondissements); but ‘significant’ in these districts means a minority—
for example, the 18th arrondissement had an immigrant population of 27.5 percent in 
2017 (INSEE, 2020a). The question raised here is what residence in these more mixed 
neighborhoods means. Does it suggest a group of immigrants who are on their way to 
‘assimilation’ and who are comfortable interacting with the Français de souche or other 
Europeans (Najib, 2019)? Does it signify the fading of differences between people of 
Algerian origin and dominant French society? Among my study participants, those of 
Berber origin are more likely to live in central Paris than those who consider themselves 
Arab. It might not be coincidental that Berbers tend to have lighter skin, hair, and eye 
color, and they enjoyed a degree of racial privilege under French colonial rule 
(Camiscioli, 2009). They may thus find it relatively easy to live in central Paris. 
Certainly, some of my Berber-identifying respondents commented on their ability to ‘fit 
in’ with their pale skin, light eye color, and blond hair. For example, Sylia said, “I look 
like them, so it is easier for me [to fit in].” But as I explain below, such a pathway to 
sameness is not preordained. Moreover, the openness of dominant space to particular 
groups of outsiders should not be understood as creating spaces that are somehow neutral 
or devoid of identities.   
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While I give attention to residential space, the issue of residential segregation or 
integration is of less interest to me here than the ways all kinds of places become integral 
to my respondents’ understandings and negotiations of identity, belonging, and 
membership. Space and representations of spaces (like the banlieues) are important to 
these negotiations, but not in any single way. I want to suggest that relationships between 
place, identity, and belonging are complicated and fraught with tension, as people from 
immigrant backgrounds must struggle to define who they are and where they belong in a 
national society that insists upon the neutrality and universalism of its values. Rather than 
take the meaning of certain kinds of places for granted, I ask my respondents what those 
places mean to them, and how their performances of identity might shift as they move 
through space—going, perhaps, from immigrant-dominated to French-dominated spaces, 
or from school to home, and so on.  
Narrating space 
 Immigrants have played a fundamental role in shaping urban space and urban life 
in Paris for generations, and those spaces are filled with meanings and tensions for 
immigrants and non-immigrants alike. The banlieues, and the negative discourses that 
surround them, have a particularly salient role in Algerian-origin individuals’ perceptions 
of their place in French society, even for those that do not live in the banlieues. For 
many, the banlieues are ‘home,’ even as these neighborhoods are constantly denigrated 
by politicians and the media. Within the context of ethnic segregation, social marginality, 
and transnational mobility, “domesticity—understood as the potential to enact a domestic 
dimension in meaningful places—is an important asset to resist present hardships, 
cultivate memory and lay out projects for the future” (Boccagni and Brighenti, 2015, p. 
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1). At the same time, and regardless of their relationships with the banlieues, Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants must also position themselves within public spaces that 
are characteristically ordered, framed, and managed by dominant groups (Boccagni and 
Brighenti, 2015). It is important to understand how migrants navigate social membership 
in the fragmented and discontinuous spaces of a racially and class segregated city. 
 The interviews conducted for this study show that while structural forces—state 
policies, immigration policies, capitalism—shape the city and people’s place within it, 
individuals exercise some agency in navigating different kinds of spaces and in asserting 
their identities and understandings of community through their performances in these 
spaces. Previous chapters have described how interviewees place identities in different 
spheres and histories of life, thereby situating themselves selectively within these realms 
through their social behaviors. Research participants express their identities situationally, 
conforming to, or resisting, the codes and unwritten rules that govern certain realms of 
life and the spaces associated with them. The struggle for Algerian-origin individuals to 
‘fit in’ among French society manifests itself spatially, though such struggles may not be 
visible to members of the dominant group. In the sections that follow, I explore how my 
respondents frame and re-frame the banlieue as home by contesting dominant 
conceptions of the banlieue. I then offer counternarratives to the ‘banlieue is home’ 
narrative by showing the ambivalence some feel toward the banlieue, or their outright 
rejection of these spaces. Finally, I discuss the spatialities of Algerian immigrants and 
their descendants as they move in and out of immigrant and non-immigrant spaces in the 




(Re)Framing the banlieue as home 
Individuals of Algerian origin interviewed for this research tend to construct their 
own neighborhood in terms of ‘home’ and ‘belonging,’ as places where they feel safe and 
familiar, thereby connecting the physical aspects of place(s) to the social dimensions of 
everyday places (van der Burgt, 2015). As geographers Blunt and Dowling (2006) 
describe, ‘home’ is not simply a site in which individuals live, it is also a “spatial 
imaginary: a set of intersecting and variable ideas and feelings, which are related to 
context, which construct place, extend across space and scales, and connect places” (p.2). 
Algerian-origin peoples work to create a translocal/ transnational conception of place 
where the sights, smells, and sounds of Algeria are ‘normal’ and not ‘foreign.’ For many 
participants, the banlieue offers a space in which to (re)create an Algerian ‘home’—a 
space of authenticity, inclusivity, and ‘community.’ Though these spaces were created 
through exclusion and discrimination, they have also become spaces of safety, security, 
and comfort. Phillips (2006) speaks of the positive attributes of such spaces formed from 
discrimination and economic need: these are vibrant lived spaces that produce a sense of 
belonging and safety and that facilitate social capital. Like Phillips’ respondents, my 
respondents “valued the local networks of support, institutions, care, and information 
exchange relationships” in these spaces (2006, p. 28). These neighborhoods 
convey/preserve an ‘Algerian’ identity, but this can extend beyond people of Algerian 
descent to a broader immigrant population. This is despite elements of isolation (both 




For instance, Lina, a 60-year-old immigrant, living in the Champigny-sur-Marne 
banlieue, wanted to raise her children around other immigrants and Muslims, stating “I 
wanted my children to grow up without racist [treatment].” Though the living conditions 
in her building are lower than she desires (the elevator is regularly out of service, the 
hallways smell of urine, repairs take longer than they should, etc.), Lina talks about how 
hard she has worked to make her family’s home comfortable. For Lina, her home in the 
banlieue is a place of comfort and ease. Her apartment is decorated in the style of her 
home in the Kabyle region of Algeria: bright maroon tapestries adorn the walls, carpets 
from Algeria are on the floors, and a tea set from Algeria is on display on the buffet in the 
dining/living room. It is not only the space of her apartment that Lina adorns with 
Algerian items. She also wears an Algerian dress as a housecoat; it is black with gold 
embroidery and is her favorite article of clothing. When I joined Lina and her family for 
meals, a family friend, Binta (from Senegal) was invited over to celebrate the breaking of 
the fast during Ramadan. For Lina, the space of her home is inclusive beyond being an 
‘Algerian’ space—she is open to a broader sense of a community of (Muslim) 
immigrants. This meeting of friends, family, and an academic geographer (an outsider) 
seemed normal for this group—a sense of shared community, engagement with their 
heritage and traditions, and a desire to share it with outsiders. In this way, the banlieue 
functions as “a “village” of multicultural entente and familial ties” (Austin, 2009, p. 88). 
Understanding the banlieue in this way demonstrates that this space is meant to be an 
authentic space, though its meaning and form have a specific meaning in the French 
context: it is not an entirely closed-off ‘cultural space’ that reproduces Algerian life 
exactly, but, rather, a space that offers refuge from French spaces.    
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 In the same ways that Lina prefers to live in a community of immigrants in the 
banlieue, Hacina, a 24-year-old immigrant, living in the 93rd district outside of Paris 
explains, “I like living in the banlieue…there are no French people here, only Blacks and 
Arabs.” She describes a sense of ease that she feels, of ‘being at home’ when in the space 
of the banlieue: “Being here is better…there’s no pressure”—referring to the social 
pressures, stemming from secularist and assimilationist discourse and policy, of ‘French 
space’ within the city of Paris. From this perspective, ‘French’ is very much a marked, 
visible category that Hacina can avoid by living most of her life within the boundaries of 
banlieue—where she lives, works, and conducts her social life. Hacina describes a 
distaste of what she called “original French” meaning Français de souche, describing 
them as unkind and unwelcoming. When Hacina met me for our interview, she arrived 
late because she had gotten lost. We were meeting at a café just inside the périphérique, 
and she was unfamiliar with the area, even though it was within minutes of her home. She 
called me and asked for directions and I sent her a text message with the address of the 
café so that she could use her phone to map her way there. She again got lost driving out 
of Paris and into the banlieue. She explained that she “never goes to Paris.” Once we 
were on the familiar streets of her neighborhood (only a few blocks from the café where 
we met), she no longer needed guidance with navigation. This small, but telling action 
indicated an almost physically identifiable boundary between where Hacina feels ‘in 
place’ and ‘out of place,’ where she is ‘lost’ and where she ‘belongs.’ 
Hacina’s friend Djamila, with whom she works at the local hospital, agrees with 
Hacina’s positive feelings of ‘being at home’ in the banlieue. “There are many people 
like us here,” she says, referring to their common Algerian heritage. Djamila lives in the 
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same banlieue (Bobigny) as Hacina in the 93rd district (north-east of Paris), but down the 
street, in a different high-rise building. The two women share meals with friends and 
families in their apartments, but usually congregate at Djamila’s because she has children 
at home. Like Lina, Djamila and Hacina have a large group of immigrant (and 
immigrant-descendant) friends that share meals, Muslim holidays, and celebrations 
together. During my interviews with Djamila and Hacina, we shared a meal of couscous 
at Djamila’s house (according to Hacina, “you cannot learn about Algeria without 
couscous!”). After we finished the couscous, while drinking mint tea (in the customary 
fashion of Algeria), another friend arrived at Djamila’s, Brice, an immigrant from 
Senegal, who joined in the conversation. Again, the space of Djamila’s home was 
inclusive beyond the boundaries of ‘Algerian’ and included a broader sense of 
community that included other immigrants from the neighborhood.  
In a way similar to Lina’s interior decor, Djamila’s home is filled with 
decorations and products that remind her of Algeria. The contrast was striking between 
the state of disrepair of the building she lives in, with its drab walls, and Djamila’s home, 
decorated with vibrant art from Kabylia in Algeria (where Djamila is from). Djamila 
explained that though she does not go home to Algeria as often as she would like, when 
she does, she brings back olive oil, dates, and spices to cook with in France. She pointed 
out her favorite trinkets from Algeria, on display in her living room—a polished metal 
teapot, a metal plate with a design hammered in the center, a woven tapestry on the 
wall—all brought from Kabyle. At home, Djamila wears an Algerian dress (like Lina’s) 
as a housecoat. She only wears this at home and never outside her apartment (she is a 
nurse, and she and Hacina both wear typical medical attire at work). Though Djamila and 
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Lina lived miles apart, and did not know each other, their lives, apartments, and social 
gatherings were mirror images of each other—the drab and deteriorating buildings of the 
banlieue contrasted with a cheery and vibrant décor from Algeria inside their apartments, 
even down to the similar clothing that they each wore at home. Both women cooked 
Algerian food and prepared North African tea for my visit; both visits were accompanied 
with the inclusion of others from the neighborhood (all immigrants or descendants of 
immigrants).  
During my interview with Djamila, her son was studying for an upcoming exam 
in school, and Djamila was distracted by this, regularly interrupting herself to remind him 
to focus. Djamila keeps a strict hold over her children and encourages (rather forcefully) 
their success in school. For Djamila, her children can “achieve more in life” than she did; 
she wants a life for them that was not of a working-class nature, perhaps a life outside the 
space banlieue. Djamila’s ambivalence toward the banlieue is evident here, in that she 
both chooses to live in her neighborhood and creates a space of ‘home’ while 
simultaneously desiring her son to have the ability to live somewhere else. Though she 
did not fully articulate her specific desires for her children (whether she wanted them to 
live somewhere else and to lead a different kind of life), her efforts both to foster a sense 
of ‘home’ and belonging in the banlieue and to focus on her children’s ability to exercise 
a choice in where and how they live seemed to disrupt the “non-assimilation” narratives 
so commonly applied to Algerian immigrants.  
Djamila was not unique in her desire to exercise freedom and choice in where and 
how her family lives. Many of my interviewees, in fact, had made decisions in their own 
lives to separate themselves fully or partly from the banlieue and to renegotiate their 
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relationships with both the Algerian/immigrant community and with ‘mainstream’ French 
society. In the following section, I offer a counterpart to the above descriptions of a 
reproduction of Algerian home and community, by presenting the narratives of those who 
have tried to distance themselves from immigrant space.  
Leaving Immigrant Space 
 Where some research participants fit the traditional assimilation narrative about 
‘immigrant colonies’ or ‘immigrant clusters,’ not all appeared to be striving for 
community authenticity, or an ‘Algerian sense of home.’ For example, Sarah., Lina’s 
eldest daughter, expressed both positive and negative feelings and associations with her 
childhood home in the Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue. When we met for our interview, 
Sarah picked me up in the 20th arrondissement and drove me to Champigny-sur-Marne, 
where Lina raised her, about a 30-minute drive. She talked about how far away it was 
from Paris, and how difficult it is to get there or to get to Paris from there on public 
transportation. When we parked her car (after looking for a ‘safe’ place to park), she said 
hello to her friends that we passed and stopped to introduce me. Sakina and I 
communicated in a mix of French and English, and when she introduced me as an 
American to her friends, they were all very happy to meet an American but did not speak 
English to me. When I asked about language use in her neighborhood, Sarah told me that 
no one in her banlieue learns or speaks English. “Why would they?” she asked, 
conveying a sense of restricted opportunities for the residents. 
When we arrived at her family’s apartment, I was shown to the sitting area and 
offered a glass of Fanta (Sarah and her family were still practicing fasting until sundown, 
but they wanted to offer their Christian guest a beverage). As we waited for the sun to go 
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down, I went to the window and looked at the view. The sun was going down behind the 
other high-rise buildings and rays of light were streaming through. I thought it was a 
beautiful scene and said, “Sarah! Come look at this!” Sarah sighed and stayed in her seat, 
and said, “I know that view.” I felt the world close in on me and tried for a moment to 
imagine looking out this very window for days and years on end. I thought about how 
hard Sarah had worked to escape her childhood living environment, and I felt exhaustion 
in her response to my naïve enjoyment of the sunset in the banlieue. Sarah’s ambivalence 
toward her neighborhood was palpable.   
Sarah was open about her complicated feelings about her neighborhood. She 
described it, on the one hand, as familiar and secure: she knows the people around her 
and she does not feel out of place or at risk of being the victim of the racism that she feels 
in the central part of Paris. Yet her old neighborhood also feels increasingly unfamiliar 
and unsafe. She has been exposed to and, in some cases, included in ‘French’ social 
spheres such as her university, so she no longer identifies solely with her neighborhood. 
As we drove into the banlieue, she explained, in clear detail, the level of danger we were 
in—that her car might be broken into or stolen, and that we had to be conscious of where 
we were (as two women) after dark. Sarah exemplifies the ambivalence experienced by 
racialized groups in their everyday lives as they navigate and try to reconcile contrasting 
identities and emotional responses (Boccagni and Kivisto, 2019). For Sarah the banlieue 
insofar is her ‘home’ in some respects but a deeply unhomely environment in other 
respects (Boccagni and Kivisto, 2019). It is from this paradox of feelings that Sarah 
navigates where she ultimately belongs, and where her place in the world is located.  
 
273 
While Sarah was eager to leave the banlieue where she grew up, she continues to 
be drawn to immigrant spaces, though she experiences them somewhat as a detached 
observer. She is a doctoral student whose work focuses on Algerian immigrant women in 
the Clichy banlieue just north of the city of Paris, where she took me one day for a visit. 
We took the metro up to Clichy. It was a long metro ride in a very crowded metro car; 
Sarah explained that the trains do not go to these (low-income, immigrant) areas very 
often, so the trains are almost always overcrowded. We walked around the commercial 
center, where we saw clothing stores that specialized in Algerian wedding attire and 
restaurants that offered special menus for Ramadan, and we walked among a highly 
diverse crowd of people. Sarah remarked that usually she wears a headscarf when she 
visits Clichy to conduct interviews with Algerian women for her research (she was not 
wearing one during our meeting). When she conducts interviews, she uses her Algerian 
Arabic, and she describes feeling comfortable in this area. Her time spent working with 
these immigrant women had a profound effect on her own feelings of belonging and 
inclusion in France. Sakina explained that it was during these interviews that she found 
expression for her lifelong feelings of exclusion as a child of immigrants, as a woman, 
and as a person of Algerian descent born and raised in France. She feels at home in these 
immigrant neighborhoods, she says, because she grew up in one. She also feels the 
respect and admiration of the women, who know that she is highly educated. But she 
identifies with her research population of Algerian women only partly. As an academic 
researcher and ‘banlieue escapee’ she maintains a kind of ‘objective’ distance from the 
women she interacts with in Clichy. As we walked, Sarah talked about her research, 
referring to the women she works with as ‘they’/’them’ and placed herself apart from 
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them, even her interviewees are women much like her mother, Lina, a first-generation 
female Algerian immigrant.  
As noted earlier, Sarah has become more comfortable in French spaces because of 
her time at university and the level of access that her educational mobility has offered 
her. Yet, in some cases/spaces, she sees French space as exclusionary, including, 
somewhat counterintuitively, the area around the Paris Mosque in the center of Paris. The 
mosque is located in the 5th arrondissement—a very wealthy downtown area of Paris55. I 
visited the mosque with Sarah, who explained that she had been to the mosque before, 
but she did not visit often. She brought a headscarf with her, in her bag, that she took out 
and put on before we entered the mosque (I had also brought a scarf and put it on before 
entering). Inside the building, Sarah walked around the mosque with me and explained 
the different rooms and fixtures. Upon exiting the mosque, Sarah immediately removed 
her headscarf and pointed out the police vans stationed outside the mosque 24 hours/day. 
As she pointed to this clear sign of a police presence, her demeanor did not change, it 
seemed that she just wanted me to notice this everyday company of the police in the lives 
of Muslims. Here, we see her ambivalence again, this time toward French space. Sarah 
 
55 The mosque was built to honor the North African soldiers who fought for France in the 
first World War. At the time of the construction (the early 1920s), the location was 
chosen for its “prime and historic location,” meant to illustrate “France’s deep and 
historic respect for Islam” yet also to hold control over the use of the mosque—there was 
a very small population of Muslims living nearby at the time (Bayoumi, 1998, pp. 303-
304). The mosque was conceived of as a symbolic gesture of France’s good will toward 
its Muslims, “That didn’t mean, however, that it was to be used by them” as Bayoumi 
(1998) describes, referring to the low number of immigrants/Muslims living in the 
expensive 5th arrondissement (p. 305). In 2012, the migrant population of the 5th 
arrondissement was 17 percent, with, 8.2 percent of the population living in social 
housing; the 5th arrondissement is among the lowest migrant population and social 
housing (OECD, 2018, p. 35). 
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can navigate both immigrant and French spaces with a degree of ease, but there remains a 
tension in how she views her belonging in these spaces—she belongs partly in both; both 
require some level of adjustment.  
As we walked away from the mosque, we began a conversation about the banning 
of headscarves in certain public spaces (e.g., schools) and the policing of Muslim spaces 
by state authorities. Sarah has mixed feelings about the controversy surrounding the hijab 
in France. She says, “it is really about belonging or being excluded” when talking about 
wearing a headscarf. She feels that the headscarf is both a symbol of rebellion against the 
French (see Chapter Five for further discussion of rebelliousness against Frenchness), but 
at the same time, Sarah feels that the legal restrictions on headscarves work in ways to 
isolate Muslim women from French society. The mosque is in a very upscale 
neighborhood, and when I asked Sarah about this, she said, “No Muslim could afford to 
live here,” and she speculated that the French who do live in the neighborhood “probably 
hate the mosque.” As we walked to the metro station, she explained that she did not like 
to walk in ‘French’ places like this because she felt that everyone was staring at her 
“because I am not white.” From Sarah’s perspective, French spaces are white and 
immigrant spaces are for people of color.  
Other study respondents offered less conflicted evaluations of different spaces, 
describing the banlieue as a place to be avoided all together and situating themselves 
more squarely in French spaces. Abdel, a 25-year-old son of immigrants, grew up in 
Reuil-Malmaison, a banlieue west of Paris, but he now lives in the 14th arrondissement, 
in south-central Paris. In 2012, the migrant population of the 14th arrondissement was 20 
percent, with, 24.8 percent of the population living in social housing, the fourth highest 
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level of social housing in Paris (the first being the 19th arrondissement, with 38 percent) 
(OECD, 2018, p. 35). Abdel considers himself to be Algerian, but he distinguishes 
himself from the Algerian community. Much more than Sarah in the previous example, 
he works to distance himself from his Algerian roots and Algerian social circles. He 
explains, “I have some acquaintances from Algeria, though all my friends are from 
France. I do not have close links with members of my extended family. I found my job, 
my housing, and borrowed money on my own.” 
Abdel makes a concerted effort to surround himself with French friends and social 
circles. Describing his socializing habits, he states,  
I mainly socialize with non-North Africans, through the contexts of studies and of 
associations I joined. For instance, the residence I live in is very friendly and 
tends to organize many events. I have developed my friendships mainly because 
of my studies. Most of my friends are from Sciences Po56 because they shared 
with me a common interest in politics or art.  
In Abdel’s efforts to distance himself from immigrant spaces, places, and people, he also 
works to claim space in the dominant French space. He chose the location for one of our 
meetings near the Sorbonne University, in the 5th arrondissement of Paris, near the city 
center. Abdel’s years of school, socializing, and living in Paris, outside of the banlieue, 
have given him the experience and presence to feel comfortable in these places. 
However, Abdel has struggled to find work as a high school teacher and is working as a 
substitute teacher at a school in a northern district, in an immigrant banlieue. He has to 
travel from the southern part of the city of Paris, where he lives, to outside the northern 
boundary to get to work, a commute that takes about 45 minutes on the metro.  
 
56 The Paris Institute of Political Sciences, often referred to as ‘Sciences Po.’ 
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Abdel’s feelings about the banlieue where he grew up are negative. He 
remembers Reuil-Malmaison as “dirty…there was an airport nearby and it was so loud. I 
hated it.” His mother and sister still live in a home near where Abdel grew up. He rarely 
visits, and he disassociates himself from his parents’ immigrant status. When he explains 
his perspective of ‘immigrant spaces,’ he calls the residents ‘them’—referring to 
immigrants and their descendants, thereby distancing himself from the residents, in effect 
othering them. He describes these spaces as a product of racism, suggesting that “French 
society is torn apart by racism and the will to integrate immigrants.” He says, “Most of 
them [descendants of immigrants] are born, raised, live and die in the same poor suburbs 
of French cities.” But for Abdel, the solution to this problem is not so much addressing 
French racism but moving immigrants and their descendants out of their segregated 
spaces. He suggests the need for “a massive land settlement, that is to say the destruction 
of ghettos and the settlings of immigrants and newcomers everywhere around France 
(and not only around the main metropolises), in order to foster social diversity.” This 
perspective of immigrant space echoes mainstream discourses about the ‘problem’ of the 
banlieue as one of self-segregation, cultural isolation, and concentrated poverty –a 
problem to be solved by dispersing residents away from these problematic sites.  
From the narratives of Sarah and Abdel, we start to see the ways that some 
banlieue residents accept criticism of the ‘cultural isolation’ that exists in the 
neighborhoods where they grew up. Both recognize exclusion on the part of 
‘mainstream,’ non-immigrant French society; but both in different ways, also reject the 
immigrant space of the banlieue and attempt to function within ‘mainstream’ French 
spaces (though not with equal levels of comfort or enthusiasm). The following section 
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explores the experiences of other respondents whose attitudes toward different spaces are 
even more ambivalent (and ambiguous) than these, and whose relationship with different 
places and identity categories are fraught with emotional tension. This section will give 
particular attention the ways that my study respondents perform different identities as 
they move through both immigrant and dominant spaces. 
Balancing French and Algerian Identities through Space 
 The ways that Algerian-origin peoples in France think about themselves can 
translate into their conduct and performance in particular places and situations. Many of 
my respondents work to gain acceptance and to exist within the French ‘mainstream’ by 
strategically engaging with social space. That is, they employ strategies to “reduce social 
distance, minimize difference, and build relationships and coalitions that allow them to 
negotiate” space and social membership (Pugh, 2017, p. 2). Yet they face a variety of 
challenges when entering dominant French space, such as being the only person of 
Algerian descent in the room and interacting with people from the majority group who 
may carry implicit biases, stereotypes, and patronizing attitudes toward racialized groups 
(Sinclair, 2018). In this section, I describe how individuals move in and out of immigrant 
and dominant spaces, and the different performances of identity involved, including 
personal comportment and language use. All of these aspects form a balancing act 
performed by Algerian-origin people as they move through space in France.  
One example is Idir, a 32-year-old immigrant who lives in the 92nd district outside 
of Paris in the Meudon banlieue. He requested that we conduct our interview in the very 
heart of Paris (we met at the Shakespeare Library, a very well-known tourist location 
near the Notre Dame Cathedral), an area that he knew well because he visited there often 
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on his days off. Though this part of Paris is more than 40 minutes away from where he 
lives (by metro and bus), Idir described feeling comfortable in parts of Paris that other 
participants explicitly avoided. Idir attributed this level of comfort within French spaces 
to his time at the Cité International University in Paris (the university is in the 14th 
arrondissement, about a 20-minute metro-ride away from the Shakespeare library). 
During his time at the university, he lived and went to school in French space, made 
French friends, and even dated a French girl.  
Though he functions in these spaces, he admitted that he struggles with the 
secular aspect of public space, and, more broadly, with the notion of a secular society. 
“The problem is religion in France,” he remarked. Idir likened the immigration ‘problem’ 
between France and Algeria to that of the U.S. and Mexico, he says:  
The river, the Rio Grande, separates the two, just like the Mediterranean Sea 
separates France and Algeria…but Mexican immigrants living in the United 
States share a common religious foundation of Christianity with Americans, so 
they can get along. In France, the majority of Algerians are Muslim. This is the 
problem.  
Though he has French friends, Idir feels that he has not been able to make good personal 
connections with French people because, he says, “I can’t see myself in them.” For Idir, 
faith is the fundamental reason for feeling distance between himself and others. As I 
described in Chapter Five, he prefers not to read philosophical works from authors who 
do not believe in God; and he feels the same about those with whom he socializes. 
Though he feels relatively comfortable in French spaces like the downtown tourist area 
and the neighborhood surrounding his university, he avoids what he considers ultra-
French spaces (e.g., including non-tourist/non-university French spaces) as much as he 
avoids banlieue areas outside of his home neighborhood. For example, he, like other 
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participants, avoids the ‘rich’ arrondissements such as the 15th and 16th arrondissements 
in Paris; likewise, he avoids the ‘bad’ banlieues, choosing, rather, to spend his free time 
in other parts of the city where identities are perhaps less rigid or prescribed. He shows 
relative comfort moving across space and performing a French identity, but he also 
recognizes the limits to his Frenchness, and thus maintains some affinity to Algerianness.   
Idir is not the only participant seeking a community, and a place, that he can ‘see 
himself’ in. Youcef is a 35-year-old immigrant living in the 94th district outside of Paris 
who blames social problems in French society on both ‘the French’ and ‘immigrants.’ 
First, he places blame on the French state for patterns of segregation, stating that 
immigrants were “funneled into these high-rise buildings” in the banlieues because 
France wanted to “keep the immigrants contained” in a small area. Though Youcef lives 
outside the city limits of Paris (in a neighborhood he describes as “totally Algerian”), he 
regularly travels across the city to meet up with other people of Algerian descent. While 
he is philosophically against segregation, he seeks to socialize and live with people of 
Algerian backgrounds, though he is clear about seeking out a community that includes a 
particular kind of Algerian-origin people.  
To elaborate on this ambivalent viewpoint, Youcef had a difficult time in France 
when he was working toward legal residency. Before his student visa expired, Youcef 
had been enjoying his time in France—he had mostly French and some Algerian-descent 
friends, and he lived and worked within French spaces. Once he lost his legal status in 
France, Youcef fell into a depression. He lost his job (he needed legal papers to continue 
his employment and the company was unwilling to sponsor a work visa) and many of his 
French friends along with it. As I first described in Chapter Five, it was during this time 
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that Youcef turned to Facebook to create a community. He explains, “I really felt like, I 
like this thing of Algeria, I like meeting Algerian people…I felt like something was 
missing and I wanted to reconnect with Algeria, so I found this Facebook group called 
‘The Community of Algerian Friends.’” He joined the group and began organizing 
meetings for job fairs and educational opportunities. Youcef says that he felt very 
welcomed by this group: “I was super proud to find, like, all these Algerians with good 
education, good manners and coming from like my background…they speak nice, they’re 
serious in what they do, and people who, like, look like you, you know?” Yet while 
Youcef was proud of being part of a group of educated, well-mannered individuals of 
Algerian descent, his sense of community was disrupted when members of the group 
began speaking Arabic at a group picnic. Even though Youcef was raised in Algeria, his 
family focused on teaching him French, not Arabic. Youcef felt exclusion from his ‘own 
group’ when the language changed to Arabic. Here, Youcef shows the balancing act that 
he practices between French and Algerian spaces—he devised a specific sense of cultural 
identity that is Algerian in a specific way that has access to privilege and mobility 
because of (French) education and (French) language abilities. It is an idealized, 
somewhat hybrid sense of community that is disrupted when its members speak Arabic. 
Youcef, like Idir, requested to meet me in the downtown area of Paris, but at an Algerian 
restaurant. So, while he holds confidence in French spaces, he too seeks to maintain a 
certain degree and a certain kind of Algerianness. Idir and Youcef are indicative of the 
balancing act of Algerian-origin peoples in France—those who feel mostly comfortable 
moving across space and performing French identity, but also seek to maintain a certain 
degree and a certain kind of Algerianness. In the following section, I offer additional 
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narratives that reveal how participants conditionally embrace and perform elements of 
Frenchness and Algerianness and move between categories and spaces as they attempt to 
produce community and belonging.  
Seeking ‘Algeria’ within Paris 
Some of my study respondents feel relatively comfortable moving between the 
banlieue and mainstream spaces of central Paris and feel able to perform elements of 
Frenchness within the latter, even as they maintain a circle of friends that is defined (at 
least partly) by their Algerianness. Others live within the city of Paris, but purposefully 
seek out elements of Algerianness in these spaces. For example, Annia, the 22-year-old 
daughter of immigrants, lives in the 18th arrondissement, which she calls “Little Algeria” 
because she can be around the tastes and smells from her parents’ homeland when she so 
chooses, as Algerian spices and food staples are readily available in stores in this district. 
The 18th arrondissement is a mix of tourism, nightlife, and immigrant neighborhoods; it is 
centered around a hilltop neighborhood called Montmartre—a former artists’ village 
where Picasso and Dali spent time. Atop the hill is the Sacré-Cœur basilica, surrounded 
by gardens, shops, and eateries. Nearby, the iconic Moulin Rouge cabaret draws tourists 
and nightlife enthusiasts alike. Woven between these landmarks are clusters of immigrant 
neighborhoods, home to African markets, Arab cafés, and halal butchers. In 2012, the 
migrant population of the 18th arrondissement was 23.4 percent, with 20.6 percent of the 
population living in social housing (OECD, 2018, p. 35). This seems to be enough 
immigrant presence to make the 18th seem ‘colorful,’ ‘lively,’ and ‘fun’, but not so much 
to make it ‘scary,’ ‘crime-ridden,’ or ‘ghetto-like’ as the banlieues are perceived. Indeed, 
the dominant French social group frequents the 18th and views it as a destination spot. It 
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is a popular location to hold birthday celebrations and other friendly gatherings among 
the young and ‘hip’ crowd of white, middle class Parisians. Annia likes this atmosphere 
of an ‘edgy’ immigrant/artist/gritty neighborhood. Annia’s engagement with “Little 
Algeria” speaks to the different ways that individuals can ‘be Algerian’ and experience 
identity and place. She is ‘Algerian’ yet also experiences the neighborhood’s immigrant 
character much as a ‘tourist’ would. It is a space of lively adventure, and she is part of it 
as an ‘immigrant’ but capable of consuming it as an outsider might. It is important to 
note, in this respect, that Annia distances herself from her parents’ version of Algerian 
culture: they live in the banlieue but Annia has left that life behind her and now lives 
within the city limits of Paris in the 18th arrondissement.  
The act of seeking a certain kind of Algerian space, as Annia does, is a common 
spatial practice among my research participants. For instance, Farid, a 52-year-old 
immigrant, has lived in the 20th arrondissement for nearly 30 years, but he says, “There 
are some places in Paris that I have never been, like the 8th or 16th [arrondissements]. I 
don’t like it there, there aren’t any immigrants57…my favorite place is the 20th 
[arrondissement]. There is diversity here and I feel good.” Mehdi, a 41-year-old 
immigrant, lives in the 94th district outside of Paris, but commutes into the city—20 
minutes on the metro—to work in Said’s café in the 13th arrondissement. Like Farid, 
however, spending a great deal of time in within Paris has not made him any more 
comfortable being there. He makes a concerted effort to avoid ‘French’ spaces, where he 
feels he is treated with racist sentiments: “I never go to the center [of Paris]” he says, 
 
57 Of the 73 individuals of Algerian origin interviewed for this research, none of them 
lived in the 8th or 16th arrondissements. 
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“people that look like me don’t go there.” For Mehdi, Said’s café is a sanctuary of 
Algerianness where he feels safe to exist amidst a broader environment of hostility. 
A tendency to avoid places where participants feel they will be subjected to racist 
treatment is common, as shown by multiple participants. According to Rafik, for 
instance, Algerians in France “are raised with hate…they know that French people hate 
them…anti-Algerian racism is all over France.” This sense of racism affected some 
participants’ engagement with different spaces in Paris. For example, Ferhat, a 45-year-
old son of immigrants, explains that he used to live in the 15th arrondissement, but he 
moved away because he felt that “the rich people are racist” and that there were “too 
many white people” in the neighborhood. He moved to the 19th arrondissement where he 
is more comfortable because “there are more immigrants.” Here, Ferhat offers a twist to 
the traditional assimilation narrative—the assumption that there is a one-way movement 
from ghetto to middle class residential areas, as immigrants move along the trajectory of 
integration.  
Participant Lakhdar seeks and produces a particular kind of immigrant space 
within a non-immigrant-dominated neighborhood in central Paris. Lakhdar is a 48-year-
old immigrant who lives and works in in the 10th arrondissement, where in 2012, 
immigrants were 22.9 percent of the population, though only 12.7 percent of the 
population lived in social housing (OECD, 2018, p. 35). The 10th arrondissement is an 
upper-class neighborhood, with the exception of an area of about 3 square city blocks that 
houses Algerian restaurants, halal butchers, tea houses, and cafés. Lakhdar, a café owner, 
socializes almost exclusively with Algerians, and creates a social space in his café that 
caters to people of Algerian origin. As well, he employs almost exclusively Algerians 
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(specifically Berbers) in his café. But while he clearly identifies with, and places himself 
among Algerians, he understands Algerianness in certain ways—as encompassing certain 
kinds of people with certain values and attitudes. As seen with other respondents, 
Lakhdar is critical of the banlieues, though he has never lived in one. He describes the 
banlieues as isolated and impoverished areas and as a problem—as the problem—in 
France. Lakhdar feels that these problems could be alleviated with an increase in social 
housing availability throughout the city of Paris. For Lakhdar, the problem of the 
banlieue is not that it is an Algerian space, but that it has ceased to embody real Algerian 
values. In his understanding, the problems of illegal behavior, including the use and sale 
of drugs, could be avoided if the families (i.e.  mothers) “worked harder to teach their 
children the values and culture of Algeria.” He, in contrast, is creating just such an 
authentically Algerian space. He does not seek to assimilate fully into France but to 
practice, and to create a space for, proper Algerian values. Lakhdar never visits the 
banlieue (though some of his employees live there), and he comments on the banlieue 
from the perspective of an outsider, avoiding any association with delinquency and 
poverty. But he buffers himself equally from French-dominated spaces. Though he says 
of Paris, “this is my home, I can go anywhere,” his everyday life offers little cause to 
travel to more ‘French’ spaces like the 15th and 16th arrondissements in Paris (areas that 
other respondents avoid).  
While my working-class participants were more likely to live in the banlieue 
neighborhoods, some were living in central Paris, where they had found temporary 
housing with other Algerians. For example, Ali, a 29-year-old immigrant, was staying 
with a friend in the 13th arrondissement when I interviewed him. He was living illegally 
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in France, so state-subsidized official housing is impossible for him. Ali told me of the 
many times that he has been stopped by the police—in the metro stations and on the 
streets. For these reasons, Ali is very careful about where he is at what part of the day. 
His work as a manual laborer for a morning market takes him to some wealthy parts of 
Paris, but he explained that he does not go to these areas outside of the time that his 
market is scheduled there58. Ali also remarked that he socializes with only Algerian 
people because, “I can’t trust French people” not to turn him in for living in France 
illegally. Yet even Ali, despite his precarious position as an undocumented immigrant in 
dominant spaces, felt that he could at least make himself appear as if he belonged. He 
explained, “If you look like them, they think you belong here and will be nice to you.” He 
then flipped up his shirt collar up to illustrate his point (Ali wears knock-off designer 
clothing that he buys at the street markets). 
These examples of the production of Algerian spaces within Paris and the 
practices of coding and interpreting spaces and places exemplify the different kinds of 
performances, attitudes, and perceptions of (spatial) identity that can be found among 
study participants. These performances speak to a sense of belonging with an Algerian 
community but also ambivalence toward and a sense of distance from certain kinds of 
Algerians and Algerian spaces. This is a selective performance of Algerianness that takes 
place in certain kinds of spaces. As important as the spaces that Algerians frequent in 
Paris are those that they avoid, and many participants discussed these spaces of 
 
58 Different neighborhoods have a market on different days of the week. The schedule is 
the same every week.  
 
287 
avoidance. In the following section, I address performances of identity as study 
participants move between Algerian and French spaces.  
Spatial Dissonance: Spatiality and Identity Performance 
 Most of my research participants feel, to varying degrees, part of an Algerian 
‘community,’ but their identities and spatialities also produces dissonances insofar as 
they can experience archetypal immigrant spaces as outsiders. Their sense of otherness 
with respect to Algerian/immigrant space, or certain kinds of spaces, shows how broad 
identity labels and a sense of community do not map neatly on the urban landscape. The 
importance of spatial context to the performance of identity comes into full view when 
we listen to study participants’ descriptions of their movements across different spaces in 
Paris. An example is Sakina, the 31-year-old daughter of immigrants who lives in the 20th 
arrondissement, where immigrants are around one-fifth of the population and where 
around of the third of the population lives in social housing (OECD, 2018, p. 35). The 
20th arrondissement, though within the périphérique, is the last area of the city of Paris 
before the banlieues. It is known as a ‘bohemian’ area with a new wave of contemporary 
art galleries, and it is home to the famous Père Lachaise Cemetery, where celebrities like 
Oscar Wilde and Jim Morrison are buried. Sakina works in a French-dominated 
workplace, but after work, she surrounds herself with other Algerians as often as 
possible. 
Sakina seeks social interaction with Algerians, because, she says, “I like to hang 
out with other Algerians…we can REALLY be Algerian!” She works and volunteers at 
the Berber Cultural Center (located in the 10th arrondissement, near Lakhdar’s café), 
spending most of her evenings and weekends there at events or tutoring students of the 
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Berber language and culture. Sakina explains that part of the reason she prefers to be 
around other Algerians is because she has experienced racism from “white, French 
people” all her life. As I described in Chapter Five, she grew up in Lille (a city in 
Northern France), where she felt even more racism than in Paris. People would yell at 
her, "You’re not in your country!" If her father was late coming home at the end of the 
day, she assumed it was because the police stopped him. After the 2015 Bastille Day 
attack in Nice, France, Sakina was walking in the street when news came on a television 
in a storefront that the police killed an Algerian immigrant during the attack. A 
Frenchwoman yelled at Sakina as she walked by, “There is one less of you!” For these 
reasons, Sakina tends to frequent Algerian or ‘immigrant’ areas where she feels that she 
is less likely to experience racist treatment. 
As Sakina describes the spatiality of her life, she offers a depiction of her life 
growing up in Lille, which sounds much like the situation described above with Lina and 
Djamila: “Inside my house was Algeria, outside was France.” Sakina describes how her 
parents decorated her childhood home with artifacts from Algeria, specifically, things 
from Kabyle. Her mother cooked Kabylie food, dressed in Kabylie clothing, and spoke 
Berber to her father and the children. Sakina talked about the ways that she had to 
transform herself as she stepped from her home into the world of France. It was like a 
doorway between two worlds—home and France, where the physical surroundings, food, 
language, and social rules were different. 
This experience of moving between worlds, whether referring to movement to and 
from the banlieue, or movement between the spaces of home and public space, ‘inside 
Algeria, outside France,’ was repeated by other participants. Very similar to Sakina, 
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Amara speaks about the different worlds between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ her familial 
home. Amara is a 23-year-old daughter of immigrants, who lives with her parents in the 
Champigny-sur-Marne banlieue. Amara’s family’s home is also decorated with articles 
from Algeria, and the language practices between family members differs from one 
relationship to the next. Her mother speaks Berber at home, and her mother and father 
speak Berber to each other, but her father speaks French to the children. “We don’t know 
why,” she says. Outside the house, they only speak French.  
Though Amara expresses a confidence in her French identity, she lives, works, 
and goes to school outside the city of Paris, in immigrant-dominated spaces. She explains 
this dual life within the different spaces she inhabits: “At home, it is important to keep 
our traditions, you know, to go back to Algerian [customs] to eat our food or things like 
that or speak the language.” But she says that while her parents keep an atmosphere of 
Algeria within their home, they “are more open-minded” than other immigrant families 
she knows, and explains, “Outside of our home we do what we want, you know?” Here, 
Amara is referring to her parents allowing her the freedom to choose her friends, 
participate in ‘French’ activities, and date casually. Amara speaks about people in her 
neighborhood that make a concerted effort not to speak to French people, completely 
excluding them from their lives. “If those people don’t change their mind, they can’t be 
integrated in the country. It’s already difficult for us to be integrated. So, if you do things 
like that, you’re not integrating.” Still, though she does have some French friends, most 
of her friends are from African immigrant families that live in her neighborhood. In her 
view, though, this particular circle of friends shares her viewpoint; in other words, these 
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are not the kind of Algerians/immigrants whom she perceives as ‘not integrated’—that is, 
who alienate themselves from society and politicize their difference.   
Amara is in school, working to earn a specialization in social housing. As part of 
her studies, she interns at a social housing company, going through applications to 
determine whether or not applicants are eligible for public assistance. Amara says that 
she enjoyed her coursework in commercial real estate, but that she developed a special 
preference for the work in social housing because of her life experience in Champigny-
sur-Marne. She says, “I have to choose integrity over money.” Amara describes France’s 
a crisis in social housing, explaining that “there are 7000 housing applications for 2000 
housing options” in her office.  
Like Sakina, Amara maintains some critical distance from Algerianness, even 
though she lives, works, and identifies with/within Algerian spaces. Like Sakina, she 
works to ‘serve’ her community, seeing that community as being in need of ‘help,’ even 
if she personally has more mobility than others within that community. For Amara, social 
housing is a classic progressive intervention—it is about changing people’s social 
surroundings in order to improve who they are; to lift individuals out of lower social 
standards into the standards of the rest of society. In these ways, Sakina and Amara move 
in these different spheres and spaces where they are part of the community but also 
position themselves as external to it in such a way that their services can ‘help’ those in 
need.  
Another of my respondents, Hassan, has followed a trajectory like Amara and 
Sakina’s in his simultaneous commitment to, and externalization of, the 
Algerian/immigrant community. Hassan moves through immigrant spaces with a semi-
 
291 
outsider role; he teaches young students in the St. Denis neighborhood north of Paris. St. 
Denis has the highest population of immigrants of any neighborhood in the greater Paris 
area, with nearly half the population of immigrant origin; in 2008, 18.1 percent of the 
population of St. Denis identified as Maghrebian (Tribalat, 2010; Maxwell, 2008, p. 197). 
It is known for high rates of crime, poverty, and civil unrest. For these reasons, the area is 
appealing to Hassan as a prime location to ‘give back’ to the immigrant community. He 
likes his position as a teacher because he “can teach children like me, kids of 
immigrants.” Hassan explained that “there is a big problem [of racism] in France and 
people don’t speak about it…It’s a big problem of social ethnicity, especially in schools. I 
have two classes, no whites. But in schools on the other side of the Seine, all white 
people.” He explained the lives of his students, the spaces that they occupy, and ongoing 
conflicts with the police, in terms of “old tensions” that reach back to colonialism. But 
while Hassan identified with his students’ interactions with the police, he felt that he had, 
on a personal level, left these experiences behind him when he moved to Paris.  
He grew up in a community where many immigrants came to work in the mines 
(as his father did), and his childhood friends were from a variety of immigrant families—
not just Algerians, but also Polish, Spanish, and Turkish immigrants. He does not keep in 
touch with these childhood friends because, he explained, “I moved geographically, and I 
also moved socially.” Hassan is the only person from his hometown friend-group who 
went to university to get an education and who moved away. Now that he is an adult, his 
friends are not of Algerian origin: “My friends here in Paris are from classical French 
families, they are not immigrants.” Hassan does live in an immigrant neighborhood, in 
the 18th arrondissement in Paris. But as described above, this area does not carry the same 
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stigma as the banlieue, and the immigrant presence here is discursively slotted into a 
framework of multicultural hipness. In these ways, Hassan steps outside his ‘normal’ to 
teach the children of immigrants in the space of the banlieue. He is committed to his 
students in the banlieue, and he feels comfortable there, but this is not his space, and he 
approaches it partly as an outsider—as someone who wishes to ‘help’ a group of people 
who are more disadvantaged than he is.  
The examples of Sakina, Amara, and Hassan show the differing ways that some 
participants expressed social-spatial dissonance in their everyday lives, moving in and out 
of spaces and feeling varying degrees of belonging in them. In these cases, archetypal 
immigrant spaces can be spaces of otherness, even as they are familiar. A multitude of 
meanings, motivations, and intentions enter into these individuals’ engagements with 
certain places and the social groups and norms associated with those places.  
Conclusions 
 The narratives presented in this chapter show how participants experience and 
perform their identities through space. These examples reveal an interplay between 
conforming to, and even desiring, French environments and spaces and staying within 
‘immigrant spaces’ or ‘Algerian spaces.’ Each of the narratives presented in this chapter 
represent a different set of performances, attitudes, and perceptions. Together, they all 
speak to the complexity of integration. Much more than adaptation, integration is a 
political process that involves accommodation, resistance, subversion, avoidance, and the 
production of alternative modes of community and membership. In the course of 
everyday life, my respondents perform Frenchness and Algerianness in different ways 
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and to different degrees; they avoid certain elements of each category and try to produce 
and perform idealized versions of each.   
The different spatialities expressed by my study participants indicate the diverse 
ways that individuals conceive of membership in different communities and the 
relationship between communities and places. This account does not entirely negate the 
insights of spatial assimilation literature—that is, that many first-generation immigrants 
find themselves, both by choice and by necessity (and discrimination) in poor quality, 
crowded, segregated housing. But it tries to go beyond this by exploring how people 
understand different landscapes and how, within many constraints, they make choices 
about where home and community are located.  This is story not of a clear pathway to 
assimilation, but of ongoing ambivalence; of simultaneous insiderness and outsiderness. 
Patterns of mobility and immobility speak to different opportunities and advantages, but 
also to different strategies for asserting membership in different communities. In some 
cases, participants were intent on blending into the spaces and social realms of French 
mainstream society; others avoided French space and French people; some located 
authentic Algerian space in the banlieues; still others found a more desirable 
Algerianness in more affluent and more multicultural neighborhoods.   
I have given special attention in this chapter to the banlieue as the archetypal 
representation space of the Algerian community. These immigrant-dominated spaces are 
referred to by mainstream commentators as no-go areas that are full of crime and 
deviance. Many of my respondents, though, view and experience these places quite 
differently—as places of community, warmth, and hospitality. Still, many of the 
respondents at least partly accept mainstream narratives of the banlieue and feel a greater 
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degree of ambivalence toward these places. Some seek to avoid them all together; others 
experience them as somewhat foreign places that while not deviant, are also not 
desirable. Such individuals seek out places of belonging elsewhere, but only seldom find 
them in the ‘pure’ spaces of French national culture.   
This chapter recognizes that moving away from immigrant space can signify a 
moving away from one’s immigrant roots—from ‘tradition’ and family and the strictures 
of ‘culture.’  But it also opens the possibility of movement back and forth between places 
and communities and of the formulation of different ways of relating to community and 
place. It highlights the mixed feelings that people have about different places (and not 
just residential areas) and their desire to break out of existing categories and ways of 
seeing sameness and difference. A key point in all of this is that the outcome of such 
negotiations is not societal homogeneity but the reproduction and reworking of different 
identity categories. Integration does not erase differences so much as it multiplies them 
and changes their boundaries. Space is not external to these dynamics, but central to 
them. For people of immigrant backgrounds—who are defined as foreigners and who 
stand more or less apart from the dominant national polity—space is the medium in 





This dissertation has developed a case study of Algerian-origin communities in 
Paris to shed light on processes that underlie what we commonly think of as immigrant 
integration. Using critical race theory, postcolonial scholarship, and critical geographical 
theories of identity, place, and space, this dissertation has tried to reconceptualize 
integration as a political rather than ecological process. I have explored the experiences 
of Algerian immigrants and their children, examining how they enact identity and 
belonging in French society, and how they navigate systems of racialized exclusion. The 
narratives of my study respondents reveal the varying ways that formerly colonized 
people structure their interactions and engagements with people and institutions who 
once subjugated them and who largely continue to view them as outsiders and foreigners. 
These narratives show how, in such circumstances, former colonial subjects might 
exercise some agency in formulating their identities and their sense of community within 
the former metropole.  
The topic of immigration in France has been discussed in great detail in both 
French and English academic literature, and there is no shortage of scholarship on the 
exclusion of immigrants in postcolonial contexts. Yet despite a wealth of scholarship, 
there is a remarkable persistence of public and even academic discourse that takes the 
concept of integration for granted, and that, in the French context, treats postcolonial 
migrants as problems in need of a solution—a solution that usually involves a complete 
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shift in consciousness on the part of immigrants. For instance, in January of 2021, French 
President Emmanuel Macron received a report from his ‘Memories and Truth 
Commission’ on the Franco-Algerian relationship. The so-called ‘Algeria Report’ 
addressed the “reconciliation of memories” between Algeria and France (Carmella and 
Patrick, 2021; Ramdani, 2021, p. 1). Though Macron intended the report to be a step 
toward “heal[ing] the wounds between France and its former colony, including the after 
effects of atrocities committed during Algeria’s war of independence from 1954 to 
1962,” the report “once again hews to France’s long-standing position of not apologizing 
for its harsh colonial rule of Algeria from 1830, or the brutal tactics it used during the 
eight-year war of independence” (Carmella and Patrick, 2021, p. 1). Some are calling it a 
“toothless” report, one that “feigns an interest in justice while whitewashing colonial 
crimes” (Ramdani, 2021, p. 1). Rather than recommending an apology to Algeria, 
supporting reparations, or raising the possibility of prosecutions, the report settled on 
“tokenism and a desire to downplay unspeakable crimes that are in living memory” 
among French, Algerian, and Algerian immigrant populations (Ramdani, 2021, p. 1).  
Macron connects Islamist ‘separatism’ with the “traumas of France’s colonial 
past,” specifically the Algerian War, which he feels “feed[s] unspoken resentments” that 
allegedly radicalize youths and lead to acts of terrorism (Ramdani, 2021, p. 1). It is 
exactly this populist trope that this dissertation has interrogated—the trope that today’s 
Islamist terror in France is directly connected to “angry Algerians who remain as 
incorrigibly violent as they were when they resisted French rule.” This trope has many 
repercussions for the Algerian community in France that relate to their identity, their 
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spatial practices, and their sense of belonging, inclusion, and exclusion (Ramdani, 2021, 
p. 1). 
While this study is not large enough to be generalizable to the entire Algerian 
community in France, much less to all immigrants in all postcolonial contexts, its value is 
in its interrogation of the categories (like ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’) that have underpinned 
traditional theorizations of immigrants’ lives and experiences, and that also inform public 
discourse about immigration integration. This dissertation continues to push against 
ecological conceptions of integration.  It speaks instead to an understanding of 
‘integration’ as a complex set of spatialized engagements, negotiations, and 
accommodations between immigrants and non-immigrants (‘natives’ and ‘aliens’/ 
‘foreigners’ and ‘outsiders’). Importantly, there is no real endpoint to these interactions—
there is no future in which a national society achieves total sameness, harmony, and 
unity. National society rests on a constant interplay between difference and sameness: 
one group may eventually achieve sameness in the eyes of the dominant majority (and in 
its own eyes), but there will always be another that must be singled out, disciplined, 
excluded, or policed. Thus, the politics of ‘integration’ is a continual process marked by 
varying degrees of conflict, tension, harmony, inclusion, exclusion. This process plays 
out through space, and especially through the designation of spaces as public, private, 
desirable, or deviant.   
Theoretical Interventions  
In the past decade, much of Europe has witnessed a resurgence of discourse and 
policy relating to immigrant integration. Integration has also remained a major 
preoccupation in migration scholarship, especially in Europe. In both scholarly and 
 
298 
political circles, integration signifies an assumption that an immigrant group can and 
should become indistinguishable from the native-born population. In this sense, its use 
has been almost identical to that of ‘assimilation’ in the US context, embodying the same 
normative expectation that newcomers and foreigners can and will adapt and 
acculturate—that they will shed their markers of difference, ‘tradition,’ and ‘ethnicity.’ 
Conventional understandings of assimilation suggest that each subsequent generation 
will, or should, progressively experience a deeper sense of belonging to the place where 
their forebears have settled; simultaneously they will lose their feelings of belonging 
toward their place of origin. This conventional viewpoint has been complicated by 
notions of ‘segmented’ and ‘downward’ integration, as well as by the concept of 
transnationalism.  But even these refinements to integration continue to rely on a 
monolithic understanding of the ‘immigrant group,’ usually with reference to national 
origins. They have also tended to take the ‘host society’ as a given, rather than as a 
historical construct.  
To be sure, this study does not dismiss the importance of national categories. But 
it has sought to understand categories like nationhood to be actively produced and 
reproduced through discourses, institutions, and policies. ‘France’ is not a homogenous 
unit, but French national identity, and the narratives that underpin it, are very powerful, 
and French national norms and identities are imprinted on the spaces of everyday life in 
France. A dominant conception of Frenchness pervades citizenship and immigration law 
and enters into the social and spatial practices of inclusion and exclusion between native 
French and Algerian-origin groups. French state discourses and policies constantly 
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remind immigrants that they are a challenge or even threat to the secularist, republican, 
French-European polity.   
  Nor does this dissertation dismiss the possibility of becoming the same—of 
‘assimilating’ into a nationally-defined mainstream. Many European migrants in the 
United States and France in the 20th century came to see themselves, and to be seen by 
long-established citizens, as American or French. But this dissertation has tried to show 
that this process of sameness is neither inevitable nor natural; nor does it lead to the 
disappearance of ‘difference’ from society. It is a political negotiation that results in new 
social cleavages and redrawn boundaries of difference and sameness. In France anxieties 
over immigration and integration have reproduced narratives of a unified, universal 
Frenchness. These narratives suggest that foreigners are welcome to join the French 
polity by embracing certain ‘universal’ qualities and values. But the polity is not 
universally inclusive, and foreigners seldom have either the social or cultural capital to 
reconfigure and broaden the boundaries of membership.   
In this work, then, I have reimagined integration not as an ‘either-or’ state, or as 
an idealized end-state, or as a process of adaptation, but as a political process that 
involves conflict and negotiation. This politics works partly through citizenship and 
naturalization law. Subordinate groups encounter ongoing tensions between the 
universalisms that define ideal liberal democratic citizenship and the particularisms that 
ultimately delineate societal belonging. By focusing on citizenship, I have tried to move 
beyond the question of why some immigrants ‘integrate’ faster or more slowly than 
others, and to interrogate, in the first instance, what people mean when they talk about 
integration. How do they define the boundaries of culture, community, and polity, and 
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what are the beliefs and practices that sustain these entities? What are the rules of 
membership, and who creates and enforces these rules? What are the relations between 
marginalization and lack of recognition in France and integration? How are Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants represented by the French state and how in turn do they 
respond to these representations?  
This dissertation has specifically sought to bring postcolonial scholarship into the 
study of integration and to show how the politics of integration are ultimately rooted in 
colonial relations. Untangling colonial histories is key to understanding the immigration 
politics in France today, and in many other postcolonial contexts. France and Algeria are 
forever imbricated, and the colonial past continues to haunt the presence. Violent events 
in the French colonial past have led to feelings of distrust toward Islam in French society 
(Bancel et al., 2005). At the same time, memories of the Algerian War and of the highly 
discriminatory treatment of Algerians both before and after independence inform my 
respondents’ understandings of their position in France and of the possibility (or lack 
thereof) of equality (Barou, 2014).  
In its exploration of the postcolonial context of integration politics, this 
dissertation brought Islam into focus, not as an ‘immigrant tradition,’ but as a field of 
contestation and identity formation. Since colonial times, the French state has viewed 
Algerians and Muslims as irredeemably foreign ‘others.’ Islam has only become more 
prominent in recent years as a signifier of foreignness—as something that must be ejected 
from the ‘public’ spaces of the nation. My respondents are subordinated by this dynamic, 
but they are also participants in it. While they do not wield the same power to set and 
hold boundaries of membership, they do engage with the categories produced by this 
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dynamic; they experience and enact their membership and exclusion in the course of 
everyday life, in the spaces that they visit and avoid, and in the reinforcement of ideas of 
public and private space.   
Finally, this study has drawn on geographical perspectives on the ‘everyday’ and 
on immigrants’ relationships to residential space and the broader urban landscape. Here, 
the ‘everyday’ is understood to connect experiences and practices, including the ways 
people conduct themselves in their daily routines, how they think about the social world 
around them, how they interact with dominant members of the national ‘host’ society, 
and how they comport themselves in certain spaces. In understanding the more nuanced 
realities of Algerian use of space, this work expands upon and goes beyond more 
traditional concerns with residential clustering. I have brought into focus how my 
respondents ‘see’ different spaces and associate them with different groups—how they 
constantly assess whether and how they belong in these spaces. Subordinate groups have 
some agency in producing and navigating space: they can change their behaviors in 
certain spaces or avoid spaces all together. They can also attach new meanings to spaces 
and can challenge dominant meanings and identities. The production and navigation of 
urban, national, and transnational space, I have tried to show, is central to the ways my 
respondents assert their identity and their membership in different communities; it is part 
of the relational process of creating self and other.  
Empirical insights 
In terms of its more specific empirical contributions, this dissertation has explored 
the ways my respondents respond to and at times destabilize binary formulations of 
identity. My respondents constructed and expressed their identities in relation to binary 
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notions of ‘Frenchness’ and ‘Algerianness.’ These identity categories had a great deal of 
meaning for my respondents. Yet there is no static ‘Algerian culture,’ just as there is no 
static ‘French culture.’ Rather, these identities are constantly being reformulated in 
relation to each other in an ever-shifting (geo)political context. Indeed, my respondents 
draw on, and place themselves in relation to, multiple, intersecting, and sometimes 
contradictory identities as they navigate different settings and interact with different 
groups. The meanings they attached to certain identities reflected stereotypes and 
prejudices, impressions and experiences, desires, and aversions. These meanings vary 
somewhat between my respondents: not all approach their Algerianness or Frenchness in 
the same way. Not all feel fully included or excluded from particular categories. If the 
conventional theorization of integration assumes a coherent ‘host society,’ this study has 
shown the host-society to be imagined and performed, and thus constantly in the process 
of becoming. The same, of course, can be said of ‘immigrant ethnicity.’   
 This dissertation has highlighted religion and citizenship as two important social 
fields in which people of Algerian origin experience community and exclusion and 
participate in the politics of integration. People of Algerian origin live in a secularist 
political context that draws upon a colonialist imaginary of Islam as antithetical to French 
republicanism. In French political discourse, to be part of the French polity is to be an 
autonomous, rational individual who is capable of freeing oneself from social, religious, 
and cultural determinisms. Because of the salience of this discourse, people of Algerian 
origin, regardless of their actual religiosity, must engage with their Muslim identity and 
with the neat boundaries that laïcité attempts to draw around ‘public’ and ‘private’ space. 
My respondents purposefully and actively respond to the closures inherent in French 
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laïcité and citizenship by adhering to Western secularist understandings of religion or, in 
other cases, by challenging the exclusions of laïcité and asserting the compatibility of 
their religious identities with French republican values and principles. They also work to 
distinguish between belief and culture—to distinguish behaviors and actions that are 
religiously Muslim from those that are culturally Muslim (or culturally French). These 
practices partly map onto generation, with many of my first-generation respondents 
upholding a strict distinction between public and private realms, and second-generation 
respondents being less concerned with orthopraxy and thus less preoccupied with 
maintaining strict distinctions between public and private practices. This generational 
difference, though, was not entirely clear-cut among my study participants, and there was 
considerable variation among generational groups.  Indeed, my second-generation 
respondents fell into three broad groups: practicing Muslims who incorporated a strict 
orthopraxy into their everyday lives in France; those who defined themselves as 
‘culturally Muslim’ and who relied on secularist thinking to describe their Muslim 
identity as ‘cultural’ rather than ‘religious’; and those who rejected Islam entirely and did 
not adhere to any practices connected with religion. 
Laïcité was the basis of a broader discussion of citizenship as a key field of 
integration politics. In the modern nation-state, citizenship is sometimes conflated with 
identity, in that citizenship not only confers legal status but also actualizes membership in 
a national, and therefore cultural, community (Isin and Wood, 1999). Citizenship 
encompasses the legal status of citizens, the relationship between citizenship and the 
state, relationships and obligations among citizenship, and notions of belonging and 
loyalty (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2001). This broad understanding of citizenship is 
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needed to understand how people of Algerian origin understand, perform, and assert 
belonging in the ‘community’ and polity. My analysis showed that formal inclusion in an 
immigrant-receiving context does not guarantee a sense of belonging, likewise, formal 
exclusion does not always equate to a lack of belonging. My participants described a 
range of feelings toward France, including gratitude, entitlement, and resentment. 
Resentment, somewhat paradoxically, was often coupled with a desire for membership 
within the French polity. That is, some of my respondents felt resentment about French 
colonization of Algeria and the violent war of decolonization; these individuals asserted 
that France ‘owes’ them citizenship as payment for the suffering of their ancestors.  
My research showed that my respondents also disrupt the modern nation-state 
ideal of unitary ties to a singular national polity (Scribner, 2007). Instead, they conceive 
of themselves as members of both France and Algeria, selecting different elements of 
membership to each (Basch et al., 1994). Thus, for many of my respondents, lives are 
lived between two places. Many participants attempt to re-create Algerian culture in 
France, and they maintain social and political connections to Algeria. But, again, 
transnationalism is not a uniform condition. Some respondents, while recognizing their 
connection to Algeria, try to distance themselves from ‘homeland’ and to situate 
themselves more fully in French society—or particular elements of French society.  
This research also showed how study participants configure their identities 
through urban space. The findings in this study suggest that Algerian-origin individual’s 
performances of identity and their citizenship practices involve varying engagements 
with everyday spaces of the city. While my research shows a reproduction of ‘Algerian 
culture’ in the banlieues, this practice is complicated by individuals’ different mobility 
 
305 
through space. As such, divisions between ‘Algerian’ or ‘immigrant’ space and French 
space are very real but are not absolute or all-encompassing: people can and do move 
between them. My participants’ relationships to different spaces varied considerably—
where some described the banlieue as an authentic cultural space, others sought out more 
‘diverse’ spaces away from what they viewed as the degraded and culturally stultifying 
immigrant neighborhoods on the periphery of Paris. Still others engaged partially with 
the banlieue, living their daily lives across and through different kinds of spaces, and 
adjusting their behavior accordingly; for some, the banlieue presented itself as an 
‘authentic’ space but ultimately as foreign and unfamiliar.   
Further, dominant conceptions of French national identity and values are encoded 
in ‘public spaces’—both spaces governed directly by the French state including schools 
(the main site of conflict over headscarves), as well as public parks and pools, 
government buildings, and the like. French identity is also encoded, less formally, in the 
commercial spaces of inner Paris—in the streets, cafés, and workplaces. These spaces are 
presumably open to all, yet they are not wholly open to everyone or to every identity. 
Algerians are conscious of and react to the ways that they are perceived and framed vis-à-
vis the dominant French society. My study respondents use, avoid, or modify their 
behavior in these spaces, whether to assert membership in French society, to rework what 
counts as Frenchness, or to refuse conformity to either broad identity categories like 
Algerian or French. The engagement with these spaces, and how they are interpreted and 
used, varies from one individual to another, though there are some loose patterns that 
emerge around generation and educational levels. 
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In sum, the lives and experiences of immigrants and their descendants can be 
understood whereby people engage with different social categories and social spaces in 
the course of everyday life. My study participants’ social-spatial behaviors represent a 
multitude of meanings, motivations, intentions, and values that play into their 
understandings of how they can and should incorporate themselves into some 
communities while distancing themselves from others. Integration is not a clearly 
definable process but a politics of negotiating identities, members, and spaces. This 
politics is shaped by present-day experiences and informed by the colonial past; it relies 
upon stark binaries of identity and difference, but also disrupts these. While recognizing 
the many constraints that immigrants and their children face in national contexts that 
view them as aliens, it has also emphasized that immigrants and their children are active 
participants in the politics of integration.  
Moving forward 
In France, the study of so-called ‘identity politics’ has become the subject of 
controversy. A 2021 book published by esteemed French scholars Stéphane Beaud and 
Gérard Noiriel criticizes scholarly examination of ethnic and racial questions, gender and 
sexuality subjectivities, postcolonial inquiry, intersectionality, and a newly understood 
approach of ‘Islamo-leftism59’ as adversary to the French state. Explicitly targeted in this 
critique of critical race and postcolonial examination are American academics, blamed 
for being obsessed with race and the postcolonial condition. Beaud and Noiriel feel 
obliged to defend “not thought in general, but specifically [French] national thought” as it 
 
59 Islamo-leftism is the term applied to academic research on race, gender and social class, 
and religion. It implies a “broader culture war that is sweeping both the political and 
academic establishment in France” (Fassin, 2021a, p. 1). 
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pertains to these conditions (Fassin, 2021b, p. 1). Clearly, the burgeoning interest “among 
younger scholars” in the ideas and theories that analyze religious prejudice, racial 
discrimination, and social injustice “have disturbed a comfortable belief in the 
supposedly universalist values of the French republic” (Fassin, 2021a, p. 1).  
Like Fassin (2021), I take issue with Beaud and Noiriel’s characterization of 
scholarship on immigrants in France and their faith in French universalism.  I have shown 
in this dissertation that the experiences and perspectives of Algerian immigrants cannot 
be divorced from broader historical and geographical contexts; their ‘integration’ does 
not start with a definitive break with one’s homeland; rather, it flows through deep 
historical relationships between origin and destination. These postcolonial, transnational 
relationships animate relationships of inclusion and exclusion that we see today.  
With this said, I want to reiterate that the ‘colonial’ is not a static feature of 
people’s lives or identities, and it is important to recognize how the meaning of 
postcolonial changes over time and, as I have indicated in this dissertation, how it varies 
between individuals. Postcolonialism as a theoretical approach questions binaries such as 
self/other, metropole/colony, center/periphery, colonized/colonizer, etc. (McClintock, 
1992). But it has also, at times, reinforced these same binaries. It also assumes a temporal 
progression from ‘pre-colonial’ to ‘colonial’ and ‘post-colonial’ in such a way that 
assigns levels of development and experience singularly to each period of time 
(McClintock, 1992). My participants’ narratives suggest, in contrast, that the postcolonial 
coexists with a multiplicity of experiences that have been shaped in different spatial and 
temporal contexts. Additionally, a singular category of ‘postcolonial’ cannot be used in a 
universal sense where all individuals within a postcolonial population share identical 
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identity attributes. In much the same way that national categories are overgeneralized, 
experiences of postcoloniality are regularly overgeneralized. Yet not all experiences of 
colonialism and postcolonialism are the same, and the distinct historical drama between 
France and Algeria, and the modern-day problems this relationship entails, cannot be 
used as a template to understand all postcolonial relationships, outcomes, and 
interpretations. Though the Franco-Algerian connection is manifestly shown to influence 
identity among my participants, it would be misleading to claim that individuals are only 
postcolonial—that their existence can only be understood in relation to their subjugation 
by a colonial power (cf. Spivak, 1999).  
The challenge, then, is to bring an appreciation for colonial relationships into the 
study of integration politics while not viewing the present day as an inevitable outcome 
of, or replica of, past events. Colonialism is a source of memories, tensions, and 
resentments; it is a process that has brought people together in relations of subordination 
and domination; it continues to shape relationships and identities. Yet the meaning of 
colonialism has also shifted over time, as its legacies have been woven into contemporary 
events and political-economic processes.  
My research also advances the concept of intersectionality and points to ways that 
we can refine it.  My findings affirm that we need to consider gender, racial, and class 
status in understanding the experiences of immigrants (and all people).  However, these 
are not neat categories, and my findings do not show clearly identifiable clusters of 
respondents based on ascribed categories. Nor do my findings indicate that a specific 
combination of subordinate social locations produces specific outcomes for Algerian 
immigrants and their descendants. While Algerian-origin individuals do hold multiple 
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subordinate identities, how these categories operate together varies (in some cases, 
dramatically) from one participant to another. My data did not reveal certain 
combinations of identities that indicated certain outcomes; clearly, then, intersectionality 
does not function as an additive model of identity ‘variables.’ This is not to say that we 
cannot find patterns in data, but that patterns are not always absolute or definitive. This is 
because the identity categories themselves are not so much set categories as sets of 
relationships that shape, and are shaped by, interactions between real people in real 
places. Intersectionality must be understood to encompass a degree of indeterminacy in 
terms of people’s life experiences.  
Finally, this dissertation points toward the need to incorporate space more fully 
into the study of immigration and integration. A great deal of geographical work has 
addressed residential clustering, which is indeed can be important indicator of social and 
economic exclusion. But there is much more to immigrant geographies than residential 
patterns (and residential patterns themselves can have multiple meanings). Building on 
the work of geographers such as Kay Anderson, Deborah Phillips, Lise Nelson, and 
Nancy Hiemstra, this dissertation proposes thinking in more complicated ways about how 
people from immigrant backgrounds relate to complex, fragmented urban space. This 
approach raises questions for future research about how people interpret the social coding 
of spaces, how they move in and out these spaces, and how they adjust their behavior as 
they do so. It draws our attention to the ways people can feel excluded from places but 
also how they can potentially navigate these spaces by adjusting behaviors. And it also 
makes us consider how people from immigrant backgrounds can experience archetypal 
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immigrant spaces as foreign places, or as culturally oppressive places that they would 
rather escape.  
At a time when immigrants in many contexts are being blamed for many societal 
problems, it is crucial that we recognize the power of social categories while also treating 
immigrants and their descendants as individuals who hold multiple, and sometimes 
conflictual, identities, desires, memories, and experiences. We need to recognize that 
people are situated in multiple, translocal contexts, and that they often feel a mix of 
belonging to and exclusion from all of these contexts. Immigrants do share many 
experiences, but they are not a monolithic bloc; they, and the societies of which they are 
part, are in a constant process of becoming, though not toward any particular endpoint.   
This framework I have presented in this dissertation is intended not to find general 
experiences and trajectories, but to capture a diversity of experiences, to complicate the 
idea of clear pathways of sameness, and to show how people are constantly living and 
producing difference and sameness vis-à-vis multiple categories.  
While this dissertation has highlighted the uniqueness of the French-Algerian 
situation, the conceptual framework it offers is applicable to other contexts that conceive 
of themselves as facing a ‘problem’ of assimilation of immigrant populations. It is 
especially relevant to contexts where Islam has become a “crucial litmus test to determine 
whether [immigrants can] integrate and function effectively in the liberal-democratic” 
West (Chin, 2010, p. 558). Such has been the case throughout Europe, including in 
Germany, where the recent arrival of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees has re-
ignited debates about the (in)compatibility between Muslims and (non-Muslim) German 
society. Suspicions of Islam’s incompatibility with Western life have also punctuated 
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immigration debates in settler-colonial societies like the U.S., Canada, and Australia. The 
presence of the postcolonial subject in the West effectively questions the authority and 
authenticity of founding Western narratives of modernity, democracy and secularism. In 
what ways, we must ask, do religion, secularism, race, modernity, nationhood, and 
citizenship become connected to each other in different contexts? How are these 
connections informed by historical and contemporary dynamics and discourses? Where 
do we see continuities and changes across temporal and geographical contexts? And how 
are these politics grounded in actual space—in cities, neighborhoods, parks, monuments, 
schools, and workplaces? How do people experience them as material realities in their 
day-to-day lives? Such questions, I believe, may at last move us beyond the assumptions 
of conventional integration models, which maintain a tight grip both on immigration 
scholarship and on public discourse. They will provide some entry point into difficult 
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-Place of birth: 
-Ethnic / national heritage: 
-Years in France: 
-Continuous residence in France?: 
-Years in other residences: 
-Generation in France 
-Generation outside of Algeria/North Africa: 
-Number living in the household: 
-Languages spoken at home (specify which member of the household): 
-Language at work: 
-Citizenship(s): 





-Were you referred to your current job by another Algerian/North African?: 
-Neighborhood and postal code of residence in Paris: 
-Were you assisted in finding your housing by another Algerian/North African?: 
 
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
1. Could you tell me about the history of your family? How did you/your 
parents/grandparents come to live in France? Did other Algerian/North African/Arab 
immigrants others help you/your family? 
2. Do your friends tend to be other Algerians/North Africans? Other immigrants? Do you 
have close links with members of your extended family? Have you asked your friends 
and/or family for help finding a job? Finding housing? For help in other ways (such as 
borrowing money)? What is the main value of having close family and friends that you 
can rely on here in France (or in Algeria/North Africa)? 
 
3. Are there times when you do NOT want to rely on your network with other 
Algerians/North Africans/Berbers/Arabs/etc? Under what circumstances do you engage 
with French institutions for assistance (such as social services)? 
 
4. Why do you live in the particular area that you live? How would you describe your 
neighborhood (i.e. 'immigrant neighborhood', Algerian/Arab neighborhood, middle-class, 
etc.)? Does it feel like a 'community', or just a place to live?  Do you have everything 
they need there? Do you feel that you have good access to other places in or near the 
city? How often do you go to other parts of the city, and how do you feel when you are in 
these other places? Are your social networks located in this neighborhood or do they 
extend beyond it? 
 
5. Do you socialize with non-Algerians/North Africans? How? In what contexts? Do you 
have separate groups of friends or a group of friends with whom you interact? How did 
you develop the group of friends you have? 
 
6. How do you label yourself (in terms of religious, ethnic, or nationality- for example, 
“Algerian” “Berber” “Arab”)? Do you label yourself the same way in all situations? 
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7. Are you a French citizen? Why or why not? If you are a citizen, did you find easy or 
difficult to become a citizen? If not, would you become? 
 
8. How would you characterize “French society”? What are the dilemmas/opportunities 
facing Algerians/Muslims/immigrants (etc.) in France? How do you think the non-
Algerian/North African population in Paris perceives Algerians/North Africans and why? 
What is it like dealing with teachers, employers, officials, etc. who are not from an 
immigrant background? Are there times when you are made to feel that you are not 
French? 
 
9. What are your feelings in the current environment of social unrest with regards to the 
terrorism attacks in France over the last 2 years? How do you feel about the media’s 
portrayal of the situations? How does this affect the social status of Algerians/North 
Africans/Arabs living in France? 
 
10. What is necessary for social relationships in France to become better? What can be 
done to make social situations better for all immigrants living in France? (Please offer 
your total opinion here, socially, politically, religiously, culturally, etc.) 
 
11. Do you follow politics in France? What are your feelings about the current events in 
France, with the government involved? What are your feelings about the next presidential 




[If applicable: 12. Walking Interview/Activity: 13. Other information:] 
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